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There is no moral exemption for any man or body of men
that breaks contracts. Nor is there any hope of public or
private respect for a contract breaker. A contract breaker
is an utter misfit as a citizen or a business man.
—Franklin MacVeagh, former president
of the Commercial Club of Chicago
and U.S. Secretary of Treasury2

OVERVIEW
Illinois’s five public pension systems are in awful shape.
2. Franklin MacVeagh, Labor Unions, Address before the Cincinnati
Commercial Club (May 26, 1905), in 8 PUB. POL’Y 29, 30 (July–Dec. 1905)
[hereinafter
Address
of
Franklin
MacVeagh],
available
at
http://books.google.com/books?id=V9IpAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA25&lpg=PA25&dq=
franklin+macveagh+labor+unions&source=bl&ots=y4X4wNxZt&sig=ZUGhs7_
05xd4otztKS143Y_CwBA&hl=en&ei=tYITTYSEC4W0lQearemDDg&sa=X&oi
=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CCcQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=fran
klin%20macveagh%20labor%20unions&f=false (last visited Dec. 23, 2010).
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Combined, the five retirement funds serving teachers, state
employees, university employees, judges, and legislators have for
fiscal year 2014 unfunded liabilities totaling $104.6 billion, and an
overall funding percentage of 42.9%.3 The Teachers Retirement
System alone has $58 billion in unfunded liabilities and is 44.2%
funded.4 Indeed, Illinois has the largest unfunded pension
obligations of any state in the nation.5 In addition, these
obligations will consume a larger and larger share of the State’s
annual revenues and force the State to cut State services, raise
taxes, or both.6
These unfunded liabilities, though, are not the fault of public
employees. Public employees have historically paid their fair share
of the normal cost of benefits through payroll deductions.7 Rather,
the liabilities principally stem from the State’s decades-long
failure to make its required contributions to the five pension
systems.8
In particular, between fiscal years 1985 and 2012 unfunded
pension liabilities grew by over $87 billion.9 Over 47% of that
3. COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT FORECASTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY,
SPECIAL
PENSION
BRIEFING
2
(Nov.
2014),
available
at
http://cgfa.ilga.gov/Upload/1114%20SPECIAL%20PENSION%20BRIEFING.p
df.
4. Id.
5. THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, THE TRILLION DOLLAR GAP:
UNDERFUNDED STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS AND THE ROAD TO REFORM 17
(Feb.
2010),
available
at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/reports/2010/02/10/the-trillion-dollar-gap.
6. ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, REPORT OF THE PENSION MODERNIZATION
TASK FORCE 48, 62 (revised Mar. 30, 2010) [hereinafter PENSION TASK FORCE
REPORT]. In early January 2011, the General Assembly raised the income tax
rate as well as imposed spending caps. Taxpayer Accountability and Budget
Stabilization Act, Public Act 96-1496.
7. See e.g., Correspondence from Illinois State Board of Investment (Feb.
11, 2011) (on file with author) (detailing that over the last 40 years members
of the State University Retirement System have paid on average 43.9% of the
normal cost of benefits via employee contributions, whereas the State meets
its share of normal cost through employer contributions, which have not
historically been paid in full).
8. PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 48, 68, 119, 121. In
addition, employee benefit increases that were added since FY1987 only
comprise $7.8 billion of the State’s unfunded liabilities. Id. at 120. See Eric M.
Madiar, Illinois Public Pension Reform: What’s Past Is Prologue, in 31
ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT, Summer 2014, at 5–17
nn.15–140 and accompanying text [hereinafter Madiar Prologue Article] (for a
detailed discussion of the State’s history in failing to properly fund the State’s
public
pension
systems),
available
at
http://www.illinoissenatedemocrats.com/images/PDFS/2014/il_public_pension_
reform.pdf.
9. COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT FORECASTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY,
Briefing on Causes of State Pension Unfunded Liability, Presented to First
Conference Committee on Senate Bill 1, at 5 (June 27, 2013),
http://cgfa.ilga.gov/Upload/Presentation%206-27-13.pdf. The remaining 17.5%
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growth (or $41.2 billion) came from the State not paying what it
should have to the pension systems. Stock market losses, the next
single largest cause, accounts for 16.5% (or $14.4 billion) of that
growth. Changes in actuarial assumptions, such as people living
longer than expected, caused 10.1% (or $8.8 billion) of that growth.
Benefit increases for public employees only accounts for 9.3% (or
$8.1 billion) of the growth. And employee salary increases were
less than expected over that period and actually helped reduce
those unfunded liabilities by .6% (or $535 million).
State contributions were not forthcoming because the State’s
fiscal system failed to generate sufficient revenue to both maintain
public services, such as education, healthcare, and public safety,
as well as cover the State’s actuarially required contributions to
the systems.10 As a result, the legislature and various governors
chose for decades to use the pension system as a credit card to
fund public services and stave off the need for tax increases or
service cuts.11
Nonetheless, the staggering size of these liabilities produced
an immediate response from the Illinois General Assembly in
2010. The legislature passed Senate Bill 1946, which cut the
pension benefits provided to future public employees and officials
hired after January 1, 2011.12 While the legislation slowed the
growth of the State’s future liabilities, the legislation did not
reduce the State’s existing liabilities.
Some commentators have urged the legislature to go even

(or $15.2 billion) in growth in unfunded liabilities is attributable to
“miscellaneous factors,” such as: (a) Retroactive benefit payments for
individuals who delayed applying for retirement, (b) Fewer terminations of
vested employees than expected, (c) Differences between actual cost of benefits
earned and projected costs; (d) Retirements with reciprocal service credits; (e)
Disablements and service retirements other than expected; (f) Delayed
reporting of retirements (effects on pension benefit obligations); and (g)
Mortality other than expected. Id. See also Doug Finke, State of Illinois’
Record of Shorting Pensions Goes Back Decades, ST. J-REG., Feb. 9, 2013,
http://www.sj-r.com/top-stories/x846054923/State-of-Illinois-record-of-shortingpensions-goes-back-decades (providing a similar summary of the growth of
unfunded liabilities between FY1985 and FY2012).
10. PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 48. The Commission on
Government Forecasting and Accountability stated in its testimony before the
First Conference Committee on Senate Bill 1 on June 27, 2013 that the
Pension Task Force Report’s assessment remained correct that state pension
contributions were not forthcoming because the state’s fiscal system failed to
generate sufficient revenue and that the pension system was used as a credit
card to fund public services and stave off the need for tax increases or service
cuts. 98th Ill. Gen. Assem., Proceedings of the First Conference Committee on
Senate Bill 1, Presentation of the Commission on Government Forecasting and
Accountability, at 56:44-1:14:01 (June 27, 2013) (on file with author).
11. Id.; Madiar Prologue Article, supra note 8.
12. Public Act 96-0889 (later codified in 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-160).
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further,13 sparking a legal debate at the State Capitol in
Springfield over whether the General Assembly could cut the
pension benefits promised to current employees (and retirees)
without violating the 1970 Illinois Constitution’s Pension Clause.
The Clause, however, plainly provides that: “Membership in any
pension or retirement system of the State, any unit of local
government or school district, or any agency or instrumentality
thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the
benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.”14
This Article reviews not only the Pension Clause’s language
and origins, but also the constitutional convention debates
discussing it, and relevant court decisions construing the
provision. The Article also evaluates the arguments made by legal
commentators on behalf of particular stakeholders about whether
the Clause allows the legislature to cut the pension benefits of
current public employees and retirees as well as other related
issues. The Article concludes that the General Assembly cannot
unilaterally cut the pension benefits of current employees or
retirees as a means to reduce the State’s existing pension
liabilities based on the Clause’s plain language, the drafters’
original intent, voters’ understanding of the provision, and court
decisions construing the Clause. Simply put, there is no police or
reserved powers exception to the Clause’s protection.
As detailed below, the Clause not only makes a public
employee’s participation in a pension system an enforceable
contractual relationship at the time an employee joins a pension
system, but also insulates from diminishment or impairment by
the General Assembly all “benefits” found in the Pension Code or
in other state statutes that are conditioned on a person’s
membership in one of the State’s various public pension systems,
including subsidized health care. The Clause’s protection also
extends to employee contribution rates and any benefit increases
added during an employee’s term of service. In addition, the
drafters of the Clause intended (as confirmed by the Illinois
Supreme Court) to grant pension recipients the ability to obtain
relief in State court to ensure that they receive their pension
payments if a pension system defaults or is on the verge of default.
Moreover, any solution seeking to shrink the State’s existing
pension liabilities must derive from either paying the outstanding
liabilities or reducing benefits to current employees via legitimate
contract principles. The proposals offered by one legal
commentator on behalf of Illinois’s business community, as
detailed below, cannot be squared with the boundaries imposed by
the Pension Clause. In sum, welching is not a legal option

13. See infra notes 342–44, 353–56, 529 and accompanying text.
14. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIII, § 5 (emphasis added).
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available to the State. An analysis of the Pension Clause, as with
any constitutional provision, begins with its language.

I. THE PENSION CLAUSE’S LANGUAGE AND ORIGINS
A. The Clause’s Plain Language
1. Guiding Rules of Interpretation and the Clause’s Text
The meaning of the Pension Clause, as with any
constitutional provision, “depends on the common understanding
of the citizens who, by ratifying the constitution, gave it life,” as
well as the delegates who drafted and adopted it at the
convention.15 This understanding is best determined by referring
to the common meaning of the words used in the provision.16 If
that language is unambiguous, it must be given effect without
reliance on other aids of construction.17 As the Illinois Supreme
Court put it long ago, “Constitutions are of a practical nature,
founded on the common business of life, designed for common use,
and fitted for common understandings. The people make them, the
people adopt them, and the people must be supposed to read them
with the help of common sense.”18 With this in mind, we begin our
review with the Pension Clause’s language.
The Pension Clause provides: “Membership in any pension or
retirement system of the State, any unit of local government or
school district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall be
an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall
not be diminished or impaired.”19 Even without resorting to a
dictionary or grammar book, the plain language of this sentence
contains two interconnected parts establishing two propositions.
First, a public employee’s membership in a State or local pension
system is an enforceable contractual relationship. Second, the
“benefits of” membership that a public employee enjoys cannot be
diminished or impaired.

15. Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1184 (Ill. 1996).
Accord Baker v. Miller, 636 N.E.2d 551, 554–55 (Ill. 1994) (“As with statutory
construction, this court must construe a constitutional provision so as to
effectuate the intent of the drafters. The best indication of the intent of the
drafters of a constitutional provision is the language which they voted to
adopt.”).
16. Id.
17. Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N.E.2d 1034, 1041 (Ill. 1999).
18. People ex rel. Decatur & State Line Ry. Co. v. McRoberts, 62 Ill. 38, 40–
41, 1871 WL 8316 *1 (1871) (quoting Justice Story for this proposition).
19. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIII, § 5.
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2. Membership in a Pension System Is a Contractual and
Enforceable Right
As to the first proposition, while the Pension Clause does not
specify when an employee obtains contractual rights, common
sense and logic nonetheless dictate that an employee receives
these rights upon becoming a member of a pension system. Under
the Illinois Pension Code, public employees are eligible for
membership in different systems after different periods of service.
Judges, for example, are immediately enrolled into the Judges
Retirement System (JRS) upon assuming office.20
In addition, unless the terms of membership specify
otherwise, common sense and logic further dictate that a public
employee has a legal interest in his or her membership rights even
if certain conditions must be met before reaping the full rewards of
membership.21 In other words, there is nothing that immediately
suggests that a member of a pension system only has a legal
interest in rights that he or she accrues or earns on a per day
basis.
3. Pension Benefit Rights May Not Be Diminished or
Impaired by the Legislature
As to the second proposition, while the Pension Clause lacks
detail as to what “benefits” of membership may not be “diminished
or impaired,” the common meaning for these terms provides
significant clarity as to the Clause’s protective scope. Webster’s
New World Dictionary defines the word “benefit” as “anything
contributing to an improvement in condition; advantage; help”
and, in another, more specific definition as “payments made by an
insurance company, public agency, welfare society etc. as during
sickness, retirement, unemployment, etc. or death.”22 Accordingly,
the word “benefit” refers not only to the specific annuity payments
a public employee or retiree is eligible to receive, but also other
entitlements of membership that advantage the public employee
or retiree.
The word “impair” has a common meaning of “to make worse,
less, weaker, etc. damage; reduce.”23 And, the word “diminish”

20. 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-120 (2008) (judges).
21. See e.g., Forester Wheeler Energy Corp. v. LSP Equip., LLC, 805
N.E.2d 668, 694 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (“It is well settled that a party’s rights
under a contract become ‘vested’ for the purposes of the retroactive application
of a statute when the contract is entered into rather than when the rights
thereunder are asserted.”).
22. WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, 131 (2d Coll. Ed. 1978).
23. Id. at 703.
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means “to make smaller; lessened; reduced.”24 Taken together, the
Pension Clause’s own language bars governmental action to
reduce or eliminate a public employee’s or retiree’s pension
payments and other entitlements available to the employee or
retiree under the terms of membership when the person became a
pension system member. At the same time, the plain language also
indicates that an employee’s pension payments and other
membership entitlements are “contractual” in nature and may be
presumably altered through mutual assent via contract principles.
4. The Pension Clause’s Prohibition against the
Diminishment or Impairment of Pension Benefits
Is Cast in Absolute Terms
These propositions, in turn, indicate that the Clause on its
face does not permit a unilateral reduction or elimination of the
pension benefits of a current member of a pension system due to
exigent circumstances, such as a fiscal emergency.25 The Clause,
after all, lacks any exceptions to its prohibitory language against
the diminishment or impairment of pension benefits. As a
consequence, the Clause’s text at least provides no support for the
claim that the legislature could use the pension system’s present
unfunded liabilities as a reason for cutting the benefits of current
employees or retirees participating in the system.
While the Clause’s plain language undoubtedly supports the
above conclusion, Illinois courts have long instructed that
constitutional interpretation involves the object and purpose of the
provision at issue.26 As a result, this analysis also considers the

24. Id. at 396.
25. People ex rel. Lyle v. City of Chi., 195 N.E. 451, 453 (Ill. 1935) (holding
that the exigency of the Great Depression was an insufficient basis to reduce
judicial salaries in violation of the Illinois Constitution, and explaining
“[l]egitimate methods of relieving the situation are commendable, and where
the law, either by express provision or by necessary implication, provides for
an emergency departure from its terms, it is permissible to accommodate the
law to such emergencies, but in order to justify such a departure the
justification must be found within the law. It does not arise from the
emergency, but, as existing under the law, is applied when the emergency
happens.”); People ex rel. Northrup v. City Council of Chi., 31 N.E.2d 337, 339
(Ill. App. Ct. 1941) (same conclusion with respect to aldermanic salaries and
stating “an emergency cannot be created by the facts and used as a means of
construction of a constitutional provision which has made no reference to any
emergency by its terms.”). Accord Jorgenson v. Blagojevich, 811 N.E.2d 652,
662–63 (Ill. 2004) (explaining that in Lyle, the Supreme Court noted that “any
departure from the law is impermissible unless justification for that departure
is found within the law itself. Exigent circumstances are not enough. Neither
the legislature nor any executive or judicial officer may disregard the
provisions of the Constitution even in case of a great emergency.”).
26. Wolfson v. Avery, 126 N.E.2d 701, 707 (Ill. 1955).
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Clause’s origins and background to ascertain its object and
purpose.
This inquiry seeks to determine the scope and nature of the
“contractual relationship” established by the Clause as well as the
“benefits” that are subject to its protection. Illinois court decisions
instruct that after consulting a provision’s language, it is
appropriate to consider the historical background underlying its
inclusion in the constitution, the debates of the members who
drafted the provision at the convention, as well as the
explanations of the provision published at the time.27 Illinois
courts also instruct that it is improper to construe a constitutional
provision in a manner that seeks to avoid the intention of the
framers, even to relieve a great hardship or inconvenience.28
Finally, a constitutional guaranty, such as the Pension Clause, is
must be liberally construed.29 With these rules in mind, we review
the Pension Clause’s historical origins as well as the original
intent and purpose of the provision according to its framers and
the voters who gave it life.

B. Public Pension Law in Illinois Prior to the 1970
Constitution
1.

The Purpose of a Pension

Two years before the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention
(“Convention”), Rubin Cohn, an esteemed law professor at the
University of Illinois, legal advisor to the Convention, and long
time member of the Illinois Public Employees Pension Laws

In seeking such intention courts are to consider the language used, the
object to be attained, or the evil to be remedied. This may involve more
than the literal meaning of words. That which is within the intention of
the statute, though no within the letter, and, though, within the letter,
it is nevertheless not within the statute if not likewise within the spirit.
The same general principles to be applied in construing statutes apply
in the construction of the constitution.
Id. (emphasis added).
27. Id. Accord People ex rel. Keenan v. McGuane, 150 N.E.2d 168, 172 (Ill.
1958) (considering the historical background leading to the provision’s
inclusion in the constitution). McNamee v. State, 672 N.E.2d 1159, 1165 (Ill.
1996) (consulting the sponsors’ floor debate statements to determine the scope
of the Pension Clause); Client Follow-Up Co. v. Hynes, 390 N.E.2d 847, 853
(Ill. 1979) (explaining courts often look to official information disseminated to
voters and newspaper accounts of wide circulation about the provision to
discern the voter’s understanding of the provision’s meaning).
28. Chance v. County of Marion, 64 Ill. 66, 68, 1872 WL 8262 at *1 (Ill.
1872); Wolfson, 126 N.E.2d at 710 (“Courts should not apply so strict a
construction as to exclude its real object and intent.”).
29. Wolfson, 126 N.E.2d at 710.
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Commission (“Pension Laws Commission”), explained the multiple
purposes for pension and retirement plans.30 Retirement plans, he
explained, offer employees a sufficient level of income upon
retirement so they can live in reasonable security.31
These plans also allow employers to attract better employees,
reduce turnover, facilitate orderly retirement of older employees,
and make it possible to retain valuable employees who might
otherwise seek more gainful employment.32 In addition, retirement
plans are especially important for public employers because the
“government cannot compete with private industry salary levels,
and must rely heavily upon the equalizing factor of an attractive
and liberal retirement plan.”33
2. The Legal Protection Provided to Mandatory and
Optional Public Pension Plans Prior to the 1970 Illinois
Constitution
Before the adoption of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, Illinois
courts afforded different legal protection to public pension benefits
depending on whether a person participated in a mandatory or
optional retirement plan.34 If an employee participated in an
optional plan, then the pension was considered enforceable under
contract principles, and was deemed to provide the employee with
“vested rights.”35 The plan was “optional” because the person could
elect to participate in the retirement plan by making contributions
to the plan via payroll deductions.36 An employee in an optional
plan received constitutional protection under the 1870
Constitution’s Contracts Clause, which, like the U.S. Constitution,
barred the State from impairing contracts.37
Importantly, an employee in an optional plan was entitled to
30. Rubin G. Cohn, Public Employee Retirement Plans—The Nature of
Employees’ Rights, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 32, 40 (1968) [hereinafter Cohn].
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. People ex rel. Sklodowski v. State (Sklodowski I), 695 N.E.2d 374, 377
(Ill. 1998). See generally, Comment, Public Employee Pension Rights and the
1970 Illinois Constitution: Does Article XIII, Section 5 Guarantee Increased
Protection?, 9 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 440, 441, 445–49, 458–59 (1976)
[hereinafter Comment] and Cohn, supra note 30, at 51–58 (providing a
detailed background discussion of the mandatory/optional pension distinction).
See also REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS
COMMISSION 102–09 (1963) [hereinafter 1963 PENSION LAWS REPORT]
(summarizing the prevailing view regarding the type of legal protection for
mandatory and optional pension plans).
35. Sklodowski I, 695 N.E.2d at 377 (citing Bardens v. Bd. of Trs., 174
N.E.2d 168, 170 (Ill. 1961)).
36. Id.
37. Bardens, 174 N.E.2d at 172.
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a pension based on the pension statute in effect when the
employee entered the retirement system, not the statute that
existed when the employee retired.38 In Bardens v. Board of
Trustees of the Judges Retirement System, for example, the Illinois
Supreme Court invalidated a retroactive change to the salary
formula used to determine a judge’s pension.39 Under the statute,
the pension would have been based on the judge’s average salary
over the last four years of service, rather than the salary on the
judge’s last day of service.40 The court found the statute
unconstitutional because the plaintiff had originally contracted for
the right to receive a pension “measured by the salary that he was
receiving upon the date of his retirement.”41
Indeed, prior to the 1970 Constitutional Convention, it was
well understood that by the Illinois Attorney General and at least
one scholar that the Bardens decision absolutely barred the
General Assembly from unilaterally reducing the benefits of
participants in an optional plan.42 The Illinois Supreme Court
later made the same observation in a 1981 decision where it
declared that the legislature had “no power” to diminish or repeal
the pension rights existing in the optional plan at the time the
participant began making contributions to the plan.43
3. Most Public Employees in Illinois in 1970 Were Members
of “Mandatory” Pension Plans Lacking Constitutional
Protection
If an employee participated, however, in a mandatory plan,
then the “rights” created in the relationship were simply a
gratuity or bounty,44 and the legislature could change or revoke

38. Id. at 171; Arnold v. Bd. of Trs., 417 N.E.2d 1026, 1027 (Ill. 1981);
Kraus v. Bd. of Trs., 390 N.E.2d 1281, 1284–85 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
39. Bardens, 174 N.E.2d at 171.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Pensions: State Emps.’ Ret. Sys., No. 21, 1961 Op. Atty. Ill. Gen. 75, 78–
80 (1961) (opining that optional pension plans afforded vested contractual
rights under the Illinois Constitution’s Contracts Clause “could not be
impaired by subsequent legislation” even if the unilateral alteration or
modification were “slight” or “minor” in nature); Cohn, supra note 30, at 62;
Comment, supra note at 34, at 458–59 & n.87.
43. Arnold, 417 N.E.2d at 1027 (emphasis added) (citing Raines v. Bd. of
Trs., 7 N.E.2d at 491–92 (Ill. 1937); Kraus, 983 N.E.2d at 1284–85).
44. Characterizing pension benefits as a bounty under a mandatory plan
beckons the famous law school hypothetical of one person offering $100 to
anyone who would walk across the Brooklyn Bridge. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS § 3.24, at 191–96 (2d ed. 1990). Traditional contract doctrine
would hold that a person would only obtain a contractual right to receive the
$100 if the person walked the entire length of the bridge (complete
performance). Id. at 192. Short of that, the traditional view allowed the person
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the plan’s terms at any time.45 A plan was deemed “mandatory” if
the employee was required, as a condition of employment, to make
contributions to a pension plan that were automatically deducted
from his or her salary.46 An employee belonging to such a plan only
had the “right…to share in the [pension] fund in the manner and
on such terms as the legislature may, from time to time, determine
best serves the welfare of the participants and the people of the
State.”47
At the time of the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention, 15
of the 17 retirement systems set forth in the Pension Code were
“mandatory” plans.48 Only the Judicial Retirement System and
General Assembly Retirement System (GARS) were “optional”
plans.49 As a consequence, the pension “rights” of the vast majority
of state and local employees could be modified or abolished by the
legislature at any time.

C. Public Pension Law in Illinois Before the Convention
Mirrored the Law of Other States
Illinois’s optional versus mandatory distinction in legal
protection provided to pension plans reflected the majority view
taken by other states at the time of the Convention.50 Most states
viewed public pensions as “simply gratuities which a gracious and
beneficent government employer may confer, withhold, modify or
repeal as the whim of an omniscient sovereign dictates.”51 The
majority view also governed the private sector before Congress
enacted the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA), except where the employer’s plan expressly created
a contractual obligation.52
making the offer to revoke it any time prior to complete performance. Id. As
we all learned in law school, the traditional view has long been rejected and
the offer cannot be revoked when performance begins because the person
obtains an option contract to complete his or her performance in a reasonable
period of time. Id. at 193–94. See also Jason A. Walters, The Brooklyn Bridge
is Falling Down: Unilateral Contract Modification and the Sole Requirement of
the Offeree’s Assent, 32 CUMB L. REV. 375, 401–08 (2002) (discussing the
history of unilateral contract theory and the option contract concept in further
detail).
45. Sklodowski I, 695 N.E.2d at 377 (citing Bergin v. Bd. of Trs., 202
N.E.2d 489, 494 (Ill. 1964)).
46. Id.
47. Keegan v. Bd. of Trs., 107 N.E.2d 702, 706 (Ill. 1952).
48. Arnold, 417 N.E.2d at 1028.
49. Id.
50. Cohn, supra note 30, at 33.
51. Id.
52. Note, Contingent Workers and ERISA: Should the Law Protect Workers
With No Reasonable Pension Expectations?, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 667,
670–75 (2000) (explaining how pension benefits were governed by state law
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While the “gratuity” approach was the dominant legal theory,
four other perspectives existed at that time of the Convention and
bear discussion. Each of these approaches is briefly reviewed
below.
1. The Significance of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s
Spina Decision
Henry Green, one of the Pension Clause’s principal sponsors,
gave special mention at the Convention to a 1964 New Jersey
Supreme Court decision that treated public pensions as property
rights, but having no better protection than gratuities. 53 In Spina
v. Consolidated Police and Firemen’s Pension Fund Commission,54
the court dealt with a challenge to a legislative change requiring
police and firemen to work 25 years, rather than 20 years to
receive a pension.55 The court rejected the trend to treat pension
benefits as contractual in nature after noting that an attempt to
characterize pensions as “contracts” failed at New Jersey’s 1947
Constitutional Convention.56 The court, instead, framed the issue
as whether the legislature was free to rewrite the formula to
receive pension benefits for the good of all who contributed where
the pension fund could not meet “present and future [fiscal]
demands.”57 The court upheld the change and reasoned that while
public employees had “a property interest in an existing [pension]
fund” that the State could not simply confiscate, the legislature
could nonetheless, cut benefits to maintain the fund’s solvency.58
Green, as discussed below, explained to Convention delegates that
the result permitted by the Spina decision made the Pension
Clause necessary so that result could not occur in Illinois.59

and treated as gratuities or vested contractual rights depending on the terms
of the private employer’s retirement plan). See Hughes v. Encyclopedia
Britannica, Inc., 117 N.E.2d 880, 882 (Ill. App. Ct. 1954); Guincy v. Curtice
Burns, Inc., 327 N.E.2d 284, 286 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (summarizing Illinois
law).
53. Transcripts: Jul. 10, 1970–Aug. 5, 1970, 4 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS,
SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 2931 (1972) [hereinafter 4
PROCEEDINGS] (statement of Del. Green), available at http://www.idaillinois.
org/cdm/ref/collection/isl2/id/7417. Del. Green further explained that the need
to afford contractual protection to Illinois public pension participants was
based, in part, “on a Supreme Court decision from New Jersey in 1964 that
has a very, very similar pension problem to that of Illinois.” Id.
54. Spina v. Consol. Police & Firemen’s Pension Fund Comm’n, 197 A.2d
169 (N.J. 1964).
55. Id. at 171.
56. Id. at 174–76 & n.3.
57. Id. at 175.
58. Id. at 175–76.
59. 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 53, at 2931.
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2. Few States Provided “Contractual” and Constitutional
Protection to Public Employee Pensions
Only a minority of state courts provided “contractual”
protection to pension benefits regardless of their mandatory or
optional nature.60 In Arizona and Georgia, pension benefits were
completely immunized from legislative impairment.61 In Yeazell v.
Capins, the Arizona Supreme Court, for example, invalidated a
statute that adversely changed the formula used to determine the
pensions of active police officers from a one-year average of final
salary to a five-year average of final salary.62 The court held that,
because employee pension benefit rights became “vested” when
employment was accepted, the legislature could not later change
those rights retroactively without the mutual assent of the
employee.63 The court also held the fact that the employee
continued to work after the statutory change took effect could not
be construed as employee acquiescence or a waiver of existing
rights.64 In the court’s view, the employee could not be compelled
while being employed to choose between his original pension rights
and the statutorily modified pension rights via “legislative
coercion.”65
California, Washington, and other states, however, provided a
less restrictive or “limited vesting” approach to pension benefits.66
In these states, the legislature had the reserved power to make
reasonable reductions or modifications to pension benefit rights to
maintain the fiscal integrity of the pension system so long
employees were also afforded an off-setting increase in benefits.67
Under both the Arizona and California “contract” approaches,
though, employee pension benefits were “vested” or legally fixed
according to the pension statute in effect when the person started
employment and was enrolled in the retirement plan.68
60. Cohn, supra note 30, at 33.
61. Id. at 33–34, 42–46 (discussing Yeazell v. Capins, 402 P.2d 541 (Ariz.
1965) (where the court held that an employee’s “‘rights’ to a pension became
‘vested’ upon acceptance of employment and could not be retroactively
‘impaired’” by the legislature), Burks v. Bd. of Trs., 104 S.E.2d 255, 227 (Ga.
1958) (same); Bender v. Anglin, 60 S.E.2d 756, 760 (Ga. 1950) (same)).
62. Yeazell, 402 P.2d at 542.
63. Id. at 546 (citing and quoting York v. Cent. Ill. Mut. Relief Ass’n, 173
N.E. 80, 83 (Ill. 1930)).
64. Id. at 546–47.
65. Id.
66. Cohn, supra note 30, at 33, 46–48.
67. Id. at 46–48.
68. Id. at 42–48. See e.g., Allen v. City of Long Beach, 287 P.2d 765
(invalidating a unilateral increase in employee contributions rates from 2% to
10% of salary and an adverse change in the formula used to compute pension
payments because those modifications were not reasonable changes necessary
to the successful operation of the pension plan and because the employees
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3. The New York Constitution Expressly Protected Public
Pension Benefits in Absolute Terms
New York, as detailed later, provided express constitutional
protection to pensions through a 1938 constitutional amendment
that characterized a public employee’s participation in a
retirement plan as a “contractual relationship.”69 The provision
also stated that pension benefits set forth in a retirement plan
could not be “diminished or impaired.”70 At the time of the 1970
Convention, New York court decisions held—as they do today—
that the constitutional amendment “fix[es] the [pension] rights of
the employee at the time he or she becomes a member of the
system.”71 These decisions also held that the “benefits” receiving
protection under New York constitutional provision were
“pecuniary matters” and that the provision prohibited “any action
which would impair or diminish the member’s right to payment of
pensions, annuities, and related monetary advantages.”72 The New
York constitutional provision, in short, afforded the same robust
legal protection Arizona courts provided to public pension benefit
rights. Accordingly, New York’s constitutional provision prohibits
“official action during a public employment membership in a
retirement system which adversely affects the amount of the
retirement benefits payable to the members on retirement under
the laws and conditions existing at the time of his entrance into
retirement system membership.”73
were not given new off-setting benefits); Bakenhaus v. Seattle, 296 P.2d 536,
539–41 (Wash. 1956) (rejecting a 1937 law that made the right to receive a
pension vest only when all the conditions precedent were met, and holding
that pension rights are a vested, contractual right based on a promise made by
the State at the time an employee commences service. The court also held that
pension rights may be modified prior to retirement when necessary to keep the
system “flexible” and maintain “its integrity.” Those modifications must be
reasonable and any disadvantageous modification must be accompanied by a
corresponding benefit to employees).
69. N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 7 (“After July first, nineteen hundred forty,
membership in any pension or retirement system of the state or of a civil
division thereof shall be a contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall
not be diminished or impaired.”) (emphasis added).
70. Id.
71. Birnbaum v. N.Y. State Teachers Ret. Sys., 152 N.E.2d 241, 245 (N.Y.
1958). Accord Ballatine v. Koch, 674 N.E.2d 292, 294 (N.Y. 1996).
72. Brown v. N.Y. State Teachers Ret. Sys., 269 N.Y.S.2d 649, 650 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1966), aff’d, 279 N.Y.S.2d 532 (N.Y. 1967).
73. Birnbaum, 152 N.E.2d at 246. See Ballatine, 674 N.E.2d at 294 (“The
provision ‘fix[es] the rights of the employees at the time of commencement of
membership in [a pension or retirement] system, rather than as previously at
retirement,’ and thus prohibits unilateral action by either the employer or the
Legislature that impairs or diminishes the rights established by the
employee’s membership.”); Pub. Emps. Fed’n, AFL-CIO v. Cuomo, 467 N.E.2d
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4. The Hawaii, Alaska, and Michigan Constitutions Also
Protected Public Pension Benefits, but Only “Accrued”
Benefits
At the time of the 1970 Convention, the constitutions of
Hawaii, Alaska, and Michigan also each contained provisions
protecting public pensions that were virtually identical to the New
York Constitution.74 As with the New York Constitution, a
person’s membership in a public pension system was deemed a
“contractual relationship.”75 The Hawaii and Alaska Constitutions,
however, only protected “accrued benefits” from diminishment or
impairment.76 Similarly, the Michigan Constitution only protected
“accrued financial benefits.”77 The New York Constitution, in
contrast, lacked the limiting word “accrued.”
While courts in Hawaii, Alaska, and Michigan had not
definitively construed the scope of their respective constitutional
provisions in 1970, they ultimately arrived at different conclusions
as to what pension benefit rights received protection based on each
state’s constitutional convention debates. In Hawaii, the courts
concluded that the provision’s use of the word “accrued”
differentiated between a current employee’s past and future
pension benefits.78 This word, in turn, permitted the legislature to
236, 239 (N.Y. 1984) (noting that the purpose of the New York Pension Clause
“was to fix the rights of the employee at the time he became a member of [a
pension] system” and “[i]f changes were applied retroactively to prior members
of a public retirement system, they were held unconstitutional on the theory
that a member’s rights were frozen as of the date of the employment and that
any changes lessening benefits must be made prospectively.”); Lippman v. Bd.
of Educ., 487 N.E.2d 897 (N.Y. 1985) (“The membership in a pension or
retirement system is, therefore, substantially a contractual relationship when
the members joins the system. The benefits which are the essence of that
contract should not be diminished or impaired.”).
74. See HAW. CONST. of 1950, art. XVI, § 2 (“Membership in any employees’
retirement system of the State or any political subdivision thereof shall be a
contractual relationship, the accrued benefits of which shall not be diminished
or impaired.”) (emphasis added); ALA. CONST. of 1956, art. XII, § 7
(“Retirement Systems. Membership in employee retirement systems of the
State or its political subdivisions shall constitute a contractual relationship.
Accrued benefits of these systems shall not be diminished or impaired.”)
(emphasis added); MICH. CONST. of 1963, art. IV, § 24 (“The accrued financial
benefits of each pension plan and retirement system of the state and its
political subdivisions shall be a contractual obligation thereof which shall not
be diminished or impaired thereby.”) (emphasis added).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See e.g., Everson v. State, 228 P.3d 282, 290–91 (Haw. 2010)
(explaining that based on the 1950 constitutional convention debates of the
Hawaii’s pension provision, “the legislature could reduce benefits as to (1) new
entrants into a retirement system, or (2) as to person already in the system in
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reduce the pension benefits of current employees for benefits
derived from future services, but not benefits a person already
earned through past services.79
The Michigan Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion
that its constitutional provision conferred a contractual right upon
a member of a public pension system to receive “accrued financial
benefits” from services already performed, which could not be
diminished or impaired.80 However, the provision would not limit
the legislature from imposing new conditions for earning financial
benefits in the future so long as those conditions were
reasonable.81
The Alaska Supreme Court, on the other hand, construed its
constitutional provision in a manner consistent with California’s
“limited vesting” approach.82 Under this approach, an employee’s
rights to benefits under the pension system “vest” on initial
employment and enrollment in the system, rather than at the time
when an employee becomes eligible to receive benefits.83 These
benefits, including any enhancements occurring during the
person’s employment, could not be “diminished or impaired.”84
Consistent with the California approach, though, the legislature
could make reasonable modifications in benefits if any resulting
disadvantage to employees were offset by a comparable new
advantage.85
As detailed below, public employee groups lobbied Convention
delegates to constitutionally protect pension benefit rights not only
because Illinois courts characterized pension benefits in
mandatory plans as mere gratuities, and the New Jersey Supreme
Court authorized the reduction of benefits in its Spina decision
due to chronic underfunding, but also because public employees
believed the government would abandon the already underfunded
pension system in an economic crisis. These lobbying efforts
ultimately succeeded in the inclusion of a constitutional provision
modeled after New York’s 1938 constitutional amendment.

so far as their future services were concerned. It could not, however, reduce
the benefits attributable to past services.”).
79. Id.
80. Advisory Op. re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 258, 209 N.W.2d 200,
202–03 (Mich. 1973).
81. Id.
82. Hammond v. Hoffbeck, 627 P.2d 1052, 1056–57 (Alaska 1981) (citing
and quoting with approval Allen, 287 P.2d at 767 (Cal. 1955)).
83. Duncan v. Retired Pub. Emps. Ass’n, 71 P.3d 882, 886 (Alaska 2003).
84. Id.
85. Hammond, 627 P.2d at 1057.
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D. The Public Employee Outcry for Constitutional
Protection of Pension Benefits
While providing constitutional protection to public pension
benefits was not the impetus for the 1970 Illinois Constitutional
Convention,86 it nonetheless became a significant issue. Elmer
Gertz, chairperson of the Convention’s Bill of Rights Committee,
reported that he and other committee members were inundated
with communications from public employees, particularly
university employees.87 Public employees believed their pension
benefits were imperiled due to underfunding and required
constitutional protection.88 John Parkhurst, chairperson of the
Local Government Committee, received similar correspondence
from police and firemen who concerned that granting
municipalities “home rule” authority would permit them to
abandon their pension obligations to employees.89
A review of the correspondence the framers received during
the Convention sheds valuable light on to what they knew about
the pension issue and why the Pension Clause ultimately became
part of the 1970 Constitution.90 The review below concludes that
86. See Arnold B. Kanter & Wayne W. Whalen, Thoughts on Constitutional
Drafting, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 31 n.2 (1971) (stating the Convention was
prompted by the need to revise: (1) the State’s revenue system; (2) the method
of judicial selection due to corruption; (3) the method for redrawing House and
Senate districts due to U.S. Supreme Court redistricting decisions; (4) the
need for “home rule” authority for municipalities; (5) and the general
inflexibility of the 1870 Illinois Constitution).
87. Elmer Gertz, The Making of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, 5 J.
MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 215, 233 (1972) [hereinafter Gertz].
88. Id.
89. See e.g., Letter from Donald E. Nolan, to John C. Parkhurst, Chairman,
Local Gov’t Comm., Ill. Const. Convention (April 27, 1970), in ILLINOIS
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, Box 28, Folder 30 (on file with Ill. State
Historical Library) [hereinafter ILL. CONST. CONV. PAPERS] (writing in
opposition to a home rule proposal pending before the Convention’s Local
Government on behalf of police and firemen because it poses “a threat to losing
protection of the Pension Fund Program”); Letter from David S. Clark, Sec’y,
Des Plaines Prof’l Firemen’s Ass’n, to John C. Parkhurst, Chairman, Local
Gov’t Comm., Ill. Const. Convention (April 20, 1970), in (same); Letter from
Edward J. Malloy, Legislative Representative, Mun. Emps. Soc’y of Chi., to
John C. Parkhurst, Chairman, Local Gov’t Comm., Ill. Const. Convention
(May 4, 1970), in (same). Mr. Parkhurst received hundreds of other letters and
postcards from police and firemen—many handwritten—stating the same
concerns. See generally ILL. CONST. CONV. PAPERS, at Box 28, Folder 30.
90. See Elk Grove Eng’g Co. v. Korzen, 304 N.E.2d 65, 68–69 (Ill. 1973)
(“The framers of the constitution would naturally examine the state of things
at the time; and their work sufficiently attests that they did so.”); Hoffman v.
Clark, 372 N.E.2d 74, 82 (Ill. 1977) (referring to a delegate’s briefing memo to
discern the intent and purpose of Article IX, Section 4(b) of the Illinois
Constitution); People v. Tesler, 469 N.E.2d 147, 162–63 (Ill. 1984) (Ward, J.,
concurring) (relying on the research papers delegates received at the 1970
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the framers and delegates had a deep understanding of both the
fiscal condition and legal landscape governing public pensions.
More importantly, the delegates were familiar with the reasons
why public employees wanted to constitutionally protect their
pension benefits at the time employees became members of a
pension system.
1. Public Employee Organizations Led Efforts to Include
Pension Protection in the New Constitution Due to
Underfunding
Lobbying efforts to constitutionally protect pension benefits at
the Convention began in early March 1970 when a group of
University of Illinois retirees wrote the Convention President and
each of its committee chairs on two occasions.91 The retirees
requested the inclusion of the following language in the proposed
constitutional convention to determine the intent for Article I, Section 6 of the
Illinois Constitution; the “research papers should not be overlooked in any
search to determine the mind of the constitution.”). See also 2A NORMAN J.
SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 48.4 (7th ed. 2010) (noting “[t]he events occurring
immediately prior to the time when an act becomes law comprises an
instructive source, indicative of what meaning the legislature intended. * * *
Legislative history can also consider part of a statute that never became into
existence. * * * The contemporary history of events during this period consists
chiefly in statements by various parties concerning the nature and effect of the
proposed law and statements or other evidence on the evils to be remedied.
Contemporary history also includes information concerning the activities of
pressure groups, economic conditions in the country at the time, prevailing
business practices, and the prior state law, including judicial decisions,
applicable to the subject of the legislation in question.”).
91. Letter from Mary Lois Bull, Sec’y, Univ. of Ill. Urbana Retirees’
Interim Comm., to Samuel Witwer et al., President, Ill. Const. Convention
(Mar. 5, 1970), in PAPERS OF HENRY I. GREEN COLLECTION, Box 1, Folder 13
(on file with Univ. of Ill., Urbana-Champaign, Ill. History and Lincoln
Collection) [hereinafter GREEN PAPERS]. The lobbying efforts of the university
retirees later led to the formation of the State Universities Annuitants
Association (SUAA) with the Pension Clause as its signature achievement. See
STATE UNIVERSITIES ANNUITANTS ASSOCIATION: 25 YEARS OF HISTORY, 1971–
1996, at 3, (May 1996), available at http://www.suaa-ui.org/archive/SUAA%20
History %2025%20Years%201971-1996.pdf (“On April 1, 1970, the University
of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign Chapter of Annuitants of the State Universities
Retirement System (UIUC) was formed, the first of the now twenty-five local
associations. One of the most important accomplishments of the Urbana
Chapter was working for the inclusion in the 1970 revision of the Illinois
Constitution of an article protecting all state pension systems: Membership in
any pension or retirement system of the State . . . shall be an enforceable
contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or
impaired. (Constitution of the State of Illinois, Article XIII, Section 5. Pension
and Retirement Rights). Such a vested pension rights provision had been a
goal vigorously sought by Ed Gibala [Executive Director or SURS] and SURS,
and the Urbana SUAA Chapter.”).
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constitution:
Pension rights of public employees are an integral part of the
contract of employment, and these rights are vested in the
employee at the time he accepts each employment contract. The
General Assembly shall have the responsibility of implementing
and preserving the value of these vested rights both during the
period of employment and after retirement.92
The university retirees stated in their letter that their
proposal had been recommended by “the Advisory Committee to
the State Universities Retirement Board.”93 The Illinois Education
Association sent a virtually identical letter to the same delegates
in April 1970 explaining that “[m]ost teachers continue to work at
salaries greatly less than other professions and continue to do so
only because they can rely on their pensions for retirement.”94
These requests were renewed in a June 26, 1970, letter
received by all Convention delegates from Harl H. Ray, chairman
of the Employees Advisory Committee to the State Universities
Retirement System.95 Mr. Ray implored delegates to “not deny us
the Constitutional right to always be able to receive that pension
promised by the State Legislature during our period of
employment.” Constitutional protection, he reasoned, was
warranted because “the State Legislature has failed to finance the
pension obligations on a sound basis.”96
2. The Pension System Was No Better Funded in 1970 Than
It Is Today
At the time of the Convention, the Pension Laws Commission
reported that the General Assembly Retirement System (GARS)

92. Id.
93. Id. See also Letter from Sharon Thannert, to Dels., Ill. Const.
Convention (Mar. 4, 1970), in PAPERS OF PETER A. TOMEI, Box 15, Folder 6 (on
file with Chi. History Museum) [hereinafter TOMEI PAPERS]; Letter from
Jeanne Wojsiat, to Del. Peter A. Tomei, in TOMEI PAPERS (same); Letter from
Warren Johnson, to Del. Peter A. Tomei, in TOMEI PAPERS, Box 15, Folder 3;
Letter from Karen Tarpey, to Del. Peter A. Tomei, in TOMEI PAPERS, Box 15,
Folder 6.
94. Letter from David Frey, Sec’y, Lake Shore Div. of the Ill. Educ. Ass’n,
to Fred Turner et al., Ill. Const. Convention (Apr. 7, 1970), in ILL. CONST.
CONV. PAPERS, supra note 89, at Box 28, Folder 30.
95. Letter from Harl H. Ray, Vice Chairman, Emps. Advisory Comm.,
SURS, to Dels., Ill. Const. Convention (June 26, 1970), in GREEN PAPERS,
supra note 91. See also, Letter from Stanley L. Johnson, Exec. Vice President,
Ill. State Fed’n of Labor and Cong. of Indus. Orgs., to Dels., Ill. Const.
Convention (June 17, 1970), in GREEN PAPERS, supra note 91 (advocating that
“[s]peaking of Public Employees, those who have already retired and those to
go on pension are also concerned over their vested right to receive pensions
from the Public Body now and in the future.”).
96. Id.
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was 68.5% funded, while the State University Retirement System
(SURS) was 47% funded.97 The remaining state-funded retirement
systems had the following funding percentages: State Employees
Retirement System (SERS) 43%; Judicial Retirement System
(JRS) 32.3%; and Teachers Retirement System (TRS) 40%.98 The
five State pension systems had an aggregate funding ratio of
41.8%. By comparison police and firemen pension funds were
respectively only 33.8% and 19.1% funded.99 As noted at the
outset, the five systems currently have a combined funding ratio of
42.9%.
3. The State University Retirement System Also Advocated
for Constitutional Protection Because of Its
Underfunding and the Lack of Legal Protection Provided
to Mandatory Pension Plans
In July 1970, Henry Green, one of the Pension Clause’s
principal sponsors, received a letter from the Executive Director of
the State Universities Retirement System (SURS) containing a
similar plea for the constitutional protection of pensions along
with a legal memorandum.100 The letter stated that the
memorandum provided the “reasons why” the constitution should
include a provision “regarding the vesting and funding of public
employee pension rights.”101 Delegate Green later read verbatim
portions of this memorandum as his floor speech to explain the
intent and purpose of the Pension Clause to Convention
delegates.102 The legal memorandum was also distributed to all
97. REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS
COMMISSION 32 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 PENSION LAWS REPORT].
98. Id.
99. Id. at 42.
100. Letter from Edward S. Gibala, Exec. Dir., SURS, to Henry Green, a
Pension Clause principal sponsor (July 2, 1970) [hereinafter SURS Letter], in
GREEN PAPERS, supra note 91. See Article Appendix A.
101. Id.
102. Compare 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 53, at 2925 (Del. Green) (stating,
Now at the end of 1968 in Illinois we had more than 370,000 public
employees who were participating in 374 pension funds in this state. In
addition, there were more than 79,000 people who were already on
retirement or disability or survivor’s insurance benefits from these
funds. . . . Now, with regard to the first point, the Illinois courts have
generally ruled that pension benefits under mandatory participation
plans were in the nature of bounties which could be changed or even
recalled as a matter of complete legislative discretion. And as a result
in Illinois today we have public employees who are beginning to lose
faith in the ability of the state and its political subdivisions to meet
these benefit payments. This insecurity on the part of the public
employees is defeating the very purpose for which the retirement
system was established[.] . . . In the past twenty-two years the
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Convention delegates.103
The SURS letter noted that while the “General Assembly has
done an excellent job in funding its own retirement system
obligations,” it “has failed to meet its commitment to other public
employees.”104 The letter continued that the legislature’s failure to
fund the other retirement systems “has created such a staggering
liability for future taxpayers that the extra load during an adverse
economic period may require the public to renege on its obligations
to its public servants.”105 By way of example, SURS noted how the
General Assembly passed legislation in 1967 providing state
universities with appropriations that would at least cover the
amount necessary to fully fund current service costs and the
interest owed on past liabilities.106 Yet, in 1968 and 1969, the
legislature reneged on this funding commitment by failing to
appropriate the required funds.107
The letter’s accompanying legal memorandum then detailed
not only the total accrued liabilities and assets of Illinois’s State
and Local retirement systems, but also the distinction in legal
protection afforded to participants in “mandatory” and “optional”
pension plans.108 The memorandum explained that since “most
pension plans in Illinois provide for mandatory participation, the

unfunded accrued liabilities of these pension plans in Illinois have
increased from about $359,000,000 to almost $2,500,000,000, and the
unfunded accrued liabilities are real and are not theoretical obligations
based upon service already rendered. . . . Despite consistent warnings
from the Pension Laws Commission, the current budgeting of pension
costs necessary to ensure the financial stability of these funds, the
General Assembly has failed to meet its commitments to finance the
pension obligations on a sound basis. In 1967, the General Assembly
approved Senate Bill 515 which provided for the appropriation to one
state university retirement system, to at least equal to the amount
which would be necessary to fund fully the current service costs and to
cover the interest on the past service; and despite this legislative
mandate, the General Assembly refused to appropriate the necessary
funds. Now, during this two year period alone the appropriations under
this system were $67,000,000 less than the minimum required by the
senate bill).
with Memorandum from Edward S. Gibala, Exec. Dir., SURS, on Const.
Provision Concerning Vesting of Pension Rights for Public Emps., at 1, 2–3,
and 4, in GREEN PAPERS, supra note 91 [hereinafter SURS Memorandum].
The italicized text in the parenthetical is verbatim to portions of the SURS
Memorandum. See Article Appendix A.
103. Constitutional Provision Concerning Vesting of Pension Rights for
Public Employees, in ILL. CONST. CONV. PAPERS, supra note 89, at Box 51,
Folder 5.
104. SURS Letter, supra note 100, at 1.
105. Id.
106. SURS Memorandum, supra note 102, at 3.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1.
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pension ‘rights’ of public employees in this State are mere
expectancies which are subject to a reserved legislative power of
change or repeal.”109 The memorandum then referenced the New
Jersey Supreme Court’s Spina decision as an example of how the
legislature could reduce the pension benefits of mandatory plan
participants when the fund’s solvency was at stake.110
The memorandum also discussed how the New York
Constitution guaranteed public employees “a ‘contractual
relationship’ in the governmental ‘pension’ or ‘retirement system,’”
the benefits of which could not be diminished or impaired.111 The
memorandum concluded that because “Illinois courts have
generally ruled that public employee pensions are mere gratuities
which can be revised or revoked at the will of the legislature,” and
because the General Assembly “has cast a spell of doom on the
future of pension expectancies” by underfunding the pension
system, “public employees are beginning to lose faith in the ability
of the State and its political subdivisions to meet benefit payments
during an adverse economic period.”112
The memorandum then requested a constitutional provision
vesting employee pension benefits at the time of employment and
“direct[ing] the General Assembly to take the necessary steps to
fund the pension obligations on a basis consistent with sound
actuarial principles.”113 To that end, the memorandum proposed a
constitutional provision with language nearly identical to what the
delegates had received in March and April of 1970.114
In sum, Delegate Gertz’s remarks and the correspondence
received by Convention delegates, including Henry Green, the
Pension Clause’s sponsor, indicate that the protection of public
pension benefits garnered significant attention at the
Convention.115 These communications also gave delegates, at a

109. Id. at 1 (citing Beutel v. Foreman, 123 N.E. 270 (Ill. 1919)).
110. Id. at 1–2.
111. Id. at 4.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. The memorandum requested that the constitution include the
following provision:
Vesting of Pension Rights of Public Employees
Pension rights of public employees are an integral part of the
contract of employment, and these rights are vested in the employee at
the time he accepts each employment contract. The General Assembly
shall be responsible for safeguarding these vested rights during the
employment period and after retirement by providing for methods of
financing which are consistent with sound actuarial principles.
Id. at 4–5.
115. Gertz, supra note 87, at 233 (stating that because of the volume of
correspondence the securing of pension benefits “became a subject a
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minimum, a sophisticated understanding of the fiscal condition of
the State’s pension systems, and the difference in legal protection
afforded to mandatory and optional pension plans. They also
provided the reasons why public employees sought to
constitutionally protect the pension benefits in place when they
became members of a pension system. We next consider how the
Pension Clause became part of the Illinois Constitution.

E. The Pension Clause: A Provision Soon to Have a
Home
Initially, it was unclear where a provision safeguarding
pension benefits would belong in the new constitution. Indeed,
concerns over pensions drew the attention of both the Bill of
Rights and Local Government Committees. On June 23, 1970,
Helen Kinney, the second principal sponsor of the Pension Clause,
made a parliamentary inquiry about the process of offering a
proposal to protect public pension benefits and was informed to file
her proposal as a resolution with the Convention’s Rules
Committee for review.116 On July 1, 1970, Delegate Kinney filed a
resolution seeking a parliamentary ruling from the Convention’s
Rules Committee on the matter.117 The resolution also set forth
the text of what essentially became the Pension Clause.118
conversation among delegates and staff”).
116. Transcripts: May 22, 1970–Jul. 9, 1970, 3 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS,
SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1939–40 (1972) [hereinafter 3
PROCEEDINGS]
(Del.
Kinney),
available
at
http://www.idaillinois.org/cdm/ref/ collection/isl2/id/3982.
117. See id. at 2188 (Del. Kinney) (explaining that she wished to “offer a
provision covering pension rights for state or local employees”, but she really
didn’t “know where this would be germane—whether it would be local
government, general government, bill of rights, or some other one
completely.”); Daily Journals: Dec. 8, 1969—Sept. 3, 1970, 1 RECORD OF
PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 393 (1972)
[hereinafter 1 PROCEEDINGS] (Del. Kinney), available at http://www.
idaillinois.org/cdm/ref/collection/isl2/id/1703 (text of Resolution No. 63 filed by
Del. Kinney setting for her pension proposal and requesting a ruling on when
the matter could be presented to the Convention). See also 3 Proceedings,
supra note 116, at 1940 (providing the colloquy of Dels. Kinney and Davis,
where Del. Kinney inquires as to the proper mode of offering a proposal to
public pensions).
118. Compare 1 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 117, at 393 (Resolution No. 63)
(“Membership in any pension or retirement system of the state or any local
government, or any agency or instrumentality of either, shall be a contractual
relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired, but
benefits may be increased for pensioners of any such system or for their
dependents or beneficiaries.”) (emphasis added), with ILL. CONST. of 1970, art.
XIII, § 5 (“Membership in any pension or retirement system of the State, any
unit of local government or school district, or any agency or instrumentality
thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which
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On July 9, 1970, the Rules Committee unanimously voted to
allow Kinney’s proposal to advance as a proposed amendment to
the Legislative Committee’s proposed Legislative Article to the
constitution.119 Delegate David Davis, Vice-Chair of the Rules
Committee, explained to the Convention that the pension proposal
“relates to the power the legislature—a limitation, as a matter of
fact—on the power of the legislature to alter the provisions of
public pension and retirement plans.”120 The Convention approved
the Rules Committee’s decision and allowed the pension proposal
to proceed.121
After the parliamentary ruling, Delegates Green and Kinney
jointly sponsored and filed the pension proposal as an amendment
to the proposed Legislative Article.122 Delegate Green, a
community college official from Urbana,123 sought the amendment
because of concerns raised by university employees.124 Delegate
Kinney, a former DuPage County state’s attorney,125 was
prompted by concerns of police and firemen who believed
municipalities would use their new home rule powers to spend
retirement system moneys to repair streets and abandon the
pension system.126
The amendment’s text was nearly identical to what Delegate
Kinney had set forth in her parliamentary inquiry.127 The only
shall not be diminished or impaired.”). The Convention’s Style and Drafting
Committee made stylistic changes to the text, which the Convention later
adopted.
119. 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 53, at 2505–06. (statement of Del. Davis
of the Convention Rules Comm.).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 1 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 117, at 470. The pension proposal was
formally designated as an amendment and referred to as “Proposed Addition
No. 1 to Legislative Proposal,” which was the legislative article to the
constitution proposed by the Legislative Committee. Id. Dels. Green and
Kinney along with Dels. Anthony M. Peccarelli and Donald D. Zeglis were
listed on the printed amendment filed with the Convention. Amendments
Pertaining to Committee Proposals, in ILL. CONST. CONV. PAPERS, supra note
89, at Box 46, Folder 42; 1 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 117, at 470. Later, Dels.
Philip J. Carey, Betty Howard, Henry C. Hendren, David Kenney, Dwight P.
Friedrich, Stanley L. Klaus, Thomas R. Lyons, Richard M. Daley, Madison L.
Brown, Louis F. Bottino, William F. Fennoy, Elmer Gertz, Harold M.
Nudelman, and J.L. Buford added their names via signature as additional cosponsors. Amendments Pertaining to Committee Proposals, in ILL. CONST.
CONV. PAPERS, supra note 89, at Box 46, Folder 42; 1 PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 117, at 470.
123. 1 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 117, at 899 (convention biography of Del.
Green).
124. 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 53, at 2925 (statement of Del. Green).
125. 1 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 117, at 892 (convention biography of Del.
Kinney).
126. 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 53, at 2926 (statement of Del. Kinney).
127. Compare 1 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 117, at 393 (Resolution No. 63)
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difference was that the amendment no longer expressly stated that
the government could increase pension benefits of pensioners or
their dependents or beneficiaries after they began receiving
benefits.128 The amendment stated, “[m]embership in any pension
or retirement system of the state or any local government, or any
agency or instrumentality of either, shall be an enforceable,
contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be
diminished or impaired.”129 Delegates Green and Kinney jointly
presented the amendment to the Convention for consideration on
July 21, 1970.130

F. A Capsule of the Convention’s Floor Debate of the
Pension Clause
1. Delegate Green’s Opening Remarks on Why the Pension
Provision Was Necessary
Delegate Henry Green made the initial presentation of the
pension proposal to Convention delegates, and used verbatim
portions of the SURS legal memorandum he had earlier received
as his floor speech.131 Green explained that the pension proposal
would “do two things.”132 First, it “mandates a contractual
relationship between the employer and the employee; and
secondly, it mandates the General Assembly to not impair or
diminish these rights.”133
As to the first objective, Green stated that Illinois courts
treated pension benefits in mandatory participation plans as
“bounties which could be changed or even revoked as a matter of
complete legislative discretion.”134 Green detailed how this legal
reality, coupled with the fact that the pension system was
underfunded,135 caused public employees “to lose faith in the
(“Membership in any pension or retirement system of the state or any local
government, or any agency or instrumentality of either, shall be a contractual
relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired, but
benefits may be increased for pensioners of any such system or for their
dependents or beneficiaries.”) (emphasis added), with id. at 470–71
(“Membership in any pension or retirement system of the State, any unit of
local government or school district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof,
shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not
be diminished or impaired.”)
128. Id. at 393, 470–71.
129. 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 53, at 2925; 1 PROCEEDINGS, supra note
117, at 470.
130. 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 53, at 2925–33.
131. See 1969 PENSION LAWS REPORT, supra note 97, at 42.
132. 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 53, at 2925.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. For this proposition, Del. Green specifically relied upon and quoted
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ability of State and local governments to make benefits
payments.”136
Green noted how the General Assembly had passed
legislation in 1967 providing state universities with appropriations
that would at least cover the amount necessary to fully fund
current service costs and interest owed on past service liabilities,
but the legislature failed to make the requisite appropriations in
1968 and 1969.137 For these reasons, Green requested “that the
Convention adopt the provision which will guarantee these [(i.e.,
employee pension)] rights and direct the General Assembly to take
the necessary steps to fund the pension obligations.”138
The pension proposal, Green noted, was based on the text of a
1938 amendment to the New York Constitution.139 He explained
that the 1938 amendment came about “under a similar
circumstance” because the New York legislature was under “great
pressure” to “cut out some of the money that they were giving to
pension programs in New York.”140 The amendment, he further
explained, was adopted to prevent such legislative action, and it
was for that reason that he and other delegates were “suggesting”
that the Convention adopt New York’s constitutional language.141
While Delegate Green was under the misimpression that the
New York constitutional language expressly “mandated that state
to fully fund” its public pension funds “in two years”,142 he clarified
that the pension proposal was not offered to compel such a result
in Illinois.143 Rather, the proposal was intended to “put the
from the SURS legal memorandum he had received in early July 1970. 1969
PENSION LAWS REPORT, supra note 102; Henry Green, Speech at the Illinois
Constitutional Convention: Const. Provision Concerning Vesting of Pension
Rights for Public Emps., in GREEN PAPERS, supra note 91.
136. 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 53, at 2925.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.; Comment, supra note 34, at 450. The two-year requirement in the
New York Constitution’s Pension Clause Del. Green referenced did not require
the full funding of public pensions but delayed the Clause’s effective date to
July 1, 1940
to enable the State and its civil divisions to review their pension
systems and to adjust, amend, or supplement the provisions of existing
systems in light of the fact that after such effective date such systems
were no longer gratuities, but by virtue of the new amendment became
contracts and the members of pension systems thereby acquired vested
interests which could not thereafter be diminished or impaired.
Day v. Mruk, 121 N.E.2d 362, 363 (N.Y. 1954).
143. Transcripts: Aug. 6, 1970—Sept. 3, 1970, 5 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS,
SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 2925 (1972) [hereinafter 5
PROCEEDINGS],
available
at
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General Assembly on notice that these memberships are
enforceable contracts and that they shall not be diminished or
impaired.”144 Put differently, a public employee (whether retired or
currently employed) acquired vested pension benefits at the time
he or she was hired and entered the retirement system, and the
legislature could not later decide to reduce or eliminate those
benefits via legislative action.
2. Delegate Kinney’s Opening Remarks Define the Terms
“Enforceable,” and “Impair,” as Used in the Pension
Proposal, and Set Forth the Purpose of the Proposal
Delegate Kinney concurred with Delegate Green’s
explanation. As she put it, the proposal provided “a means of
giving them [(i.e., police and firemen)] assurance that these
benefits will not at some future date be eliminated on the part of
municipalities who do contribute to these funds.”145 As noted
earlier, Delegate Kinney supported the proposal because police
and firemen were concerned that municipalities would use their
new “home rule” powers to “abandon the pension system.”146
She also provided specific meanings for the terms
“enforceable” and “impaired” as used in the proposal. Delegate
Kinney stated that the word “enforceable” was “meant to provide
that the rights established shall be subject to judicial proceedings
and can be enforced through court action.”147 The word “impaired,”
she stated, was “meant to imply and to intend that if a pension
fund would be on the verge of default or imminent bankruptcy, a
group action could be taken to show that these rights should be
preserved.”148 She further observed that “it was definitely the
intent that an increase in benefits would not be precluded” under
the proposal, including an automatic cost of living increase.149 She
also listed the other delegates supporting the pension proposal.
3. Other Convention Delegates Speak in Favor of and
Against the Proposal
After these opening remarks, several delegates offered their
views on the proposal’s scope. Delegate James Kemp spoke in
support because “the government employee is not notoriously

http://www.idaillinois.org/cdm/ref/collection/isl2/ id/6263.
144. Id.
145. 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 53, at 2926.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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overpaid,” and because of concerns expressed by firemen.150 He
understood the proposal as making “certain that irrespective of the
financial condition of a municipality or even the state government
that those persons who have worked for often substandard wages
over a long period of time could at least expect to live in some kind
of dignity during their golden years.”151
Several delegates, however, voiced opposition and claimed
that the proposal mandated the immediate and full funding of the
various pension systems.152 One opponent, John Parkhurst further
claimed that the provision’s use of the word “diminished” meant
that the dollar value of pension benefits had to be immunized from
inflation.153 In addition, he disputed the necessity of the proposal
by noting “[t]here is no history in the state of Illinois of impairing
or diminishing or welching on any pension when they came
due.”154 If we get to the point, he added, “where we can’t pay, we’re
down the drain anyway.”155
Delegate Paul Elward, also an opponent, assumed that the
provision would prohibit the reorganization or consolidation of
pension systems.156 He also believed the proposal would bar the
legislature from cutting benefits “for a surviving widow of a
policeman in order to increase the benefits of minor children[.]”157
Delegate Ted Borek took a different approach in his opposition,
and characterized the proposal as “special legislation” protecting

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 2927 (Del. Parkhurst) (stating he read the amendment to
“mandate the General Assembly to put in 100 percent of the money to pay
anybody’s pension on anybody’s actuarial projection right now, because it says,
‘the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.’”); id. (Del. Elward)
(stating that the proposal will bust the budget “because either it means a
mandatory funding up to some percentage figure way beyond what the
average is now, or it doesn’t. If it doesn’t mean it, it doesn’t do anything”).
153. Id. (Del. Parkhurst).
Suppose this goes into the constitution. Suppose we have more
inflation. Suppose we devaluate the dollar in five years or ten years.
Haven’t we then diminished the pension funding and the pension rights
of a pensioner, based on today’s dollars? Of course we have. So this is
an admonition to the courts not to let them be diminished in terms of
the general level of the economy or the value of the dollar, now or in the
future. I submit that this is a kind of left-handed way to increase their
pension benefits and not let them ride with the value of the dollar in
years to come.
Id.

154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. (Del. Elward) (“This would, it seems to me, prohibit consolidation
which hopefully, under economic pressures in times to come, the legislature
can get some of these associations together.”).
157. Id. at 2927–28.
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the one in seven employees who were public employees.158
Reacting to the opposing delegates’ comments, Delegate
Thomas Lyons, a co-sponsor of the proposal, asked the principal
sponsors to clarify whether the amendment’s purpose “was to give
protection to those people who felt that they needed protection for
their pension rights in the event that sweeping home rule powers
were given to local governments.”159
4. Delegate Kinney Reassures Proponents and Refutes the
Claims Made by the Proposal’s Opponents
In response to Delegate Lyons’ inquiry, Delegate Kinney
explained that this was what the proposal “was designed to do,” 160
and then offered the following illustration as to what pension
proposal was intended to accomplish:
Benefits not being diminished really refers to this
situation: If a police officer accepted employment under a
provision where he was entitled to retire at two-thirds of
his salary after twenty years of service, that could not be
subsequently changed to say he was entitled to only onethird of his salary after thirty years of service, or perhaps
entitled to nothing. That is the thrust of the word
“diminished.”161
She continued that the proposal was not intended to require
the pensions systems to be fully funded or funded up to a certain
percentage.162 Rather, the funding issue only became relevant and
intertwined with the pension provision “where a court might
judicially determine that imminent bankruptcy would really be an
impairment” because pension payments could not be made.163
Delegate Kinney also refuted the claim that the proposal
would prevent system-wide consolidation or reorganization.164 She
reiterated that the proposal would not preclude future increases in
benefits to pensioners or the dependents.165 As she put it, the
provision would simply give public employees “a basic protection
158. Id. at 2928. Del. Borek also stated the words “diminished” or
“impaired” indicated to him that “the treasury of the state of Illinois would
guarantee 374 pension funds; should they go broke, they will reimburse them
to the extent that they can operate.” Id.
159. Id. at 2928–29.
160. Id. at 2929.
161. Id.
162. Id. (“It is not intended to require 100 percent funding or 50 percent or
30 percent funding or get into any of those problems.”).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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against abolishing their [pension] rights completely or changing
the terms of their rights after they have embarked upon the
employment—to lessen them.”166
5. Co-sponsors Endorse the Views Expressed by Delegates
Green and Kinney
Delegate Lyons, in turn, affirmed his support for the proposal
based on Kinney’s clarification.167 Delegate Anthony Peccarelli,
another co-sponsor, stated he agreed with “all the things said” by
Delegates Green, Kinney, and Kemp and urged delegates “to take
what they have said and consider it and emphasize what they have
said and ask that you vote for the amendment.”168
6. Delegate Wayne Whalen’s Comments in Opposition
Delegate Wayne Whalen, rising in opposition, agreed with
Kinney’s view that the “whole question of funding” the pension
system at a certain percentage was “irrelevant to the issue of
whether we should adopt the provision.”169 He disagreed, though,
that the provision would achieve the proponents’ objective. He
opined that the pension proposal merely characterized “pension
benefits as being contractual rights” and “lock[ed] in the
contractual line of cases into the constitution.”170 As such, he
asserted that the amendment simply converted the pension
benefits of public employees participating in mandatory plans
from “gratuities” to “contractual rights,” and thereby made them
subject to no greater protection than any contract under the
Contracts Clause.171
166. Id.
167. Id. (statement of Del. Lyons). Delegate Lyons stated:
We now have heard from the proponents who have represented that
that is the limit of the scope of this amendment. It does not refer to
upfunding, nor does it seek to establish some sort of an administrative
elite to administer these various funds. All that it seeks to do, as I read
the thing, is simply to grant protection to people who feel that the
protection they now feel they have might in some sense be impaired in
the event that local governments move into these fields which
heretofore were the preserve of the state.
Id.

168. Id. (emphasis added).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 2929–30. Del. Whalen suggested that rather than characterize
“pension benefits as being contractual rights,” it made more sense to
characterize these rights “as being proprietary rights of the person receiving
the benefit.” Id. at 2929. He believed that pension recipients would “stand a
better chance of receiving full payment” of their pension benefits, especially in
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Delegate Whalen added that as a contractual right it “may be
subject to any contingency built into the contract.”172 For these
reasons, he stated it would be more appropriate to expressly
protect pensions under the Contracts Clause of the Illinois
Constitution.173 Thereafter, several other delegates opposing the
proposal adopted Whalen’s view that public pensions should be
protected by amending the proposed bill of rights’ Contracts
Clause.174
7. Delegate Green’s Closing Remarks
The floor debate then concluded with closing comments from
the pension proposal’s principal sponsors, Green and Kinney. In
closing, Green stated the main reason for “mandated contractual
status” for pension benefits was to foreclose the circumstance
allowed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in its Spina decision.175
In that case, the court upheld a statutory reduction in pension
benefits because chronic underfunding left insufficient money in
the pension funds to pay benefits to both current and future
retirees.176 Green then refuted Delegate Parkhurst’s claim that the
pension provision required inflationary protection for benefits.177

the bankruptcy context, if these benefits were deemed “proprietary,” rather
than “contractual rights.” Id. Del. Whalen’s claim while interesting is
unpersuasive. As one scholar has explained, while “property rights cannot be
diminished or impaired without due process of law,” “all that substantive due
process requires is that the state’s action not be arbitrary or irrational.” Amy
Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform: The Legal Framework, 5 EDUC., FIN. &
POL’Y, at 30–31 (March 17, 2010) (Minn. Legal Stud. Res., Paper No. 10-13),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1573864. This standard would,
accordingly, allow a state to make “significant changes to public pension plans,
provided there is a rational basis for the amendment.” Id. at 31 (citing
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610–11 (1960), where the U.S. Supreme
Court held that Congress could make unilateral changes to Social Security
benefits so long as the statutory changes did not manifest “a patently
arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification”). In short,
“while characterizing the right to pension benefits as a property right may
prevent the state from taking a retiree’s benefits without just compensation,
changes to the benefits of current participants can be relatively freely made.”
Id.
172. 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 53, at 2930.
173. Id.
174. See id. at 2930–31 (noting statements of Dels. Weisburg, Davis, Borek
and Bottino).
175. Id. at 2931.
176. Spina, 197 A.2d 169, 171, 175–76 (N.J. 1964).
177. 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 53, at 2931.
In answer to Delegate Parkhurst’s question with regard to the
diminishing aspect of it—the cost of living—any of you who know when
you buy an insurance policy you’re going to get back what the contract
says. Now if the dollar isn’t worth but 27 cents when you get it back,
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Green then provided, as Kinney had earlier, his own
illustration of what the pension proposal was intended to cover:
What we are trying to merely say is that if you mandate
the public employees in the state of Illinois to put in
their 5 percent or 8 percent or whatever it may be
monthly, and you say when you employ these people,
‘Now if you do this, when you reach sixty-five, you will
receive $287 a month,” that is in fact, is what you will
get.178
Green concluded his comments with a plea to the legislature to
properly fund the pension system as had been the case in New
York since that state adopted its identical constitutional provision
in 1938.179
8. Delegate Kinney’s Closing Remarks
Kinney similarly reiterated in her final remarks that “the
thrust of” the pension proposal, as with the New York
constitutional provision it was based on, was “that people who do
accept employment will not find at a future time that they are not
entitled to the benefits they thought they were when they accepted
the employment.”180 She further explained that after conferring
with staff counsel, both she and Green agreed “it would be quite
fair if a person undertook employment under a statute that
provided for a contingency for lowering the benefits at some future

there is absolutely no reason why you have any recourse against that
insurance company.
Id.

178. Id.
179. Id. (Del. Green) Quoting an Illinois Pension Code provision requiring
the legislature to make certain appropriations to the pension systems, he
stated:
Now, I think [the legislature] either ought to live up to the laws that
they pass or that very quickly we ought to stop when we are hiring
public employees by telling them that they have any retirement rights
in the state of Illinois. If we are going to tell a policeman or a school
teacher that, “Yes, if you will work for us for your thirty years or until
whenever you reach retirement age, that you will receive this,” if the
state of Illinois and its municipalities are going to play insurance
company and live up to these contribution then they ought to live by
their own rules. And this is all in the world this mandate is doing. In
closing, I would further say it was done in 1938 by these exact words in
the state of New York.
Id.

180. Id.
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time, that this was, indeed, the contract he had accepted.”181
Kinney reminded delegates, however, the proposal was intended
“to guarantee that people will have the rights that were in force at
the time they entered the agreement to become an employee, and
as Mr. Green has said, if the benefits are $100 a month in 1971,
they should be no less than $100 a month in 1990.”182
The Convention then proceeded to take a roll call vote
approving the pension proposal.183 Thereafter, the proposal was
referred to a procedural committee for editing and inclusion into
the working draft of the proposed constitution.184

G. Key Conclusions Derived From the Pension Clause’s
Convention Debates
In sum, the following conclusions can be drawn from the
Pension Clause’s Convention debates:
! The Pension Clause was prompted by concerns raised by
state university employees over the underfunding of the
university pension system and the lack of constitutional
protection for mandatory retirement plans, and by firemen
and police officers that municipalities would use their new
“home rule” authority to abandon their local pension plans.
! A public employee’s participation in a public pension system
creates an enforceable contractual relationship in the
employment context. The drafters intended to provide
constitutional protection to the pension benefit rights in
place when an employee started employment and became a
member of a pension system.
! The Pension Clause serves as a bar against any unilateral
legislative or governmental action to reduce or eliminate the
pension benefit rights in place when an employee became a
member of a pension system.

! The principal sponsors each offered examples of how the
provision prohibited the legislature from altering the terms
of an employee’s pension benefit rights after he or she
entered service.
•

Delegate Green illustrated this point by stating that

181. Id. (Del. Kinney).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 2932–33.
184. Id.
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if a retirement plan requires a starting employee to
pay 5% of his or her salary each month and work
until age 65 to receive a pension of $247 per month,
then “that is in fact, is what [he] will get.”
•

Delegate Green, also stated the provision was
prompted by and intended to prohibit the result
allowed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in its
Spina decision where the court upheld a statutory
reduction in pension benefits because chronic
underfunding left insufficient funds to pay benefits
to both current and future retirees.

•

Delegate Kinney similarly remarked that the
proposal was intended “to guarantee that people will
have the rights that were in force at the time they
entered the agreement to become an employee, and
as Mr. Green has said, if the benefits are $100 a
month in 1971, they should be no less than $100 a
month in 1990.”

! Accordingly, the General Assembly could not under the
Clause later require an employee to contribute a greater
percentage of his salary to receive the same benefit, require
him to work more years to receive the same benefit or
unilaterally reduce the amount of an participant’s pension or
benefit rights.
! The provision is intended to be enforceable in circuit court,
including the ability to obtain judicial enforcement of
pension benefit rights and benefit payments, even if a
pension fund is broke or on the “verge of default or imminent
bankruptcy.”
! The Pension Clause was modeled after and is virtually
identical to the New York Constitution’s provision, which
protects pension benefits, according to New York court
decisions, by “prohibiting any action which would impair or
diminish the member’s right to payment of pensions,
annuities, and related monetary advantages.”185
! Pension benefit increases are permissible under the Pension
Clause, including automatic cost of living adjustments.
The drafters stated that it would be “fair” for the legislature
to condition a person’s initial entry into a pension system upon a
contingency that would allow the lowering of the person’s pension

185. Brown, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 650, aff’d, 279 N.Y.S.2d 532 (1967).
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benefits under certain circumstances or at a future time.
The drafters also made clear during the Convention debates
that the Pension Clause was not intended to: (1) require the full
funding of any pension system or require funding up to any given
percentage; or (2) limit the General Assembly’s authority to
consolidate or reorganize the pension system.
While the Convention debates undoubtedly provide fertile
material for determining the intent and purpose of the Pension
Clause, additional evidence exists regarding the scope of the
Clause. The next two sections of this Article recount the failed
efforts to modify the Pension Clause before the Convention
adjourned and how the voters who approved the constitution
understood the Clause. Each of these sections reinforces the view
that the framers intended for the Pension Clause to prohibit the
legislature from unilaterally and adversely changing the terms of
a pension plan after an employee entered the pension system, and
that the voters who ratified the 1970 Constitution had the same
understanding.

H. The Pension Laws Commission’s Failed Efforts to
Change the Pension Clause Before the Convention
Adjourned
After the Convention approved the pension proposal on July
21, 1970, efforts were made in August 1970 to delete or at least
significantly amend the proposal before the Convention adjourned
and the proposed constitution was submitted to voters for
ratification. Indeed, the Convention delegates had several
opportunities to amend the proposal before its final adoption in
late August 1970 and submission to Illinois voters for approval at
a special election held in December 1970.186 As detailed below,

186. After the Convention initially approved Dels. Green and Kinney’s
amendment on July 21, 1970, the proposal went to the Convention’s
Committee on Style and Drafting for editing. On August 12, 1970, the Style
and Drafting Committee submitted its report concerning the Legislative
Article, which included the pension provision as Section 16, to the Convention
for approval. 1 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 117, at 608; 5 PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 143, at 4022–23. The Convention then entertained amendments to the
Committee’s report on August 13, 1970 and no amendments were offered to
the pension provision. 5 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 143, at 4106–07. The
Committee later filed a revised report and filed it with the Convention on
August 27, 1970, which made some minor non-substantive, stylistic changes to
the pension proposal and which were approved by the Convention. 1
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 117, at 643, 670; Part II: Committee & Member
Proposals: Dec. 8, 1969—Sept. 3, 1970, 7 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH
ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 2429, 2584 (1972) [hereinafter 7
PROCEEDINGS], available at http://www.idaillinois.org/cdm/ref/collection/
isl2/id/10512; 5 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 143, at 4257 (statements of Del.
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these attempts to amend the pension proposal were rejected.
1. The Pension Laws Commission’s First Failed Attempt to
Modify the Clause Via Amendment.
Two weeks after the Convention initially approved the
Pension Clause, E.B. Groen, the Chairman of the Pension Laws
Commission and an Illinois State Senator, sent Delegate Henry
Green a letter in early August 1970.187 The General Assembly
created the Commission in 1945 to monitor the status of the
pension system and offer recommendations to the legislature and
public on ways to improve and fund the pension system as well as
the potential impact of proposed pension legislation.188
The letter detailed the Commission’s opposition to the pension
proposal and the Commission’s hope that the proposal would be
withdrawn.189 Groen further stated to Delegate Green that the
Commission believed the proposal was unnecessary and not in the
best interests of pension participants.190 He also opined that the
proposal’s “rigid” and “inflexible” language “would only serve to
curtail” legislative authority to make “reasonable modifications” to
benefits if doing so was necessary to preserve the integrity of the
pension system.191
Based on these concerns, Groen asked Delegate Green to
revise the pension proposal by adding the underlined language to
“lend some flexibility”:
Subject to the authority of the General Assembly to enact
Whalen). The Convention gave final approval to the pension proposal on
August 31, 1970. 1 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 117, at 740; 5 PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 143, at 4515–16. The Convention adjourned on September 3, 1970.
5 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 143, at 4678.
187. Letter from E.B. Groen, Illinois State Senator, Chairman, Ill. Pub.
Emps. Pension Laws Comm’n, to Henry Green (August 7, 1970) [hereinafter
Groen Letter], in GREEN PAPERS, supra note 91. See Article Appendix B (for
the full text of the letter). Accord REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
PENSION LAWS COMMISSION 65–66 (1971) [hereinafter 1971 PENSION LAWS
REPORT] (“Although no formal decision was then made by the Commission, it
was clear to all concerned that the members of the Commission were strongly
opposed to the inclusion of [the pension] provision in the new Constitution.
While time still remained for the Convention to undo or modify its initial
approval of this provision, the delegate who had secured its adoption was
contacted and given a statement of reasons why the Pension Laws
Commission was concerned with the proposal. * * * The Commission would
have preferred Convention reversal and total rejection of the proposed
[pension provision.]”). See Article Appendix D. (for the full text of the report).
188.108½ ILL. REV. STAT. § 22/801-802 (1969).
189. Groen Letter, supra note 187, at 1; 1971 PENSION LAWS REPORT,
supra note 187.
190. Groen Letter, supra note 187 at 1–2.
191. Id.
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reasonable modifications in employee rates of
contribution, minimum service requirements and other
provisions pertaining to the fiscal soundness of the
retirement systems, membership in any pension or
retirement system of the state or any local government,
or any agency or instrumentality of either, shall be an
enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of
which shall not be diminished or impaired.192
Chairman Groen claimed the underlined text would “not
completely foreclose the authority of the General Assembly to
make desirable changes in some of the basic provisions and would
still preserve the pension and benefit expectancies of the members
of these systems.”193 Delegate Green promptly denied Groen’s
request saying that no delegates would support the Commission’s
amendment and that he would not offer it for Convention
consideration.194
2. The Pension Laws Commission’s Second Failed Attempt
to Change the Clause Via a Convention Floor Statement
of Intent
A week before the Convention adjourned in September 1970 a
second attempt was made to allow the legislature to unilaterally
change pension benefit rights. Rubin Cohn, legal advisor to the
Convention’s Judiciary Committee and member of the Pension
Laws Commission, sent Delegate Green a follow-up letter asking
him to read an enclosed statement into the Convention record that
sought to achieve the same objective as the Commission’s
amendment through floor debate.195
The statement provided, in pertinent part, that while the
proposed Pension Clause “is taken from the Constitution of New
York,” “it should not be interpreted as embodying a Convention
intent that it withdraws from the legislature the authority to
make reasonable adjustments or modifications in respect to
employee and employer rates of contribution, qualifying service
and benefit conditions, and other changes designed to assure the
financial stability of pension and retirement funds.”196 This second
192. Id. at 2.
193. Id.
194. 1971 PENSION LAWS REPORT, supra note 187, at 66. Accord Kraus, 390
N.E.2d at 1294 (citing Comment, supra note 34, at 451).
195. Letter from Rubin G. Cohn, Pension Laws Commission member, Staff
Counsel, Judiciary Comm., Ill. Const. Convention (Aug. 27, 1970), in GREEN
PAPERS, supra note 91. See Article Appendix C (for the full text of the letter).
196. Rubin G. Cohn, Enclosed Statement Re Provision Conferring
Contractual Status on Pension Rights, at 1 (Aug. 27, 1970), in GREEN PAPERS,
supra note 91. See Article Appendix C (for the full text of the statement).
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request also failed, and the statement was never read into the
Convention record.197
The Commission later reported of its failed attempts to
modify the Pension Clause in its May 1971 report to the General
Assembly and explained how the Pension Clause presented an
absolute bar the General Assembly’s ability to unilaterally reduce
pension benefits.198 The Commission stated that because of the
Clause “[i]t may be necessary for the General Assembly to resort to
a policy of limiting liberalizing changes in the pension laws to
periods of short during, say 1 or 2 years, with a reexamination of
renewal thereof at the end of this prescribed period.”199 The
contemporaneous nature of the Commission’s overtures and their
rejection by Convention delegates demonstrate that the drafters
(1) were cognizant of the Clause’s broad limitation on legislative
power and (2) intended to immunize pension benefit rights (e.g.,
employee benefits payments, conditions or contribution rates) from
any adverse, unilateral action by General Assembly.

I. The Voters’ Understanding of the Pension Clause
The final piece of Convention history that bears upon the
intended scope of the Pension Clause is the voters’ understanding
of the provision. Since the object of construing a constitutional
provision involves the understanding of the voters who adopted
the provision, Illinois courts look to the official explanation and
press accounts because these sources are “part of the total body of
information by which voters were informed as to the meaning of
the various sections of the constitution.”200 These sources indicate
that voters were informed that the provision protected pension
benefit rights from reductions and granted public employees a
constitutional right to their “full pension benefits.”
Ultimately, the Convention approved Delegates Green and
Kinney’s pension proposal with some minor, non-substantive
197. 1971 PENSION LAWS REPORT, supra note 187, at 66. Accord Kraus, 390
N.E.2d at 1294 (citing Comment, supra note 34, at 451).
198. 1971 PENSION LAWS REPORT, supra note 187, at 68. The report states:
The constitutional provision introduces an unfortunate complicating
obstacle in the formulation of pension principles by the Commission
and the General Assembly. Until now it has been possible rationally
and realistically to experiment with new and untested aspects of
pension policy. That freedom will now be substantially limited since
errors in judgment, as borne out by experience, may become impossible
to rectify if the result would impair or diminish benefits within the
meaning of the constitutional provisions.
Id.
199. Id. at 69
200. Hynes, 390 N.E.2d at 854.
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changes to conform its text to other provisions of the proposed
Constitution.201 The proposal, as finally approved and submitted to
voters, would appear in Article XIII, and read as follows:
Section 5. Pension and Retirement Rights
Membership in any pension or retirement system of the
State, any unit of local government or school district, or
any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall be an
enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of
which shall not be diminished or impaired.202
The Convention stated in its official text and explanation of
the proposed Constitution that under the Pension Clause
“provisions of state and local governmental pension and
retirement systems shall not have their benefits reduced.”203 And,
“membership in such systems shall be a valid contractual
relationship.”204 The Convention’s official explanation also stated
that the Clause was a new section “and self-explanatory.”205 The
Convention’s official text and explanation was mailed to each
registered voter in Illinois and published in newspapers
throughout the State prior to the special referendum election held
in December 1970 to approve the proposed Constitution.206
Similarly, the Illinois State Register reported that the Pension
Clause was a “sweetener” that gave public employees on State,
county, and municipal payrolls “a constitutional right to their full
pension benefits.”207 Other Illinois newspapers simply repeated the
201. 5 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 143, at 4257 (statements of Del. Whalen).
The pension provision was amended to read as follows with changes appearing
in legislative style:
Membership in any pension or retirement systems of the State, or
any unit of local government, or school district, or any agency or
instrumentality of either thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual
relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.
7 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 186, at 2584.
202. Id. at 2747.
203. Id. at 2677. This explanation mirrored the description provided by the
Conventions’ Public Information Committee in its August 21, 1970 Weekly
Summary, which stated the proposed constitution included: “A section on
pension and retirement rights would prohibit retirement benefits from any
State retirement system from being diminished or impaired.” Weekly
Summary (Aug. 21, 1970), in ILL. CONST. CONV. PAPERS, supra note 89, at Box
62, Folder 19.
204. 7 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 186, at 2677.
205. Id. at 2747.
206. Id. at 2667.
207. Charles Scolare, Con-Con Near Windup, ILLINOIS STATE REGISTER
(Springfield), Aug. 27, 1970 (Evening Ed.), in ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION, Box 54, Folder 1 (on file with Abraham Lincoln Presidential
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text of the Clause208 or described it much the same way as the
Illinois State Register.209 As a result, both the official explanation
and newspaper descriptions of the Pension Clause show that
voters were informed that the provision protected pension benefit
rights from reductions and granted public employees a
constitutional right to their “full pension benefits.”
Finally, it is worth recounting the correspondence between

Library).
208. Will Davis, Condensation of Proposed Constitution, QUINCY HERALDWHIG, Aug. 26, 1970, in, ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, Box 54,
Folder 1 (on file with Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library) (“PENSION AND
RETIREMENT: ‘Membership in any pension or retirement system of the state or
any local government, or any agency or instrumentality of either, shall be an
enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be
diminished or impaired.’”).
209. See e.g., Charles Hity, Pensions Safe, BLOOMINGTON PANTAGRAPH,
Dec. 3, 1970, in, ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, Box 53, Folder 7 (on
file with Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library) (noting that
[p]ensions are dear to any person who has ever contributed to a
retirement fund. Con-Con’s Local Government Committee had one of its
hottest weeks after statewide circulation of a rumor that all municipal
pension agreements could be cancelled under a new constitution. Most
legal scholars didn’t consider the question a constitutional problem, but
the delegates recognized a political problem when it hit them. Pension
protection didn’t become part of the Local Government article, but it
was added to the General Provisions article. Section 5 of that article
says, in part, . . . ‘membership in any (public) pension or retirement
system . . . shall be an enforceable contract . . . benefits shall not be
(reduced) . . .’ The Local Government committee turned its attention
back to other things, which are outlined in today’s article.);
Bill O’Connell, Financial Disclosures, PEORIA JOURNAL-STAR, Dec. 7, 1970
(Morning Ed.), in ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, Box 54, Folder 3
(on file with Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library) (“Other general provisions
of the new document: . . . Provide that no pension or retirement benefits of
public employes [sic] can be diminished or impaired.”); Charles N. Wheeler III,
Con Con Votes Down Effort For 3-Group Setup In Remap, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
July 22, 1970, in ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, Box 52, Folder 81
(on file with Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library) (“In other action,
delegates voted 57 to 36 to include a section in the legislative article protecting
pension and retirement rights of state and local government employes [sic].”);
Ed Nash, Dec. 15 Vote May Change Status Quo, WAUKEGAN NEWS-SUN, Sept.
18, 1970, in ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, Box 54, Folder 2 (on file
with Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library) (“Other provisions included in the
proposed constitution: * * * “Public employees’ pension and retirement rights
and benefits would not be diminished or impaired.”); Bill O’Connell,
Constitutional Convention Adjourning: It’s Up to Voters Now; The Old, New?
Four Options or What?, PEORIA JOURNAL-STAR, Sept. 3, 1970 (Morning
Edition), in ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, Box 54, Folder 1 (on file
with Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library) (“Other sections provide for
regulation of corporations by the legislature and guarantee that public
employees’ [sic] pension and retirement rights and benefits may not be
diminished or impaired.”).

208

The John Marshall Law Review

[48:167

Delegate Peter Tomei and a constituent regarding the scope of the
Pension Clause prior to the voters’ ratification of the new
constitution in December 1970. Delegate Tomei voted in favor of
the Pension Clause at the Convention and served as the
chairperson of the Convention’s Suffrage and Constitution
Amending Committee.210 He also chaired the Chicago Bar
Association’s committee calling for the Convention and wrote a
monthly column in the Illinois Bar Journal updating members on
the Convention’s activities.211
In June 1970, Delegate Tomei received a letter from Bernard
Babler, a university employee, about how Delegate Elmer Gertz,
the chairperson of the Convention’s Bill of Rights Committee, had
“refused to take action on a resolution” proposed by the University
of Illinois faculty senates to include constitutional protection for
public pension rights of current employees and retirees.212 In the
letter, Mr. Babler included two attachments, the first was a copy
of the pension rights proposal sent by university retirees to the
delegates in March 1970, and the second was a copy of a resolution
adopted by the University of Illinois faculty senate objecting to
cuts in state contributions to the State Universities Retirement
System (SURS).213 The letter notes the General Assembly’s
continued failure to properly fund SURS and concluded that “[i]f
pension rights of state employees were part of the constitution,
these rights would be permanently vested and not subject to the
changing legislature.214
Delegate Tomei responded to Mr. Babler’s letter on December
4, 1970, just before the special December 15, 1970 election to
approve the new constitution.215 Tomei responded: “I regret that I
was unable to reply to the letter you wrote me during the
Convention. I believe that the Convention adopted the substance
of your recommendation regarding pension rights for public
employees, in Section 5 of the General Article XIII. I urge you to
support the new Constitution and vote on December 15.”216 The
Tomei correspondence provides further evidence that the Clause
was intended to immunize pension benefits from unilateral cuts by
210. 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 53, at 2933; 1 PROCEEDINGS, supra note
117, at xxii.
211. See Peter A. Tomei, A Report on Con-Con, 58 ILL. B.J. 437–38, 531–32,
618–19, 732–34, 828–30, 900–02 (1970); Peter A. Tomei, A Report on Con-Con,
59 ILL. B.J. 56–58, 137–38 (1970).
212. Letter from Bernard J. Babler, to Del. Peter A. Tomei (June 26, 1970),
in TOMEI PAPERS, supra note 93, at Box 15, Folder 1.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Letter from Peter A. Tomei, to Bernard J. Babler (Dec. 4, 1970), in
TOMEI PAPERS, supra note 93, at Box 15, Folder 1 (responding to Letter from
Bernard J. Babler, supra note 212).
216. Id.
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the General Assembly.

J. Concluding Observations Based on the Clause’s Text
and Historical Background
Up to this point, we have traced the status of public pension
law prior to the 1970 Convention, the lobbying efforts of public
employee groups to obtain constitutional protection for pension
benefits rights at the Convention, the Clause’s drafting history
and debates, the failed efforts by the Pension Laws Commission to
modify the Clause during the Convention, and how the Clause was
described to voters who ratified the new Constitution in December
1970. Several observations can be made from this historical
review.
First, prior to the Clause’s adoption, nearly all public
employees were members of mandatory pension plans that lacked
constitutional protection as “contractual” rights and could be
adversely changed by the legislature at any time. These
mandatory plans were also underfunded and no better funded
than the State’s five pension systems today.
Second, public employees believed constitutional protection
was necessary because the State had historically failed to make its
required contributions, and because employees believed that the
State would renege on its obligations should a fiscal crisis arise.
Police and firemen were particularly concerned that municipalities
would use their new “home rule” powers to abandon their local
pension systems. Accordingly, employee groups advocated for a
constitutional provision that would not only protect pension
benefit rights, but also require the full funding of the pension
system.
Third, the drafters of the Clause were aware of the concerns
raised and requests made by public employee groups, the State’s
failure to properly fund the pension system, and the difference in
legal protection afforded to persons participating in a mandatory
and optional pension plan. These concerns, in turn, prompted the
drafters to include the Clause in the new Constitution.
Fourth, the drafters intended for the Clause to (1) protect
pension benefit rights in all pension plans as “enforceable
contractual rights” as of when a public employee became a
member of a pension system, and (2) bar the legislature from later
unilaterally reducing these rights. In particular, the legislature
could not require an employee to contribute a greater percentage
of his or her salary to receive the same benefit, require him or her
to work more years to receive the same benefit, or pay the
employee a lower pension amount or unilaterally reduce his or her
benefit rights.
Fifth, while the drafters did not intend for the Clause to
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require the funding of the pension system at any particular
funding percentage, they nonetheless intended to require that
pension benefit payments be paid when those payments became
due, even if a pension system were to default or be on the verge of
default. Indeed, the drafters contemplated that a participant could
enforce his or her right to benefit payments in court through a
group action to compel payment.
Sixth, the drafters based the Clause on an identical provision
in the New York Constitution, and included the Clause, in part, to
foreclose the circumstance that occurred in New Jersey Supreme
Court’s decision in Spina where the court upheld a unilateral
reduction in pension benefits to retain the pension system.
Seventh, the drafters were aware of the concerns raised by the
Pension Laws Commission that the Clause’s plain language barred
the legislature from making unilateral adverse changes pension
benefits. And, they rejected the Commission’s efforts to alter the
Clause and permit the General Assembly to unilaterally impose
adverse changes to employee contribution rates, service conditions
or other benefit terms.
Eighth, voters ratified the Clause based on the premise that
the provision protected public pension benefit rights from
reductions and that public employees were granted a
constitutional right to their “full pension benefits.”
Finally, a plain language reading of the Pension Clause’s text
makes clear that governmental entities may not unilaterally
reduce or eliminate a public employee’s pension payments and
other membership entitlements once the employee becomes a
pension system member. At the same time, the plain language also
indicates that an employee’s pension payments and other
membership entitlements are “contractual” in nature that may be
presumably altered through mutual assent via contract principles.
Further, the Clause’s prohibitory language against the
diminishment or impairment of pension benefits is cast in absolute
terms and lacks any exceptions. As the Convention’s official text
and explanation put it, the Clause is “self-explanatory.”
With these observations in mind, we next consider how
Illinois courts have interpreted the Pension Clause since it took
effect on July 1, 1971.

II. ILLINOIS COURT DECISIONS INTERPRETING THE
PENSION CLAUSE
The discussion that follows considers how Illinois courts have
thus far construed the Pension Clause. As detailed below, two
general conclusions may be drawn from these decisions. These
conclusions mirror the framers’ intent and voters’ understanding
regarding the Clause and reflect the historical background of the
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provision.
First, public employees and retirees are constitutionally
entitled under the Clause to have their pension benefit rights
determined in accordance with the terms of the Illinois Pension
Code in effect when they entered the pension system as well as
any enhancements they may have received during employment.
The Clause also protects all other benefits found in state statutes
that are “limited to, conditioned on, and flow directly from
membership in one of the State’s various public pension systems,”
including subsidized health care.217 These benefit rights are, in
turn, deemed “vested rights,” which the legislature cannot
unilaterally and adversely modify or repeal. These rights,
however, are subject to change according to contract principles if
employees receive new consideration and assent to the change.
Second, absent express language contained in the Pension
Code that contractually commits the State to a particular funding
formula, the Clause does not constitutionally require the State to
fund the pension system at a specific funding percentage or make
the State’s required contributions according to a specific schedule.
With that said, the Illinois Supreme Court has stated that the
Clause guarantees that pension payments must be made when the
payments are due, and that pension participants would have a
cause of action to receive payment should a pension system default
or be on the verge of default.
As to the first proposition, there are five court cases that best
reveal the evolution of the court’s interpretation of the Clause.218
As to the second proposition, there are three relevant decisions.219
Since these cases factor heavily into the positions of the legal
commentators discussed later below, a detailed review of each case
is necessary. We begin our discussion with the first proposition
and the Illinois Supreme Court’s 1974 decision in Peters v. City of
Springfield.

217. Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 39.
218. Id.; Buddell v. Bd. of Trs., 514 N.E.2d 184 (Ill. 1987); Felt v. Bd. of
Trs., 481 N.E.2d 698 (Ill. 1985); Peters v. City of Springfield, 311 N.E.2d 107
(Ill. 1974); Kraus, 390 N.E.2d 1281.
219. Sklodowski I, 695 N.E.2d 374; McNamee, 672 N.E.2d 1159; People ex
rel. Ill. Fed’n of Teachers v. Lindberg, 326 N.E.2d 749 (Ill. 1975).
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A. The Pension Clause, According to Illinois Courts,
Protects Those Pension Benefit Rights Contained in
the Illinois Pension Code and Other Entitlements
Tied to Membership As of When a Public Employee
Becomes a Member of the Pension System
1. Peters v. City of Springfield
a. Facts and Procedural History
In Peters, three Springfield firemen filed suit to enjoin the city
from enforcing a municipal ordinance that reduced the mandatory
retirement age from 63 to 60. When the firemen were hired the
mandatory retirement age was 63 per state law. The Illinois
Pension Code, though silent on the issue of mandatory retirement,
separately allowed firemen to receive a pension of 50% of salary
after 20 years of service and incremental increases for every year
thereafter up to a maximum of 65% of salary. Each plaintiff was
already older than 60 and had worked 20 years, but only one
qualified for a pension at 65% of salary.
The plaintiffs argued that the city not only exceeded its home
rule authority in reducing the retirement age from 63 (as provided
by state law) to 60, but also impaired the firemen’s ability
maximize their pensions by continuing to work to age 63 in
violation of the Pension Clause. The trial court agreed with the
firemen on both points. On the Pension Clause issue, the trial
court held that the firemen had the right to work until age 63
because that was the retirement age found in the Municipal Code
when the firemen were hired, even though the Pension Code did
not specify a mandatory retirement age. The issues before the
Supreme Court were whether the City of Springfield exceeded its
home rule powers and whether the city’s action violated the
Pension Clause.
b. The Supreme Court’s Analysis and Holding in Peters
After concluding that the city acted within its home rule
powers, the Supreme Court took up the trial court’s holding on the
Pension Clause issue.220 The court observed that the trial court
found the retirement age of 63 to be part of the firemen’s pension
rights because it was applicable when the firemen entered the
pension system.221 The trial court drew no significance from the
fact that the Pension Code lacked any retirement age provision.

220. Peters, 311 N.E.2d at 111–12.
221. Id. at 111.
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The court next briefly outlined how the Pension Clause was
adopted on the Convention floor without the benefit of committee
hearings.222 Also, the court read the debates as only indicating “a
general intent to protect the pension benefits of public employees,
but, other than concern that vested rights not be defeated by
reason of the failure to provide necessary funding, [the debates]
reflect uncertainty as to the scope of the restriction which the
section imposed on legislative bodies.”223
The court then recounted the arguments of the City of
Springfield and City of Chicago as amicus curiae, seeking reversal
of the trial court.224 The City of Springfield, per the court, argued
that no Pension Clause violation occurred because the Pension
Code served as the source of protected pension rights, and the
Code “does not provide that a fireman may work until age 63.”225
The City of Chicago, however, made a broader claim that “the
right to work to a specified age is not a pension benefit” and the
change in retirement age would only indirectly affect the firemen’s
pension benefits.226
The court then observed that a person’s pension formula is
based on salary and length of service and changes to those
variables impacts the pension amount.227 The court further
observed that public employment is “not static” in that various
demands may cause positions to be eliminated or have their duties
or employment conditions changed.228
The court stated it had not previously construed the scope of
the Pension Clause’s phrase “enforceable contractual relationship,”
but noted it was similar to a New York constitutional provision
that had been interpreted by New York courts.229 The court, in
turn, cited several New York decisions along with Rubin Cohn’s
1968 law review article,230 which this Article discussed earlier.231
With these prefatory statements, the court concluded that the
“constitutional debates and authorities” show that “the purpose
and intent of the constitutional provision was to insure that
pension rights of public employees which had been earned should
not be ‘diminished’ or ‘impaired’ but it was not intended, and did
not serve, to prevent the defendant city from reducing the
maximum retirement age, even though the reduction might affect

222. Id. at 112.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See supra notes 30–33, 42 and accompanying text.
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the pensions which plaintiffs would ultimately have received.”232
Based on this reasoning, the court reversed the trial court.
2. Kraus v. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund of
the Village of Niles
a. Kraus’s Factual Background and Procedural History
Prior to Kraus, no Illinois courts had confronted a Pension
Clause challenge to a Pension Code change that reduced the
benefits a current public employee was entitled to under the Code
provisions in effect when the employee entered the pension
system, but was not yet eligible to receive those benefits.233 Five
years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Peters, the Illinois
Appellate Court considered this question in Kraus.
In Kraus, a police officer was hired and entered the pension
232. Peters, 311 N.E.2d at 112.
233. See Kraus, 390 N.E.2d at 1286–88 (discussing the inapplicability of
cases prior to Kraus). Illinois courts came close to deciding the issue discussed
in Kraus in Peifer v. Bd. of Trs., 342 N.E.2d 131 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976). In Peifer,
a police officer petitioned for declaratory judgment on whether he was entitled
to a regular pension after having been on disability for several years. Id. at
132. The police officer sought a regular pension under the Pension Code
provision in place when he joined the pension system, but was repealed by the
legislature shortly before he applied for the regular pension. Id. The trial court
dismissed the petition because the officer had not elected to receive the
pension until after the legislature repealed the Code provision. Id. at 136. The
Illinois Appellate Court reversed and held that the police officer was entitled
to receive the regular pension per the original terms of the Pension Code, not
the amended Code terms. Id. The court explained that applying the amended
Code would drastically reduce the officer’s pension and “diminish the
retirement benefits which the plaintiff became eligible for under” the original
Pension Code provision. Id. at 135. Accordingly, the court concluded that
applying the amended Code to the officer would violate the Pension Clause. Id.
The Illinois Supreme Court also came close to the issue in Kerner v. State
Employees’ Retirement System. 382 N.E.2d 243 (Ill. 1978). In Kerner, the
Supreme Court held that a former Governor’s felony conviction during office
caused him to forfeit his pension benefits per the terms of the Pension Code
when he entered the system. The court stated that the forfeiture provision was
part of the pension plan when he became a member of that plan and that the
Pension Clause only protected the “contractual relationship” existing at the
time of membership.
By implication, Kerner supports Kraus’s holding that the Pension Clause
safeguards the Pension Code provisions in place when a person becomes a
member of the system, even though the person is not yet eligible to receive
benefits under those provisions. See DiFalco v. Bd. of Trs., 521 N.E.2d 923, 925
(Ill. 1988) (noting that per Kerner, the “contractual relationship” under the
Pension Clause “is governed by the actual terms of the Pension Code at the
time the employee becomes a member if the pension system. Therefore, in
determining plaintiff’s rights under the Pension Code, we must look to the
language of the relevant statutes in effect . . . when the plaintiff began paying
into the pension fund.”).
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system in 1956, but was later placed on disability in 1967 due to
an on-duty injury. At the time he entered the pension system, the
Pension Code permitted an officer to receive a regular pension if
the officer reached age 50 and had 20 years of service. An officer
could fulfill the 20-year service requirement either by having 20
years of active service or by having 20 combined years of active
service and years on disability.
The Code also allowed an officer placed on disability to receive
a regular pension of 50% of the salary attached to the officer’s
rank for the year he or she decided to retire. Put differently, the
Code allowed an officer not only to stay on disability to meet the
pension eligibility requirements as to years of service, but also to
receive a regular pension based on the salary for his or her rank
for the year he or she elected to retire, not the applicable salary
when the officer went on disability.
In 1973, before the officer reached age 50 and met the 20-year
requirement, the General Assembly changed the Pension Code.
The Code was amended to only give an officer placed on disability
a regular pension of 50% of the salary attached to their rank when
the person was placed on disability, not the higher salary existing
when the officer decided to retire. In 1976, the officer reached age
50 and met the 20-year service requirement. He also decided to
retire and applied for a regular pension.
Based on the statutory change, the police pension board
denied the officer’s request for a pension based on 50% of the
higher salary amount in effect in 1976. Instead, the board applied
the Pension Code change to the plaintiff and awarded him the
reduced pension based on 50% of the (lower) salary for his rank at
the time he went on disability in 1967. The trial court reversed the
board’s decision and the board appealed.
b. The Issue Before the Kraus court and Its Analysis
The issue before the Appellate Court was whether the
Pension Clause entitled the officer “to receive a pension based on a
section of the Pension Code in effect at the time of his entry into
the pension system and at the time the [Clause] became effective,
although the section was subsequently repealed and replaced prior
to the time plaintiff retired or became eligible to retire.”234 The
appellate court concluded that the officer was “entitled to receive
benefits under the relevant sections of the Pension Code as in
effect at the time the constitutional provision became effective in
1971.”235

234. Kraus, 390 N.E.2d at 1283.
235. Id. at 1289, 1290–92.
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Kraus’s Discussion of Illinois Pension Cases Predating
the 1970 Constitution

To support its conclusion, the appellate court extensively
reviewed Illinois’s public pension law prior to the adoption of the
1970 Constitution, the Clause’s plain language, Convention
debates, Illinois cases construing the Pension Clause, and New
York cases construing that state’s identical constitutional
provision. As an initial matter, the court defined the term
“vesting,” in the context of “pension benefits.”236 The court
explained that “vesting” referred “to a contractual right to an
interest in a pension that may be upheld at law,” not a functional
understanding whereby a person fulfilled the specific qualifying
conditions under a retirement plan to receive a benefit.237
From this starting point, the court detailed how prior to the
1970 Constitution only the pension benefits of participants in
optional retirement system plans were deemed “contractual
rights.” These rights, the court stated, were “vested from the time
the employee began contributing to the pension fund” and
protected under the 1870 Constitution’s Contracts Clause.238 The
rights also “entitled” a person in an optional plan “to a pension
based on the statute in effect at the time he entered the system,
rather than the statute as amended prior to his retirement.”239
Pension benefits of participants in mandatory plans, in contrast,
were merely “gratuities” that could be legislatively reduced or
eliminated at any time.240
d. Kraus’s Review of the Constitutional Debates
Relying on the Convention statements of Delegates Green and
Kinney, the court determined that the drafters intended for the
Pension Clause to eliminate the different legal protections
provided to pensions under optional and mandatory plans.241 The
court also observed that the drafters modeled the Clause after a
New York constitutional provision and “intended to achieve the
same results [as that provision] by adopting” its language.242 The
court held that when the Pension Clause took effect in 1971, “its
purpose and effect was to guarantee that [the plaintiff] would
receive no less than the benefits he would receive under that

236. Id. at 1284.
237. Id. at 1284–85.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1284–85.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1291–92.
242. Id. at 1288.
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pension.”243
The court continued that applying the legislature’s 1973
Pension Code “amendment to the plaintiff would amount to a
change in the terms of his contract with [the] pension system 17
years after he embarked upon his employment and 2 years after
the constitution fixed the terms of the contract, and would directly
diminish his benefits under the contract.”244 Accordingly, the court
held that the 1973 amendment could not constitutionally apply to
the plaintiff under the Pension Clause because he was “entitled to
receive the benefits under the relevant sections of the Pension
Code as in effect at the time the constitutional provision became
effective in 1971.”245
e.

Kraus’s Reliance on Relevant New York Court Decisions

The court then stated its holding was supported by New York
court interpretations of that state’s identical constitutional
provision.246 Reliance on New York cases was appropriate, the
court explained, because the drafters intended for the Pension
Clause to follow the results of the New York provision.247 These
cases, according to the court, made clear that employee pension
rights became fixed as of the time the employee entered the
pension system or the time the constitutional amendment became
operative, whichever is later, but not at the time of retirement.248
The court also took particular notice of Kleinfeldt v. New
York—as would the Illinois Supreme Court in 1985—where the
New York court of appeals held that a statute adversely changing
the salary base on which retirement benefits were computed could
not constitutionally apply to those who became members of the
system prior to the statute’s effective date.249 Because the drafters
modeled the Pension Clause after New York’s, the court
distinguished the Clause from the constitutional provisions of
Alaska, Hawaii, and Michigan, which only safeguarded pension
benefits that had been “accrued.”250
f.

Kraus’s Treatment of the Supreme Court’s Peters
Decision

The Peters decision, according to the appellate court, did not

243. Id. at 1289.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1289–90.
248. Id. at 1290.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1291.
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sanction a contrary result because its description of protecting
“earned” benefits was uttered “in the context of a reduction in the
mandatory retirement age, which had only indirect effect on the
benefits the plaintiffs might ultimately receive.”251 The court
explained that characterizing the plaintiff’s “17 years of service”
prior to the Pension Code change as “fully accrued” would “be an
unwarranted judicial engraftment on the constitutional provision
and would frustrate the express intent of its drafters.”252
g.

The Appellate Court’s Conclusion and Reasoning

In closing, the Kraus court refuted the arguments of the
Illinois Attorney General and local pension board that its
interpretation of the Pension Clause “would result in absurdity or
injustice.”253 The court reiterated its holding: the Clause “prohibits
legislative action which directly diminished the benefits to be
received by those who became members of the pension system
prior to the enactment of the legislation, though they are not yet
eligible to retire.”254
The Clause, according to the court, did not apply to
“[l]egislative action directed toward another aim” and having “an
incidental effect on the pensions which employees would
ultimately receive”.255 The legislature could, based on analogous
New York cases, reduce for independent reasons the mandatory
retirement age, work hours, and salaries because these changes
only involved an “indirect effect on the pension benefits ultimately
received.”256 The legislature could also require employees to
provide 30 days notice before retiring.257 The court also stated in
dicta that the legislature could increase the contributions rates of
some employees to equalize them with the contribution rates of
others.258 Further, since pension benefits were “contractual” under
the Clause and governed by the “actual terms of the contract or
pension,” the court noted “there is nothing to prohibit an employee
from agreeing, for consideration, to accept a reduction in benefits”
as illustrated by New York cases.259
Based on these observations, the court found there was no
merit to the Attorney General and pension board’s fears that the
court’s holding would create a parade of horribles. The court

251. Id. at 1291–92.
252. Id. at 1292.
253. Id. at 1292.
254. Id. at 1292–93.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 1293.
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further concluded that there was no support for the argument that
the General Assembly retained “a reasonable power of
modification, even to diminish benefits to be received by prior
members of the pension system.”260 The court explained (as this
Article has above) that during the constitutional convention, the
sponsors of the Clause rejected two attempts by the Pension Laws
Commission to add such authority through an amendment to the
Clause and statement of intent.261
h. A Summary of Kraus’s Main Points
In sum, Kraus was the first Illinois court decision to
comprehensively review the Pension Clause’s history, Convention
debates, and existing case law, and to apply that background to a
circumstance where the legislature attempted to reduce the
pension benefits of a current employee not yet eligible to retire.
The court concluded that the Clause’s original intent barred such
legislative action because employees were entitled to the pension
benefit rights existing in the Pension Code at the time they began
contributing to the pension system. This conclusion, the court
noted, was in accord with New York cases and how Illinois courts
treated the pension benefits of employees participating in optional
retirement plans under the 1870 Illinois Constitution.
The court also clarified that pension benefit rights were
“contractual” in nature under the Clause, and as such could be
modified if an employee received consideration and accepted the
reduction in benefits. Similarly, the court noted that the Clause
would not be violated if a person lost his or her pension due to noncompliance with terms or contingencies outlined in the plan when
the person entered the system. Finally, the court rejected the
notion that the General Assembly somehow retained a “reserved
power” to modify and reduce pension benefits because neither the
Clause’s text nor drafting history supported that view. On this last
point, the court found instructive the failed efforts of the Pension
Laws Commission to alter the Clause during the Convention.
3. Felt v. Board of Trustees of the Judges Retirement
System
a. Facts and Procedural Background
In 1985, six years after the Kraus decision, the Illinois
Supreme Court in Felt addressed for the first time whether an
adverse unilateral change to the Pension Code applied to current

260. Id.
261. Id.
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participants of a pension system. The three judges and a widower
filed suit against the retirement system after the system applied
an amendment to the Pension Code that lowered the salary
formula used to determine their respective pensions, rather than
the more favorable salary formula in place when they began
contributing to the system as members. When they entered the
system, the Code allowed judges to retire with a pension based on
the salary of the last day of service. While the plaintiffs were
serving on the bench, the legislature through separate legislation
not only increased judicial salaries, but also changed the Code,
effective July 1, 1982, to provide judges with pensions based on an
average of a judge’s salary during the last year of service.
The judges argued that the system’s application of the Code
change violated the Pension Clause and the Contracts Clause. The
trial court agreed, and held that the Code change could apply only
to new judges entering the system. The Illinois Attorney General
appealed both legal issues to the Supreme Court.
b. The Court’s Analysis and Holding That the Statute at
Issue Violated the Pension Clause and Contracts Clause
Relying on Delegate Green’s convention statements, the
Supreme Court concluded that the Pension Clause was intended to
protect pension benefits “by first creating a contractual
relationship between the employer and the employee” and by
“mandat[ing] [that] the General Assembly not impair or diminish
these rights.”262 The court further concluded by quoting from
Delegate Kinney’s statements that the Clause was intended “to
simply give [public employees] a basic protection against
abolishing their rights completely or changing the terms of their
rights after they embarked upon the employment—to lessen
them.”263
From these premises, the court observed Peters’s
determination that annuities are based on length of service and
salary, and any changes in those factors will affect the amount of
the annuity.264 The court held that since the Pension Code change
at issue “clearly effects a reduction or impairment in the
retirement benefits to the plaintiffs” the change constituted a
“violation of the constitutional assurance of section 5, Article
XIII.”265
The court further explained that the Pension Clause was
modeled after an “almost identical” “provision in the New York

262. Felt, 481 N.E.2d at 699–700.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 700.
265. Id.
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Constitution.”266 The court also pointed to a New York court
decision analogous to Felt that reached the same conclusion.267 The
court noted that the Supreme Court in Bardens v. Board of
Trustees invalidated a nearly identical statutory change to the
pension formula under the 1870 Illinois Constitution’s Contracts
Clause.268 The earlier statute “had the effect of changing the basis
of calculation of a retirement annuity from the judge’s salary on
the last day of service to the judge’s average salary over last four
years of service” whereas the statute in Felt used the judge’s
average salary over the last year of service.269 The Bardens court
struck down the statute because the plaintiff had originally
contracted for the right to receive a pension “measured by the
salary that he was receiving upon the date of his retirement.”270
From this proposition, the court found Bardens controlling and
held that the statute also violated the Contracts Clause.271
c.

The Court Rejects the Attorney General’s Arguments

After making these holdings, the court addressed the
Attorney General’s argument that the “reduction in retirement
benefits” should be upheld because it was an “insubstantial”
impairment of benefits, and because the legislature had the power
to modify benefits under its police power.272 Initially, the court
acknowledged that “the contracts clause does not immunize
contractual obligations from every conceivable kind of impairment
or from the effect of a reasonable exercise by the States of their
police power.”273 Rather, “the severity of the impairment measures
the height of the hurdle the legislation must clear.”274 The court
then stated that “presumably the defendants would offer a similar
contention regarding [the Pension Clause] on the question of
diminution and impairment of benefits.”275
Curtly, the court stated that the Attorney General’s
“argument is not convincing” because the statute effectuated a
substantial impairment, and because Bardens similarly found that
a contract clause violation “was not defensible as a reasonable
exercise of police power.”276 The court continued that while the
legislature has an “undeniable interest and responsibility in
266. Id. at 700.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 701.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 701–02.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 701–02.
275. Id. (emphasis added).
276. Id. at 702.
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ensuring the adequate funding of the state pension systems, there
was no evidence that the underfunding was due to judicial
retirements or timing their retirements after salary increases.”277
The court also observed that the Pension Laws Commission,
which had the statutory duty to study the financial problems of
the pension systems, “did not act to restrict retirement benefits
because of judicial pay increases.”278 The court stated that “the
conclusion to be drawn” was “that the amendment severely
impairs the retirement benefits of the plaintiffs and those
similarly situated and on the record here is not defensible as a
reasonable exercise of the State’s police powers.”279
d. The Court Endorses the Appellate Court’s Decision in
Kraus
Finally, the court addressed the Attorney General’s argument
that the court should permit a reduction in benefits despite
analogous New York and Illinois decisions because “there are
jurisdictions which permit reductions in retirement benefits,” and
because Alaska, Hawaii, and Michigan are three states with
“constitutional provision relating to pensions.”280 The court
responded by relying on Kraus that “in those constitutional
provisions, unlike ours and that of New York, there is restrictive
language that has permitted modifications in benefits.”281 The
court continued that “[i]n order to accept the defendants’ argument
we would have to ignore the plain language of the Constitution of
Illinois, reject the New York decisions on the constitutional
provision which was the model for section 5 of article XIII, and
overrule this court’s decision in Bardens.”282
4. Buddell v. Board of Trustees of the State University
Retirement System
In 1987, two years after its Felt decision, the Illinois Supreme
Court issued its decision in the Buddell case, which involved
another challenge to a unilateral and adverse Pension Code
change affecting the pension rights of a current university
employee. As detailed below, the Supreme Court not only clarified
the scope of its 1974 Peters decision, but also endorsed the
Appellate Court’s decision in Kraus.

277. Id.
278. Id. at 702.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 702.
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a. Facts and Procedural History
In Buddell, a university employee started working in 1969
and entered SURS that same year. Before working for the
university, the employee had previously been in the military. At
the time he entered the system, the Pension Code allowed
employees to purchase service credit for their time in the military.
The Code was amended in 1974—three years after the Pension
Clause took effect—to repeal the purchase option prospectively for
new employees, and to require current employees to exercise that
option by September 1, 1974. The original Code provision, in
contrast, did not impose any deadline by which employees had to
exercise the purchase option. The employee applied for the service
credit in 1983, and the retirement system denied the request
because the employee had not made the election by the deadline
contained in the amended Code.
The trial court reversed the system’s decision and held the
1974 Pension Code change unconstitutional under the Clause. The
trial court reasoned that the employee was constitutionally
entitled to exercise the option at any time because the Code lacked
a time limitation when he entered the system and when the
Pension Clause took effect in 1971. The Attorney General appealed
the decision to the Supreme Court. The issue on review was
whether the military service credit provision in the Pension Code
existing prior to the 1974 Code amendment as a protected benefit
under the Pension Clause.283
b. The Supreme Court Analyzes and Distinguishes Peters
The Supreme Court began its analysis by reviewing the
Clause’s Convention debates and drew three conclusions.284 The
delegates intended for the provision to (1) characterize and
guarantee pension benefits under a “contractual” theory, (2)
eliminate the former distinction in legal protection provided to
benefits under mandatory and optional retirement plans, and (3)
ensure that “the vested rights of pension plan participants not be
defeated or diminished.”285
The court then observed that Peters held that the Clause does
not prohibit all changes in the terms of employment that might
affect an employee’s retirement benefits, including a change to the
mandatory retirement age.286 The court pointed out, however, that
in Peters, “[t]here was no provision concerning retirement age in

283. Buddell, 514 N.E.2d at 186.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
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the Pension Code.”287 To this point, the court stated that the City
of Springfield and its amicus had argued that the Pension Clause
only protects those pension benefit rights set forth in the Pension
Code.288 But, Peters “did not specifically reply to that argument”
even though the court noted various provisions in Municipal Code
governing mandatory retirement.289
The Buddell court then stated that the instant case involved
rights “contained within the Pension Code itself and not provided
for in some statutory provision relating to other matters which
incidentally affect pension benefits.”290 In addition, those rights
were in the Code when the employee entered the system and when
the Pension Clause took effect.291 As a result, the court concluded
“[t]here can be no doubt . . . that upon the effective date of [the
Pension Clause] the rights conferred upon the plaintiff by the
Pension Code became contractual in nature and cannot be altered,
modified or released except in accordance with usual contract
principles.”292
c.

The Court Rejects the Attorney General’s Arguments

The court thereafter addressed the Attorney General’s
argument that the plaintiff had no rights under the military
service credit provision because “he had taken no step to avail
himself of his benefit prior to the statutory cut-off date provided
for in the [Pension Code] amendment.”293 The Attorney General
cited the Appellate Court’s decision in Ziebell v. Board of Trustees
Police Pension Fund of the Village of Forest Park294 for the
proposition that the employee had “provided no consideration for
these additional benefits.”295
The court rejected the argument and found Ziebell
unsupportive of the Attorney General’s position.296 The court
explained that Ziebell would apply “in our case only if the plaintiff
were seeking to receive the additional military service pension
benefit without paying the additional amount required by the
Pension Code.”297 The court continued that because the Pension
Code provided that the plaintiff could purchase military service
credit in the retirement system when he joined the system, “[t]his
287. Id.
288. Id. at 187.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Ziebell v. Bd. of Trs., 392 N.E.2d 101, 105–06 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
295. Buddell, 514 N.E.2d at 187.
296. Id.
297. Id.

2014]

Is Welching on Public Pension Promises an Option for Illinois?

225

right to purchase additional credit became a contractual right
under [the Pension Clause].”298 In addition, “[t]he consideration
[the plaintiff paid] for that contractual right was the same as for
any other right conferred by the Pension Code, his employment
and continued employment by the public body, and, in addition,
his prior military service.”299
d. The Court Endorses the Appellate Court’s Kraus
Decision
In closing, the court stated that Kraus “held that the plaintiff
was entitled to receive a pension based on the relevant section of
the Pension Code in effect at the time that [the Pension Clause]
became effective.”300 And, the court found “[t]his holding” to be “in
accord with our holding in this case.”301 The court stated that
Kraus arrived at its holding by considering “the pre-1970
distinction between mandatory and optional pensions plans, the
constitutional debates and many decision[s] of the courts of New
York construing its constitutional provision, after which [the
Clause] was patterned.”302 The court continued that Ziebell does
not conflict with Kraus or Buddell’s holding because “in Ziebell the
plaintiff was seeking to receive additional pension payments for
which no contribution had been made,” whereas the plaintiff, in
the instant case, was “seeking to enforce his right to purchase the
additional service credit toward his pension.”303
Accordingly, the court held that the “rights to exercise this
option and make these additional payments are contractual rights
by virtue of [the Pension Clause], and the legislature cannot divest
the plaintiff of these rights.”304 The court further held that its
interpretation of the Clause, “as discussed in Kraus,” was “in
accord with the decisions of the New York courts interpreting”
that state’s “comparable constitutional provision.”305
5. Kanerva v. Weems
In July 2014, the Illinois Supreme Court again considered the
scope of the Pension Clause in Kanerva v. Weems.306 At issue in
Kanerva was whether subsidized retiree healthcare premiums

298. Id. at 187–88.
299. Id. at 188.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 188.
306. Kanerva, 2014 IL 115811.
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qualified as protected “benefits” under the Clause when those
premium subsidies were set forth in a statute separate and apart
from the Pension Code, and provided only to persons who were
defined as annuitants of SERS, SURS, TRS, GARS, or JRS. For
the court, this was an issue of first impression307 because its
previous decisions had only dealt with statutory provisions found
either within the Pension Code or outside of the Pension Code,308
but the purported benefit was not expressly contingent upon a
person’s membership in a public pension system.309
As detailed below, in a 6–1 decision, the court in Kanerva not
only held that subsidized healthcare premiums constituted
“benefits” under the Clause based on its plain language and
purpose, but also profoundly broadened the protective scope of the
Clause. The court concluded that the Clause protects any
“benefits”—whether found in the Pension Code or in other State
statutes—that are “limited to, conditioned on, or flow[ing] from [a
person’s] membership in one of the State’s various public pension
systems,”310 including “subsidized healthcare, disability and life
insurance coverage, and eligibility to receive a retirement annuity
and survivor benefits.”311 The majority opinion also drew a sharp
dissenting opinion from Justice Anne Burke.
a. Facts and Procedural History
In Kanerva, the court considered the constitutionality of
Public Act 97-695, which the General Assembly enacted in 2012
and which reduced the retiree healthcare premium subsidies the
State paid based on a retiree’s years of service credit. Prior to that
Act, persons who were defined as certain SERS, SURS, or TRS
annuitants received a 5% premium subsidy for each year of service
credit up to 100%. The statutory provision providing the graduated
premium subsidies was set forth in Section 10 of the State
Employee Group Insurance Act (“Insurance Act”) and enacted in
1997 and 1998. The graduated premium subsidies were also
memorialized in collective bargaining agreements between public
sector unions representing State employees participating from
1997 through 2012. The Insurance Act also provided premium-free
retiree healthcare coverage for GRS and JRS members.
As mentioned above, the Insurance Act expressly conditioned
the receipt of premium subsidies on person’s status as an SERS,
307. Id. ¶ 42.
308. See e.g., Felt, 481 N.E.2d at 699–702; Buddell, 514 N.E.2d at 186–87.
309. See e.g., Peters, 311 N.E.2d at 112; Kouzoukas v. Ret. Bd. of
Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chi., 917 N.E.2d 999, 1015–18 (Ill.
2009).
310. Kanerva, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 38.
311. Id. ¶ 39.
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SURS, TRS, GARS or JRS “annuitant.” By eliminating the
premium subsidy provision for SERS, SURS, and TRS members,
and the premium-free coverage for GARS and JRS members,
Public Act 97-695 now required all retirees to pay healthcare
premiums based on levels annually determined by the Department
of Central Management Services via administrative rule. The
Department’s rules required retirees to pay either 1% or 2% of
their annual pension amount plus a portion of their group health
benefits based on their years of service credit.
The plaintiffs in the case were four different groups of retirees
collectively participating in SERS, SURS, TRS, GARS, and JRS
who first began receiving pensions after January 1, 1998 as well as
SERS and TRS retirees who elected to retire under an early
retirement program enacted in 2002. For these retirees, Public Act
97-695 now required them to pay retiree healthcare premiums for
the first time or much higher premiums than before. The plaintiffs
filed four separate complaints in three different judicial circuits
that were ultimately consolidated by the Illinois Supreme Court in
Seventh Judicial Circuit in Sangamon County.
Collectively, the complaints alleged that the free or subsidized
retiree healthcare premiums qualified as protected “benefits”
under the Pension Clause and that Public Act 97-695 diminished
or impaired these benefits. Some but not all of the plaintiffs also
alleged, among other things, that Public Act 97-695 violated the
Contracts Clause of the Illinois Constitution and constituted a
breach of the State’s prior collective bargaining agreements with
public sector unions and thereby triggering the payment of
damages by the State.
After consolidation of the separate actions, the Illinois
Attorney General moved to dismiss the complaints under Sections
2-615 and 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure for failing to state a
cause of action. The Attorney General argued that the Pension
Clause only protects traditional pension benefits and does not
encompass the State’s obligation to contribute toward the cost of
healthcare benefits for retired state employees and their survivors.
The Attorney General further argued that Public Act 97-695 did
not violate the Illinois Constitution’s Contract Clause because the
healthcare subsidies were not tantamount to contractual rights.
As to the breach of contract claim, the Attorney General asserted
that the claim belonged before the Illinois Court of Claims because
the trial lacked jurisdiction over money damage actions against
the State.
After briefing and oral argument, the trial court entered an
order in March 2013 dismissing all of plaintiffs’ claims based on
the ground asserted by the Attorney General. The trial court
agreed with the Attorney General’s position that Pension Clause
only protects the benefits set forth in the Pension Code.
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Accordingly, the trial court found that the subsidies fell outside of
the Clause’ protection because the statutory provision establishing
the subsidies was not set forth in the Code, but in the Insurance
Act.
As support for this conclusion, the trial court observed that
the Pension Code and Insurance Act were “structurally separate
and substantially different” in that pensions were paid with
moneys from a particular pension fund and actuarially certain
while healthcare subsidies were paid with moneys from the State’s
General Revenue Fund and medical costs change with advances in
technology and treatment. The trial court further observed that
the New York’s highest court similarly concluded that healthcare
benefits were not protected “benefits” under that state’s nearly
identical provision, which had served as the model for the Pension
Clause of the Illinois Constitution.
As for plaintiffs’ Contracts Clause claim, the trial court found
that the claim failed because the healthcare subsidies were not
vested or contractual rights. The trial court explained that a
statute does not generally create vested or contractual rights
unless it contains clear and unmistakable language to the
contrary. Absent such language, a statute “merely declares a
policy” that the legislature can alter or repeal at any time. Because
the provision in the Insurance Act granting healthcare subsidies
lacked unmistakably clear language, the trial court concluded that
the subsidies were not vested or contractual rights and
consequently the General Assembly was free to eliminate the
provision. As for plaintiffs’ claim that the State’s breached its
collective bargaining agreements, the trial court held that the
claim belonged before the Illinois Court of Claims since it sought
money damages.
b. The Supreme Court’s Analysis and Holding in Kanerva
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court stated the central issue
before it was whether the trial court erred in dismissing the
plaintiffs’ complaints that Public Act 97-695 violated the Pension
Clause. After reciting the applicable rules of interpreting
constitutional provisions, the court concluded that the Clause’s
plain language made it clear that “if something qualifies as a
benefit of the enforceable contractual relationship resulting from
membership in one of the State’s pension or retirement systems, it
cannot be diminished or impaired.”312 As a result, the key question
presented was “whether a health insurance subsidy provided in
retirement qualifies as a benefit of membership” under the

312. Id. ¶ 38.
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Clause.313
In analyzing this question, the court first observed that
“Illinois law affords most state employees a package of benefits in
addition to the wages they are paid”, including “subsidized health
care, disability and life insurance coverage, [and] eligibility to
receive a retirement annuity and survivor benefits.”314 These
benefits, the court noted, “were provided when [the Pension
Clause] was proposed to Illinois voters for approval, as they are
now.”315 Most importantly, though, eligibility for these benefits
were “limited to, conditioned on, and flow[ed] directly from
membership in one of the State’s various public pension
systems.”316
According to the court, because of the “plain and ordinary
meaning” of the Clause’s language, “all of these benefits, including
subsidized healthcare, must be considered benefits of membership
in a pension or retirement system of the State and, therefore,
within that provision’s protections.”317 The fact that the benefits
were governed by provisions set forth in the Pension Code or in
another State statute was unimportant so long the benefits were
conditioned upon a person’s membership in a pension system.318
Based on this conclusion and reasoning, the court then
rejected the Attorney General’s argument that the Clause only
protects those benefits found in the Pension Code. The court stated
that if the drafters of the Clause “had intended to protect only core
pension annuity benefits and exclude various other benefits state
employers were and are entitled to receive as a result of
membership in the State’s pensions [sic] systems, the drafters
could have so specified. But they did not.”319 Instead, “the drafters
chose expansive language that goes beyond annuities and the
terms of the Pension Code, defining the range of protected benefits
broadly to encompass those attendant to membership in the
State’s retirement systems.”320 As a result, the court stated that
“to hold that [subsidized health care] benefits are not among the
benefits of membership protected by the constitution would
require us to construe [the Clause] in a way that the plain
language of the provision does not support.” In addition, the court
stated that it could “not rewrite the pension protection clause to
include restrictions and limitations that the drafters did not

313. Id. ¶¶ 32–37.
314. Id. ¶ 39.
315. Id.
316. Id. ¶ 40.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. ¶ 41.
320. Id.
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express and the citizens of Illinois did not approve.”321
The court next addressed and rejected the Attorney General’s
argument that the Clause’s constitutional convention debates
supported her position. The court observed that while it had
considered these debates in past cases, “none of those cases
involved the question of whether certain benefits attendant to
membership in a state retirement system covered by the
protections guaranteed by [the Clause].”322 And since the issue at
hand could be decided based on the Clause’s plain language, the
debates were of little utility in construing such language.323
Moreover, “[e]ven if reference to the convention debates were
appropriate,” the court stated “it would not aid the State’s
position.”324 After referring to the remarks of several convention
delegates, particularly the Clause’s principal sponsors,325 the court
concluded that the Clause “was intended to eliminate the
uncertainty that existed under the traditional classification of
retirement systems [as either mandatory or optional] and to
guarantee that retirement rights enjoyed by public employees
would be afforded contractual status and insulated from
diminishment or impairment by the General Assembly.”326 Also,
the Clause “was aimed at protecting the right to receive the
promised retirement benefits, not the adequacy of the funding to
pay them.”327 “To infer more, however, would require more than
the reports of the floor debate would reasonably support” and
there was “nothing in the debates” evincing an intention “to treat
annuitant health care benefits differently from other benefits of
pension and retirement system membership then in effect.”328
The court also found that its conclusion was supported by a
2010 decision from the Hawaii Supreme Court, which considered
the same issue in the context of a similar pension protection
provision contained in the Hawaii state constitution.329 The court
observed that, as with Illinois law, Hawaii state law “confer[red]
on public employees a package of benefits which includes both
health insurance and eligibility for retirement annuities.”330 And
as in Illinois, eligibility for health coverage was “addressed in a
separate statute from the law governing retirement annuities” and
“conditioned on membership” in a public retirement system.331 The
321. Id.
322. Id. ¶ 42.
323. Id.
324. Id. ¶ 43.
325. Id. ¶¶ 45–47.
326. Id. ¶ 48.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. ¶ 49 (citing Everson, 228 P.3d 282).
330. Id.
331. Id.
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court stated that from this analysis the Hawaii Supreme Court
reached the same conclusion that the health care benefits were
protected because they derived “from and are conditioned on
membership in a public retirement system”.332
The court further found that its conclusion was not
undermined by the fact that New York’s highest court had ruled
that the New York Constitution’s pension provision only protected
“benefits directly related to the terms of the retirement annuity,”
and not retiree healthcare subsidies.333 The court offered three
reasons.
First, the court agreed with the finding of the Hawaii
Supreme Court it had earlier referenced, which found the New
York court decision distinguishable and unpersuasive. Second, the
court recounted how retiree healthcare benefits were part of the
package of benefits provided to state employees at the time the
Pension Clause was proposed, and how eligibility for all those
benefits was tied to a person’s membership in one of the State’s
pension systems, which made them constitutionally protected. The
court reiterated that there was nothing in the Clause’s plain
language, history, or convention debates indicating a contrary
result that the Clause only protected the retirement annuity itself.
Finally, the court noted that, unlike in the New York case, the
Illinois law at issue did not involve a mere increase in the
contribution levels of retirees consistent with the boundaries of
existing law, but rather a complete elimination of those subsidies.
The court was also not persuaded by the Attorney General’s
final argument that healthcare benefits lacked constitutional
protection because “health care costs and benefits are governed by
a different set of calculations that retirement annuities.” The court
stated that while it is true the two benefits are calculated
differently, it was “also legally irrelevant.”334 The court again
repeated its earlier conclusion: “Whether a benefit qualifies for
protection under [the Clause] turns simply on whether it is derived
from membership in one of the State’s public pension systems. If it
qualifies as a benefit of membership, it is protected. If it does not,
it is not.”335
Finally, the court explained that “to the extent that there may
be any remaining doubt regarding the meaning or effect of” the
provisions set forth in the Clause, the court was “obliged to resolve
that doubt in favor of the members of the State’s public retirement
systems.”336 Accordingly, the court concluded that the trial court
erred in dismissing the plaintiffs’ Pension Clause claim because
332. Id.
333. Id. ¶¶ 50–53.
334. Id. ¶ 54.
335. Id.
336. Id. ¶ 55.
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retiree healthcare benefits qualified as protected benefits and “the
General Assembly was precluded from diminishing or impairing
that benefit for those employees, annuitants, and survivors whose
rights were governed by the version of section 10 of the [Insurance
Act] that was in effect prior to the enactment of Public Act 97695.”337 The court then remanded the case to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with the majority’s opinion.
c. Justice Anne Burke’s Dissent
Justice Burke issued a dissent nearly as long as the majority
opinion’s analysis that made two points.338 First, Justice Burke
disagreed with the majority’s holding that retiree healthcare
subsidies constituted protected “benefits” under the Clause.
Second, she disagreed with the majority’s disposition of the case to
not review the plaintiffs’ remaining claims. The first point raised
by Justice Burke is discussed below.
On her first point, Justice Burke opined that the Clause only
“protects pensions, not subsidized healthcare premiums.”339 To
support her view, she first looked to the Clause’s title—“Pension
and Retirement Rights”—as an indication that the Clause is
limited to protecting “pension and retirement rights,” and that this
phrase was defined as a “plan or fund that provides retirement
income to employees.”340 She next referred to one of the court’s
earlier decisions, which held that the benefits subject to the
Clause’s protection are “the actual terms of the Pension Code at
the time the employee becomes a member of the pension
system.”341
From this basis, she found that retiree healthcare subsidies
were not protected benefits because they were not set forth in
Pension Code, and not provided by the pension systems to
retirees.342 She also expressed her agreement with the trial court
(and Attorney General’s position) that the health benefits lacked
protection because pensions are different from subsidized health
insurance premiums in how they are calculated and in the source
of the funds used to pay these benefits.343
In addition, she stated that the only way the majority opinion
was able to reach its conclusion was by reading into the Clause
“language that is not there.”344 She observed that “[n]owhere in the

337. Id. ¶ 57.
338. Id. ¶¶ 63–94.
339. Id. ¶¶ 87.
340. Id. ¶¶ 65–67.
341. Id. ¶ 68.
342. Id. ¶¶ 69–70.
343. Id. ¶¶ 70, 86.
344. Id. ¶ 72.
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clause does it state that every benefit which ‘results from,’ is
‘conditioned on,’ ‘flows directly from’ or ‘is attendant to’ being a
member of a pension system is provided constitutional
protection.”345 By adding this language, she asserted, the majority
committed error and usurped the “sovereign power of the people.”
Justice Burke then stated that the majority’s actions
fundamentally changed the Clause’s meaning to no longer protect
“statutory benefits provided by a pension or retirement system”
but “any statutory benefit—however unrelated to pensions—if the
recipient of the benefit is a member of a pension system.”346 This
new meaning of the Clause, according to Justice Burke, had no
limits, and under the majority’s reasoning the Clause would now
protect an “honorary plaque” specifically awarded to members of
the municipal retirement system under a city ordinance.347
The remainder of her dissent turned to how the majority’s
conclusion, in Justice Burke’s view, was not supported by the
court’s prior decisions, the Clause’s convention debates, and the
cases from other states considering the same question.348 Justice
Burke gave particular weight and attention to the decision of the
New York Court of Appeals, which held that retiree healthcare
benefits are not protected by the pension provision of that State’s
constitution.349 In her words, the case was “squarely on point and
persuasive”, while the majority opinion’s reliance on decisions
from the Alaska and Hawaii Supreme Courts were not.350
In the end, Justice Burke appeared to agree with the majority
opinion that both the Clause’s plain language and convention
debates were “unambiguous” in that protected benefit rights
“could not be altered” by legislative action to the detriment of
pension participants.351
6. Distilling the Illinois Courts’ Decisions in Peters, Kraus,
Felt, Buddell, and Kanerva
The decisions in Peters, Kraus, Felt, Buddell, and Kanerva
illustrate the evolutionary path of how Illinois courts have
construed the scope of the Pension Clause’s protection. While the
Peters decision was an ambiguous beginning to this endeavor, the
courts in Kraus, Felt, and Buddell each clarified Peters’s import.
These three cases, in turn, held that the Clause safeguards the
pension benefit rights contained in the Pension Code when a
345. Id.
346. Id. ¶ 73.
347. Id.
348. Id. ¶¶ 74–85.
349. Id. ¶¶ 77–81.
350. Id. ¶¶ 81–85.
351. Id. ¶¶ 68, 74.
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participant becomes a member of pension system whether or not
the employee is eligible to retire. The courts in Kraus and Felt
drew this conclusion principally from Convention debates,
especially the statements of Delegates Green and Kinney. Under
these decisions, a public employee obtains “vested rights” in the
Pension Code provisions relevant to pension benefits when the
employee becomes a member of a pension system by making his or
her initial employee contribution to the system. Finally, under
Kraus and Buddell, the Clause protects pension benefit rights as
an enforceable contractual relationship that is subject to
modification through contract principles.352
In Kanerva, the Illinois Supreme Court broadened the
Clause’s reach to also protect any benefits—whether found in the
Pension Code or in other state statutes—that are “limited to,
conditioned on, or flow[ing] directly from [a person’s] membership
in one of the State’s various public pension systems.”353 The court
held that the protected benefits included “subsidized healthcare,
disability and life insurance coverage, [and] eligibility to receive a
retirement annuity and survivor benefits.”354 The court’s
conclusion reflects a plain language analysis of the Pension Clause
and tracks with the dictionary definition of the term “benefit,” as
discussed earlier in this Article, to mean not only the specific
annuity payments a public employee is eligible to receive, but also
other entitlements of membership that advantage the employee.355
The court’s conclusion also squares with how New York courts
interpreted the same term under its constitutional provision prior
to 1970 as referring to “pecuniary matters” and prohibiting “any
action which would impair or diminish the member’s right to
payment of pensions, annuities, and related monetary
advantages.”356
352. By characterizing pension benefits as “contractual” in nature, the
Clause allows benefits to be altered through contract principles of offer,
acceptance, and consideration, whereas constitutional guarantees prohibiting
mid-term decreases in the salary or compensation of public officials cannot be
altered through these principles. See Northrup, 31 N.E.2d at 340–42
(invalidating ordinances that imposed a mid-term reduction in the salary of
Chicago aldermen as violative of Article XI, Section 11 of the 1870 Illinois
Constitution, and rejecting the claim that the aldermen could bargain or gift
away such reductions as being “against public policy and void”). Despite that
distinction, the Pension Clause and the constitutional provisions protecting
the salary or compensation of public officials are equivalent in absolutely
barring unilateral actions that would reduce or eliminate protected benefits,
salary or compensation, as the case may be, because each of these provisions
expressly prohibits “diminishments.” See infra notes 530, 617–22 and
accompanying text.
353. Kanerva, 2014 IL 115811, ¶¶ 39–40.
354. Id.
355. See Part I.A.3.
356. Brown, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 650, aff’d, 279 N.Y.S.2d 532.
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It is unclear, however, whether Justice Burke’s criticism of
the majority’s holding would protect an “honorary plaque” or other
monetary advantage specifically awarded to members of the
municipal retirement system under a city ordinance. 357 The court,
of course, was not confronted with this circumstance, but rather a
benefit set forth in a state statutory provision outside the Pension
Code. From that perspective, the majority’s holding is limited to
the facts before the court. In addition, the scenario raised by
Justice Burke turns on the novel question of whether a unit of
local government (home rule or not) has the legal power—absent a
statutory delegation from the General Assembly—to create a
benefit via ordinance or resolution that receives Pension Clause
protection.358 This is a question Illinois courts will need to address
and is not considered here.
Finally, the Kraus decision indicates that the Clause does not
cover general terms or conditions of public employment, such as
mandatory retirement age, work hours, and salaries of employees
even though they have an indirect effect on the pension employees
ultimately receive.359 These terms or conditions are subject to
modification provided that the change “is directed toward another
aim” or stems from an independent reason.360 We next consider
three Illinois Supreme Court decisions regarding the funding of
the pension system.

B. While the Pension Clause Does Not Require the
Pension System to Be Funded at a Particular
Funding Percentage, the Illinois Supreme Court Has
Held That the Clause Requires Pension Benefit
Payments to Be Made When Those Payments Are Due
As discussed in Part I of this Article, the pension system was
significantly underfunded at the time of the Convention, just as
today. Also, the inclusion of the Pension Clause in the 1970
Constitution was largely due to the lobbying efforts of public
357. Kanerva, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 73.
358. See e.g., 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-141.1 (allowing municipalities
covered under Article VII of the Pension Code to establish an early retirement
incentive program consistent with statutory parameters via ordinance or
resolution).
359. Kraus, 390 N.E.2d at 1292–93. But see Miller v. Ret. Bd. of
Policemen’s Annuity, 771 N.E.2d 431, 441 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (distinguishing
Peters and holding that the application of a statutory amendment to the
mandatory retirement age provision contained in the Pension Code for retired
police officers violated the Pension Clause as that provision was in place when
the officers joined the pension system, fixed the officers’ annuity amount, and
the statutory change lowered the amount of the officers’ pension).
360. Kraus, 390 N.E.2d at 1293.
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employee groups at the Convention.
Not long after the Clause took effect, public employee groups
began a long-standing litigation effort to require the legislature or
local governments to pay the system’s unfunded liabilities and
fund the system on an actuarially sound basis. The Illinois
Supreme Court addressed this issue on three different occasions
and the employee groups’ efforts proved unsuccessful as explained
below.
Based on the Convention statements of Delegates Green and
Kinney, the Supreme Court has held that the Clause does not
mandate that the pension systems be funded at a specific funding
percentage or according to a particular funding schedule. Rather,
the Pension Clause requires that pension benefits be paid when
the payments become due. In addition, the court has favorably
relied upon the Convention statements of Delegate Kinney that
pension recipients would have a cause of action to compel the
payment of benefits should a pension system default or be on the
verge of default. We briefly consider the Supreme Court’s three
decisions below beginning with its decision in People ex rel. Illinois
Federation of Teachers v. Lindberg.
1. People ex rel. Illinois Federation of Teachers v. Lindberg
In Lindberg, members of the teachers’ pension systems and
members of other systems filed a mandamus action as a class to
require the Comptroller to pay certain amounts originally
appropriated by the General Assembly to their retirement systems
after the Governor exercised his item reduction veto power to
reduce the appropriated amounts.361 The plaintiffs contended that
the Pension Clause afforded them an enforceable, contractual
right to have their respective pension systems funded in an
actuarially sound manner.362 They also argued that the provisions
of the Pension Code manifested a binding funding obligation on
the legislature that could not be impaired.363 Accordingly, the
plaintiffs asked the court to restore the original appropriation
amounts and void the Governor’s item reduction veto. The trial
court dismissed plaintiffs’ class action.
After reviewing the Convention debates and relying on
Delegate Kinney’s statements, the Supreme Court concluded that
the drafters did “not establish the intent to constitutionally
require a specific level of pension appropriations during a fiscal
year.”364 The court noted, however, that the Convention debates
established that “members of pension plans . . . would receive the
361. Lindberg, 326 N.E.2d at 750–51.
362. Id. at 752.
363. Id.
364. Id.
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money due them at the time of their retirement.”365
As to the plaintiffs’ second claim, the court first noted that it
had not yet decided whether to characterize pension benefits
under mandatory pension plans as “contractual” in light of the
Pension Clause.366 From this premise, the court reasoned that
because the funding provisions at issue pertained to mandatory
plans, and because those plans were construed as not providing
vested rights, the plaintiffs had no basis to claim that these
funding provisions created a contractual obligation on the State to
make certain annual contributions to plaintiffs’ pension
systems.367 For these reasons, the Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court decision.
2. McNamee v. State
a. Background and Procedural History
Twenty years after its Lindberg decision, the Illinois Supreme
Court in McNamee again addressed whether the Pension Clause
mandates that the pension system be funded at a particular
funding percentage or according to a funding schedule.368 This
time the court considered a statutory change to the funding
formula applicable to downstate police pension funds.369 Prior to
the statutory change, the Pension Code imposed a 40-year
amortization period by which the funds were to pay off their
unfunded liabilities beginning on January 1, 1980.370 The
legislature changed the start date of the 40-year period to July 1,
1993 as well as the method for calculating the existing unfunded
liabilities.371
Current and retired police officers filed suit claiming that the
new funding schedule violated the Pension Clause because it
allowed municipalities to contribute lower initial annual
contributions to the police pension funds, thereby making the
funds less secure.372 The plaintiffs argued that a New York court
found a similar statutory change unconstitutional under that
state’s pension clause, which was the model for Illinois’s Pension
Clause.373 The defendants responded that the Convention debates
and Supreme Court’s Lindberg decision made clear that the

365. Id. at 751.
366. Id. at 752.
367. Id. at 752–53.
368. McNamee, 672 N.E.2d at 1159.
369. Id. at 1160–61.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 1161.
373. Id.
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Clause protects employee pension benefits, not any particular
method of funding the pension system.374 The defendants also
noted that the legislation did not reduce benefits due to any
beneficiaries.375
The trial court agreed with plaintiffs’ position and held the
statutory change unconstitutional based on the reasoning of the
New York court decision. The Supreme Court allowed a direct
appeal, and the issue was whether the legislation violated the
Pension Clause.
b. The Supreme Court’s Analysis
The court began its analysis by reiterating its holding from a
previous case “that the contractual relationship [covered by the
Clause] is governed by the actual terms of the Pension Code at the
time the employee becomes a member of the pension system.”376
The court then explained that the primary purpose of the Clause
was “to eliminate the uncertainty surrounding public pension
benefits created by the distinction between mandatory and
optional pension plans,” especially the prospect that home rule
municipalities would abandon their pension obligations.377
After extensively reviewing the Convention debates, the court
concluded based on the statements of Delegates Green and Kinney
that the drafters did not intend for the Clause to require pension
funding at a particular level.378 Rather, the Clause was “intended
to force the funding of pensions indirectly, by putting the state and
municipal governments on notice that they are responsible for
those benefits.”379
The court, in turn, relied on its Lindberg decision that the
Clause “does not create a contractual basis for participants to
expect a particular level of funding, but only a contractual right
‘that they would receive the money due [to] them at the time of
their retirement.’”380 The court then noted that because the Clause
protects benefits, both it and the Illinois Appellate Court had
“consistently invalidated amendments to the Pension Code where
the result [was] to diminish benefits.”381

374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 1162 (citing DiFalco, 521 N.E.2d at 925 (1998); Kerner, 382
N.E..2d at 247).
377. Id. at 1162.
378. Id. at 1162–64.
379. Id. at 1164.
380. Id. at 1165 (quoting Lindberg, 326 N.E.2d at 751).
381. Id. (citing favorably Felt, 481 N.E.2d 698; Buddell, 514 N.E.2d 184;
Schroeder v. Morton Grove Police Pension Bd., 570 N.E.2d 997 (Ill. App. Ct.
1991)).
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In conclusion, the court stated that while the Pension Clause
was modeled after the New York Constitution’s identical provision
and Illinois courts had found New York court decisions construing
that provision instructive, the Convention debates demonstrated
that the framers did not intend to adopt the funding obligations
required by the New York Constitution.382 Accordingly, the court
reiterated its holding that the Clause “creates an enforceable
contractual relationship that protects only the right to receive
benefits.”383 Further, the court contrasted how plaintiffs’ complaint
did not allege that the legislation diminished a person’s right to
receive benefits or placed the pension system, in Delegate Kinney’s
words, “on the verge of default or imminent bankruptcy.”384 The
court’s final observation, however, indicates that a cause of action
would exist if legislation diminished a person’s right to receive
benefits or placed the pension system on the verge of default or
imminent bankruptcy.
3. People ex rel. Sklodowski v. State
a. Factual Background and Circuit Court History
In 1998, two years after McNamee, the Supreme Court took
up for a third time a funding claim under the Clause in People ex
rel. Sklodowski v. State.385 The case was filed by participants of
the State’s five pension systems because of the State’s failure to
make the pension contributions prescribed by Public Act 86-273.
That Act committed the State to make additional pension
contributions over a seven-year period and pay the existing
unfunded liabilities of each system over a 40-year period. The
plaintiffs claimed that by enacting the Public Act as part of the
Pension Code the legislature made the Act’s funding schedule an
enforceable contractual right under the Clause. Accordingly, the
plaintiffs contended that the State’s failure to adhere to that
schedule impaired their rights under the Clause and sought the
issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the State Comptroller,
among others officials, to comply with the Public Act’s funding
schedule.
The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint because the
382. Id. at 1165–66.
383. Id. at 1166.
384. Id. at 1166 (citing 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 53. at 2926 (statements
of Del. Kinney (“The word ‘impaired’ is meant to imply and intend that if a
pension fund would be on the verge of default or imminent bankruptcy, a
group action could be taken to show that these rights should be preserved.”)).
385. Sklodowski I, 695 N.E.2d 374.
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requested relief would violate the separation of powers clause
under the Illinois Constitution. Plaintiffs appealed to the
Appellate Court. While the appeal was pending, the General
Assembly passed Public Act 88-593, which repealed Public Act 86273. Public Act 88-593 established a new, less aggressive funding
schedule for the State’s five pension systems as compared to Public
Act 86-273. The defendants moved to dismiss the appeal as moot,
and the Appellate Court denied the motion.
b. Appellate Court History
The Appellate Court reversed the trial court and held that the
complaint was not barred by the separation of powers clause or by
sovereign immunity.386 The appellate court explained: “[o]nce
rights are created by the constitution or statute, ‘[i]t is within the
realm of judicial authority to assure that the action of members of
the executive branch does not deprive [individuals] of an
institution of rights conferred by statute or by the
Constitution.’”387 The court further held that by enacting Public
Act 86-273, the legislature “intended to bind itself to the obligation
of paying funds to the retirement system” according to that Public
Act’s funding schedule.388 From this premise, the court
distinguished the present case from the circumstances in
Lindberg, because the Public Act “provided for the ‘how much’ and
‘when’ as to funding the retirement systems” in contractual
terms.389
The appellate court utilized the same basis to distinguish the
Supreme Court’s McNamee decision.390 The court also noted that
the present case was unlike McNamee because the plaintiffs
alleged that the “financial status of their separate pension funds is
in a precarious state and that there will be no funds from which to
pay benefits by 2008, 2009.”391 As a result, the appellate court
concluded that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint
and remanded the case to the trial court.392
c.

The Supreme Court’s Analysis

After reviewing the case’s procedural history,393 the Supreme

386. People ex rel. Sklodowski v. State (Sklodowski II), 674 N.E.2d 81 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1996).
387. Id. at 86
388. Id. at 87.
389. Id. at 88
390. Id. at 88–89.
391. Id. at 89.
392. Id. at 90.
393. Sklodowski I, 695 N.E.2d at 375–78.
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Court reiterated its holdings from its previous decisions that: (1)
the Clause was included to eliminate the distinction in legal
protections afforded to mandatory and optional pension plans prior
to the 1970 Constitution;394 (2) the Clause “makes participation in
a public pension plan an enforceable contractual relationship and
also demands that the ‘benefits’ of that relationship” not be
“diminished or impaired”;395 and (3) the contractual relationship is
governed by the actual terms of the Pension Code at the time the
employee becomes a member of the pension system.396
The court then discussed its Lindberg and McNamee
decisions, and reaffirmed the holdings of both cases that the
Clause does not create a contractual basis for participants to
expect a particular level of funding, but only a contractual right
that they would receive the money due them at the time of their
retirement.397 The court further held that the plaintiffs offered “no
cogent argument” as to why the pension funding provisions in
Public Act 86-273 created a vested right to a specific funding
schedule.398
The Supreme Court also rejected plaintiffs’ claim that they
stated a Pension Clause challenge by stating their benefits were at
risk.399 The court explained that while in McNamee it “recognized
that . . . a beneficiary need not wait until benefits are actually
diminished to bring suit under the clause,” plaintiffs offered no
“factual allegations that would support the finding that the
[pension] funds at issue are ‘on the verge of default or imminent
bankruptcy’ such that benefits are in immediate danger of being
diminished.”400 Accordingly, the court reversed the appellate court
because neither the Clause, nor Pension Code itself provided the
plaintiffs with a vested contractual right mandating that the
pension system be funded pursuant to Public Act 86-273.401 The
court further found it unnecessary to address the appellate court’s
ruling on sovereign immunity.402
4. The Take Home Message of Lindberg, McNamee, and
Sklodowski
Through the above three decisions, the Illinois Supreme
Court has made several points clear with respect to the Pension
394. Id. at 377 (citing McNamee, 672 N.E.2d 1159).
395. Id. at 377 (citing ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIII, § 5.).
396. Id. at 377 (citing DiFalco, 521 N.E.2d at 926; Kerner, 382 N.E.2d at
247).
397. Id. at 378–79.
398 Id. at 379.
399. Id.
400. Id. (citing McNamee, 672 N.E.2d at 1165).
401. Id.
402. Id.
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Clause and pension funding. First, relying principally on the
statements of Delegates Green and Kinney at the Convention, the
drafters did not intend for the Clause to require the pension
system to be funded at a particular funding percentage or
according to a specific funding schedule, unless the Pension Code
expressly contains clear and binding language. Rather, as stated
in McNamee, the Clause was “intended to force the funding of
pensions indirectly, by putting the state and municipal
governments on notice that they are responsible for those
benefits.”403 As a consequence, the Clause guarantees that pension
participants will receive the money due them at the time of their
retirement.
Second, the Clause makes participation in a public pension
plan an enforceable contractual relationship and also demands
that the “‘benefits’ of that relationship” not be diminished or
impaired. Further, the contractual relationship is governed by the
actual terms of the Pension Code at the time the employee
becomes a member of the pension system. It is for this reason that
both the Supreme Court and Appellate Court have invalidated
changes to the Pension Code that would diminish or impair a
current participant’s pension benefit rights.
Finally, the Supreme Court has recognized that while a
beneficiary of a pension system need not wait until his or her
benefits are actually diminished to bring suit in circuit court under
the Clause, a beneficiary could only do so if the complaint
contained factual allegations that the relevant pension fund was in
default or on the verge of default. The court again found support
for this position in Delegate Kinney’s statements at the
Convention.

III. A REVIEW OF STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES
In Parts I and II of this Article, we have reviewed the
Clause’s plain language, the status of public pension law prior to
the 1970 Convention, the lobbying efforts of public employee
groups to obtain constitutional protection for pension benefits
rights at the Convention, the Clause’s drafting history and
debates, the failed efforts by the Pension Laws Commission to
modify the Clause during the Convention, how the Clause was
described to the voters who ratified the new Constitution in
December 1970, and relevant Illinois court decisions construing
the Clause. With this background in mind, we now consider the
claims legal commentators have made about the Clause, including
whether it permits the legislature to unilaterally cut the pension
benefits of current employees. Since the legal commentators
403. McNamee, 672 N.E.2d at 1164.
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penned their claims prior to and without the benefit of the Illinois
Supreme Court’s decision in Kanerva that decision is not factored
into the discussion below, except for a brief reference in Part III.H.

A. Background
1. The Commercial Club of Chicago and Sidley Austin LLP
In November 2009, the Civic Committee of the Commercial
Club of Chicago (the “Club”)404 issued a minority report to the
Illinois General Assembly’s Pension Modernization Task Force
report.405 In its minority report, the Club claimed that the
legislature could, without violating the Pension Clause,
unilaterally “freeze” the pension benefits that current public
employees “earned” through past service, and reduce the benefits
those employees would “earn” going forward through future
service.406
At a lunch meeting, then-Club President, R. Eden Martin
stated that the proposal outlined in the Club’s minority report
would cut the State’s existing unfunded pension liabilities by $20
billion and net annual savings of $2 billion for the State.407 While
agreeing that the principal cause of the State’s existing liabilities
stemmed from the State’s failure to fund pension costs,408 the
Club’s report stated it was “unfair to require taxpayers to bear the
costs of the current pension programs for the State’s employees.”409
Martin explained to Club members that paying these obligations
404. See RICHARD SCHNEIROV, LABOR AND URBAN POLITICS: CLASS
CONFLICT AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN LIBERALISM IN CHICAGO, 1864–97 142
(1998) (recounting that the Commercial Club of Chicago was formed in 1877
by a group of the “sixty outstanding” Chicago businessmen belonging to the
Citizens Association of Chicago). Schneirov explained that the Club was
formed “as a forum for political discussion and as a caucus within the Citizens
Association.” Id. “Franklin MacVeagh, a wholesale merchant who was the first
president of the Citizens Association,” and later Club president in 1870,
“candidly explained the purpose of the Citizens Association in his first address
when he asserted that universal male suffrage had placed ‘political power in
the hands of the baser part of the community,’ which resulted in binding ‘hand
and foot the best part of the community.’” Id. at 58. “The Citizens Association”
while officially non-partisan, like the Club, “was a ‘supplemental political
organization’ that would ‘represent these disfranchised people.’” Id.
405. PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 61–77.
406. Id. at 71–72.
407. W. James Farrell, Chairman, The Commercial Club of Chicago and R.
Eden Martin, President, The Commercial Club of Chicago, Presentation to the
Commercial Club of Chicago: Illinois State Finance—A Study in Failure, at 6
(Jan. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Club Meeting Presentation]), available at
http://www.chicagocivic.org/initiatives/StateFinance/Remarks%20n%20Slides
%20for%20Website.pdf
408. PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 68.
409. Id. at 70.
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was politically unpalatable because “State Government couldn’t
cut—and nobody could stand the thought of a tax increase.”410
The Club claimed its proposal comported with the Pension
Clause because of a two-page statement prepared by the law firm
Sidley Austin LLP (“Sidley”).411 Sidley is not only a Club member,
but also the firm where Mr. Martin practices law.412 In April 2010,
Sidley later supplemented its analysis with an additional two-page
position statement,413 and then a more detailed narrative in early
May 2010.414 After the Chicago Tribune endorsed Sidley’s position
in two editorials,415 four other Chicago law firms signed onto
Sidley’s position.416 These firms are also Club members, and have
other Club members as clients, including the Tribune.417
410. Club Meeting Presentation, supra note 407, at 6. Martin further
explained that “[a]s to taxes, most of us would agree that cost-cutting must be
the first step. Most would agree that talking about tax increases at this stage
would detract from the effort to get reforms and cuts.” Id. at 12.
411. PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 76–77.
412.
See
Members,
THE
COMMERCIAL
CLUB
OF
CHICAGO,
http://www.commercialclubchicago.org/members (last visited Feb. 11, 2011)
(listing the managing partner of Sidley Austin LLP as a member); see also
People, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, http://www.sidley.com/r-eden-martin/ (last visited
Feb. 11, 2011) (listing R. Eden Martin as “Of Counsel”).
413. THE COMMERCIAL CLUB OF CHI., CHICAGO’S UNDERFUNDED PENSION
PLANS: A REPORT TO THE COMMERCIAL CLUB OF CHICAGO 33–37 (2010),
available
at
http://www.civiccommittee.org/Media/Default/pdf/Chicagos_ Underfunded_Pe
nsion_Plans_FINAL.pdf.
414. Memorandum from Sidley Austin LLP on Ill. Auth. to Reduce the
Pension Benefits That Current Emps. Will Earn from Future Serv. (Apr. 27,
2010),
available
at
http://www.illinoissenatedemocrats.com/images/pensions/C/ Sidley%20Memo
%2004-27-10.pdf [hereinafter Sidley Memo].
415. See Editorial, Yes You Can, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 27, 2010), available at
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-03-27/news/ct-edit-pensions03282010 0327_1_pension-plans-house-speaker-michael-madigan-illinois
(referring to Sidley’s position, the Tribune opined: “Many of the pols who run
Illinois blithely deflect calls to curb current employees’ pensions. They say
state lawyers tell them the state constitution forbids such revisions.
Unfortunately for the pols, one of the nation’s top law firms now says that’s
just false.”); Editorial, Don’t Run from a Fight, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 18, 2010),
available
at
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-04-18/news/ct-editpensions20100418 _1_pension-illinois-chicago-public-schools.
416. Letter from Civic Comm., Commercial Club of Chicago (May 3, 2010),
(on file with author); Sidley Memo, supra note 414 (listing Jenner & Block
LLP, Mayer Brown LLP, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP, and Winston
& Strawn LLP as endorsing Sidley’s position).
417. See Members, THE COMMERCIAL CLUB OF CHICAGO, supra note 412
(identifying one or more attorneys of Jenner & Block LLP, Mayer Brown LLP,
Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP, and Winston & Strawn as members of
the Commercial Club). See, e.g., Lorene Yue, Tribune Subpoenaed by Feds over
ESOP, CRAIN’S CHICAGO BUSINESS (Apr. 10, 2010), available at
http://www. chicagobusiness.com/article/20090410/NEWS06/200033651/tribun
e-subpoena ed-by-feds-over-esop (identifying Jenner & Block as the Chicago
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According to Sidley, “compelling arguments” allowed the
General Assembly to unilaterally cut the pension benefits that
current employees will earn in the future without violating the
Pension Clause.418 Those arguments, Sidley contended, derived not
only from its reading of the Clause and Convention debates, but
also from Illinois court decisions, particularly the Supreme Court’s
Peters decision and a 1979 Illinois Attorney General opinion.419
Sidley also argued that even if the Clause prohibited such
unilateral action, the legislature could nonetheless modify pension
formulas going forward for existing employees in exchange for
letting them keep their jobs or current salaries and in order to
preserve the pension system.420 Sidley further argued in a
separate statement that if a State pension fund went bankrupt,
then pension recipients would have no legal recourse against the
State for continued benefit payments.421
2. Justice Gino DiVito and the Illinois State Bar
Association
In April and May 2010, Gino DiVito, a former and highly
respected Illinois Appellate Court justice, however, offered an
opposing view that addressed Sidley’s position point-by-point and

Tribune’s counsel); see also MAYER BROWN LLP: Tax Controversy (2013),
available
at
http://www.mayerbrown.com/experience/TaxControversy/?section=additional (identifying the Tribune Company as a
client); SONNENSCHEIN NATH ROSENTHAL LLP, http://dentons.com (last visited
Feb. 17, 2015); WINSTON & STRAWN LLP, http://www.winston.com (last visited
Feb. 17, 2015).
418. Sidley Memo, supra note 414, at 1.
[T]he Pension Clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const., art.
XII, § 5) prohibits State and local governments from reducing pension
benefits that employees earned in prior years, but that there are
compelling arguments that State and local governments may enact
legislation that will prospectively reduce the pension benefits that
current employees will earn as a result of future work performed after
the prospective legislation takes effect.
Id.

419. See id. at 8–15 (discussing Convention debates); see also id. at 15–18
(discussing Peters and the Attorney General’s 1979 other court decisions); id.
at 17 (discussing the 1979 Illinois Attorney General opinion).
420. Id. at 2, 23–27.
421. Memorandum from Sidley Austin LLP on State Is Not a Guarantor of
State Pension Fund Obligations to Pension Plan Members, at 1, 4, available at
http://www.johnbiver.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/SidleyGuarantor.pdf
(last visited Feb. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Sidley Guarantor Memo]. See also
Memorandum from Sidley Austin LLP on The State of Ill., and the City of
Chicago and Smaller Municipalities, Are Not Guarantors of the Payment of
Pension Benefits (Dec. 7, 2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter Sidley
Supplemental Guarantor Memo].
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received the endorsement of the Illinois State Bar Association.422
Justice DiVito found Sidley’s argument to be “deeply flawed” and
without “legal merit.”423 He concluded that the Pension Clause
“was clearly intended to prohibit precisely the scenario suggested
by [Sidley]: that a State employee’s pension rights could be
diminished at some point after he enters State employment.”424
Justice DiVito also characterized Sidley’s proposal to alter the
pension benefit rights through contract principles as a
“charade.”425
Because Justice DiVito’s position generally supports the
conclusions contained in this Article, his views are discussed only
when necessary. We consider below Sidley’s position beginning
with the Clause’s text followed by the Convention debates and
relevant case law.

B. Sidley’s View Is Not Supported by the Clause’s Plain
Language
As discussed in Part I of this Article, the Pension Clause
provides that: “Membership in any pension or retirement system
of the State, any unit of local government or school district, or any
agency or instrumentality thereof, shall be an enforceable
contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be
diminished or impaired.”426 Part I explained that the Clause’s
plain language and common meaning reveal that a public
employee’s membership in a pension system is a contractual and
enforceable right, and there is nothing in the text to suggest that a
member only has a legal interest in rights that he or she
purportedly “earns” on a per day basis.
Also, the Clause prohibits unilateral action by the legislature
to diminish or impair the “benefits of” membership in a pension
system. The term “benefits,” per its common meaning, denotes not
only the specific annuity payments a public employee is eligible to
422. Memorandum from Gino DiVito & John Fitzgerald, Diminution of
Pension Benefits for Current Emps. (Apr. 12, 2010) available at
http://www. illinois.gov/publicincludes/statehome/gov/documents/DiVito%20M
emorandum.pdf [hereinafter DiVito April Memo]; Statement of the Ill. State
Bar
Ass’n
(Apr.
14,
2010),
available
at
http://www.illinoissenate.democrats.com/index. php/phocadownload/category/58-pensiondocs?download=287%3A04-14-2010-illinoisstate-bar-association-reducing-current-pensions-is-unconstitutional.
423. Memorandum from Gino DiVito & John Fitzgerald on Diminution of
Pension Benefits for Current Emps. 1, 9 (May 5, 2010), available at
http:// www.illinoissenatedemocrats.com/images/pensions/C/Judge%20Gino%2
0Devito%20Memo%2005-05-10.pdf [hereinafter DiVito May Memo].
424. DiVito April Memo, supra note 422, at 3.
425. DiVito May Memo, supra note 423, at 7.
426. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIII, § 5.
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receive, but also other entitlements of membership that advantage
the employee. The plain language also indicates that an
employee’s pension payments and other membership entitlements
are “contractual” in nature and may be altered through mutual
assent via contract principles. Finally, the Clause’s prohibition
against diminishment and impairment is cast in absolute terms.
As a consequence, the Clause on its face does not support the claim
that the legislature could utilize the pension system’s present
unfunded liabilities as a reason to cut the benefits of current
employees participating in the system.
1. Sidley’s Interpretation of the Clause’s Plain Language
Sidley, however, disputes that there is “remotely” any textual
basis for the position that the Clause “gives each employee a right
to have pension benefits” determined by “whatever [Pension Code]
formula was in effect on his or her first day of service.”427 Sidley
claims that the Clause only means that “employees have a
contractual right not to be excluded from membership in a
system.”428 Sidley further claims that “it says nothing about the
way in which benefits earned by future employment are to be
determined.”429 Sidley states that the “only ‘benefits’ of
membership in a pension” system an employee possesses is the
“earn[ed]” right to receive an annuity at a certain level upon
reaching retirement age as a result of their service.430
In Sidley’s view, because the “Pension Clause does not
prescribe any particular formula,” “a prospective [legislative]
change in the formula for calculating future benefits does not
‘diminish’ or ‘impair’ benefits or otherwise violate the plain
meaning of the text of the provision . . . so long as the benefits that
were previously earned are not cancelled or reduced.”431 Finally,
Sidley asserts that since “Illinois is facing fiscal and financial
crises of great magnitude,” the Pension Clause should not be
interpreted “to limit or impair the ability of the Government to
deliver essential services in the manner believed most efficient
and appropriate” absent “clear and unmistakable evidence of such
a purpose.”432

427. Sidley Memo, supra note 414, at 6.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 7.
432. Id.
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2. Sidley’s Interpretation Cannot Be Squared with the
Clause’s Plain Language and Common Meaning
Sidley’s interpretation is without support for several reasons.
First, the Pension Clause nowhere addresses, as Sidley claims,
who may be excluded from pension system membership. Sidley’s
suggestion that the provision only gives a public employee “a
contractual right not to be excluded” is classic misdirection and a
non sequitur.
Second, while the Pension Clause itself does not detail specific
pension rights, the plain language, as noted above, states that a
participant’s membership in a pension system is an “enforceable
contractual relationship.” Unless the terms of membership specify
otherwise, common sense and logic dictate that a public employee
has a legal interest in his or her membership rights—including
any membership terms governing how benefits are calculated—
upon joining a pension system. 433 The Clause itself does not
countenance a contrary result.
Finally, the inclusion of the phrase “benefits of which shall
not be diminished or impaired” manifests, contrary to Sidley’s
protests, clear evidence of the framers’ intent to limit the General
Assembly’s power to modify pension benefit rights even in the face
of a fiscal crisis. This conclusion is supported by the common
dictionary definitions of the terms “benefits,” “diminish,” and
“impair.”434 After all, the Clause’s prohibitory language contains
no exceptions and is fashioned in absolute terms. Illinois courts
have long construed similar constitutional provisions as
disallowing exigent circumstances to dictate the interpretation of
the provision unless the provision itself permits a departure from
its terms.435
In sum, the Pension Clause’s plain language reveals that an
participant’s benefit rights exist and are legally secured at the
time of membership, and those rights cannot be unilaterally
reduced or voided thereafter. Nowhere does the Pension Clause
limit protection, as Sidley claims, to only “benefits that were
previously earned.” To reach Sidley’s conclusion, the provision
would need to add the word “earned” or “accrued” before the word
“benefits” as is the case with the Hawaii and Michigan

433. See e.g., Forester Wheeler Energy Corp, 805, N.E.2d at 694 (“It is well
settled that a party’s rights under a contract become ‘vested’ for the purposes
of the retroactive application of a statute when the contract is entered into
rather than when the rights thereunder are asserted.”).
434. See supra notes 21–23 (explaining that in discerning the plain
meaning of a statutory or constitutional provision, Illinois generally looks to
dictionary definitions of undefined terms). In re Detention of Bailey, 740
N.E.2d 1146, 1156 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
435. Lyle, 195 N.E. at 453.
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Constitutions.436
Distilled to its essence, Sidley’s constru.ction ignores the
Pension Clause’s plain language, defies common sense and logic,
and adds limitations where none exist.437 Illinois courts have long
explained that the judicial branch may not add limitations or
exceptions where none exist.438 As a result, there is no strength to
Sidley’s argument that “the Pension Clause protects only those
benefits that an employee has already earned.” Because Sidley
cannot point to anything either in the text or the common meaning
of the terms used in the Clause to support its position, Sidley has
failed to meet its burden that the Clause should be read in a way
contrary to its natural meaning.439
Moreover, contrary to Sidley’s suggestion, an analysis of the
Clause does not involve whether Illinois intended to deviate from
how ERISA protects pension benefits when it adopted the Pension
Clause.440 The reason for this is simple. Congress did not pass
ERISA until 1974—more than three years after the Pension
Clause took effect.441 The drafters, obviously, had no knowledge of
what Congress would do years later. Simply put, what ERISA
permits has no bearing whatsoever on discerning the intent of the
drafters and the voters who ratified the Pension Clause.442

C. Sidley Mischaracterizes the Clause’s Convention
Debates
1. Summary of Sidley’s Position
Sidley also argues that the Convention debates fail to address
436. Supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text.
437. Accord DiVito May Memo, supra note 423, at 6.
438. See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Adelman, 574 N.E.2d 1328, 1332–33 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991) (stating that a court must construe a statute as it is, and may not
supply omissions, remedy defects, or add exceptions and limitations to the
statute’s applications, regardless of its opinion regarding the desirability of
the results of the statute’s operation).
439. Coal. for Political Honesty v. State Bd. of Elec., 359 N.E.2d 138, 143
(Ill. 1977) (stating, “[o]ne contending that language should not be given its
natural meaning understandably has the burden of showing why it should
not”). The court further stated:
This is a difficult burden for one who says that language should not be
given its common meaning, but it is proper it should be difficult.
Individuals and bodies, as a convention or a legislature, can hardly be
said to intent that language they use is to be given an opposite
meaning.
Id. at 144.
440. Sidley Memo, supra note 414, at 5.
441. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat, 829 (1974).
442. 2B A. SINGER & SINGER, supra note 90 § 51.6.
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even whether the Pension Clause limits the governments’ ability
to reduce pension benefits.443 Sidley further asserts that the
drafters offered no opinion on whether the Clause prohibited
purely prospective modifications of benefits formulas.444 Instead,
Sidley claims that the debates only speak to whether the Pension
Clause requires the full funding of the pension system and
immunizes pension benefits from inflation.445
In addition, Sidley also dismisses any sponsor statements
that undercut its position, especially those made by Delegate
Kinney, as “vague,” merely “personal views,” “misstated or
exaggerated” views or statements that were not endorsed by other
sponsors or supporters of the Pension Clause.446 Indeed, Sidley
attempts to marginalize the drafters’ intent by inventing a new
rule of constitutional interpretation that has no basis in Illinois
law: the Pension Clause cannot be read to support the position
presented in this Article “unless the discussion during the debates
established, with unmistakable clarity, that this was the
understanding of the meaning of the Clause that was widely
shared by all the delegates who voted for the Clause.”447
2. Contrary to Sidley’s Understanding, the Convention
Debates Confirm That the Drafters Intended to Protect
Those Pension Benefit Rights Contained in the Pension
Code When an Employee Joined a Pension System, and
Any Later Benefit Increases
Sidley’s reading of the Convention debates is myopic.
Contrary to Sidley’s view, Illinois courts afford significant weight
to sponsor statements when discerning the original intent and
purpose of statutes and constitutional provisions.448 Illinois courts

443. Sidley Memo, supra note 414 at 9.
444. Id.
445. Id. at 9, 12, 13–14.
446. Id. at 13–14.
447. Id. at 8. To make this claim, Sidley relies upon the statements of Del.
Witwer who said the following before voting for the pension proposal:
I am voting yes in the hope that the points which Mr. Whalen [an
opponent of the proposal] has raised will be properly protected in the
work of the Style and Drafting Committee and that there will be an
affirmation that this does not direct or control funding. I vote yes.
Id. at 12. It is difficult to fathom how this statement offers Sidley any support
because at no point did Del. Witwer dispute or reject Del. Green or Kinney’s
explanation of the pension rights safeguarded by the pension proposal.
448. See e.g., Baker, 636 N.E.2d 554–55 (stating, “[a]s with statutory
construction, this court must construe a constitutional provision so as to
effectuate the intent of the drafters”); Kalodimos v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 470
N.E.2d 266, 270–71 (Ill. 1984) (stating,
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have particularly done so with respect to the Pension Clause.449 No
Illinois court has adopted Sidley’s novel approach that drafter
statements are only worthy when they are “widely shared by all
the delegates who voted for” a particular constitutional
provision.450
At best, Sidley’s approach reflects how federal courts use
Congressional floor statements about federal legislation, which is,
of course, of no import to interpreting the Illinois Constitution.451
Even if Sidley’s approach had some plausible appeal, the
Convention record indicates that the principal sponsors, cosponsors, and at least one delegate opposing the Clause, agreed
[t]he meaning which the delegates to the convention attached to the
provision in the Constitution before sending it to the voters for
ratification is relevant in resolving ambiguities which may remain after
consulting the language of the provision . . . [T]he court is not justified
in relying upon arguments against a proposed constitutional
amendment ‘as seen by the minority,’ to determine its meaning after
adoption. A precedent so holding would be mischievous in the
opportunity it would afford a minority to frustrate the purpose of the
[constitutional convention] and the voters”);
Drury v. Cnty. of McLean, 433 N.E.2d 666, 669 (Ill. 1982) (stating,
[g]enerally, the rules of statutory construction are applicable to the
construction of a constitutional provision. We have previously
acknowledged that in construing the Constitution the true inquiry
concerns the underlying meaning of its provisions by the voters who
adopted it. However, the practice of consulting the debates of the
members of the convention which framed the constitution has long been
indulged in by courts in determining the meaning of provisions which
are thought to be doubtful. The debates, therefore, aid in determining
the intent of the drafters of the Constitution.).
See also Spinelli v. Immanuel Evangelical Lutheran Congregation, Inc., 494
N.E.2d 196, 200 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (“statements by the sponsor of the
legislation are especially significant [in discerning legislative intent] ‘since
legislators look to the sponsor . . . to be particularly well informed about its
purpose, meaning, and intended effect’” (quoting, in part, 2A A. SINGER &
SINGER, supra note 90 § 48.15).
449. See e.g., Sklodowski I, 695 N.E.2d at 379 (quoting Del. Kinney’s floor
statements); McNamee, 672 N.E.2d at 1162–66 (relying on and quoting from
Dels. Green and Kinney’s floor statements); Felt, 481 N.E.2d at 700 (quoting
or referring to both Dels. Green and Kinney’s floor statements); People ex rel.
IFT v. Lindberg, 326 N.E.2d 749, 752 (Ill. 1975) (quoting or referring to both
Dels. Green and Kinney’s floor statements); Kraus, 390 N.E.2d at 1288–89
(referring to statements from Dels. Green and Kinney).
450. Sidley Memo, supra note 414 at 8.
451. See 2A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 90, § 48:13, at nn.14, 15 (stating,
“[f]loor statements made by individual members of Congress have limited
value in interpreting the intent of Congress as a whole. Now, the federal
courts hold that statements by any members during legislative debates may be
considered in the interpretation of a statute where they show a common
agreement in the legislature about the meaning of an ambiguous provision”)
(emphasis added).
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that the provision barred the legislature from eliminating or
reducing an employee’s pension benefit rights after the person
entered service.452
As detailed in Part I of this Article, the above understanding
reflects the objective of public employee groups that successfully
lobbied for the Clause’s inclusion in the 1970 Constitution.453 That
understanding also reflects the view of the Pension Laws
Commission, which tried on two occasions to alter the Clause
452. 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 53, at 2931. Del. Green stated:
[w]hat we are trying to merely say is that if you mandate the public
employees in the state of Illinois to put in their 5 percent or 8 percent
or whatever it may be monthly, and you say when you employ these
people, “Now if you do this, when you reach sixty-five, you will receive
$287 a month,” that is in fact, is what you will get.
Id. Del. Kinney stated,
[b]enefits not being diminished really refers to this situation: If a police
officer accepted employment under a provision where he was entitled to
retire at two-thirds of his salary after twenty years of service, that
could not be subsequently changed to say he was entitled to only onethird of his salary after thirty years of service, or perhaps entitled to
nothing. That is the thrust of the word “diminished.”
Id. at 2929. The Pension Clause, “is simply to give them [public employees] a
basic protection against abolishing their rights completely or changing the
terms of their rights after they have embarked upon the employment—to
lessen them.” Id.
All we are seeking it to guarantee that people will have the rights that
were in force at the time they entered into the agreement to become an
employee, and as Mr. Green has said, if the benefits are $100 a month
in 1971, they should not be less than $100 a month in 1990.
Id. at 2931–32. Del. Lyons, a cosponsor, agreed with Del. Kinney’s remarks
about the scope of the pension clause. Id. at 2929. Del. Peccarelli, a cosponsor,
stated,
If I were as knowledgeable as Delegate Green, as scholarly as Delegate
Kinney, or the orator as Delegate Kemp, I would say all the things that
they have said. Being none of those three things, I would just ask you
to take what they have said and consider it and emphasize what they
have said and ask that you vote for the amendment.
Id. However, Del. Elward, an opponent of the Clause, stated,
[w]hat about the words “impairment” or “diminishing”? Supposing the
General Assembly decides they want to cut the benefit for a surviving
widow of a policeman in order to increase the benefits of the minor
children? Under this constitutional amendment that might well be
prohibited . . . [w]hat you are saying is that the present structure—
which admittedly is not identical in each fund and which is surely for
from ideal in terms of justice and charity—the present structure is to
be frozen in for all time to come.
Id. at 2927–28.
453 Supra notes 86–115 and accompanying text.
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before the Convention adjourned.454 The Commission’s attempts,
as discussed, were rejected by Convention delegates as the
Commission itself reported to the General Assembly. These failed
efforts demonstrate that the drafters were cognizant of the
Clause’s broad limitation on legislative power, and intended to
immunize pension benefit rights from any adverse unilateral
action by the General Assembly. Further, it was this same
understanding of the Clause that was communicated to Illinois
voters when they ratified the new Constitution.455
The fact that the principal sponsors may have not articulated
their intent in the way Sidley prefers is mere equivocation on
Sidley’s part. It is hardly a compelling basis by which to discredit
the framers’ expressed views. In short, there is no force to Sidley’s
statement that only Delegate Helen Kinney expressed the view
that the Pension Clause bars reductions in pension benefits after
an employee began employment.
The same is true of Sidley’s claim that Delegates Green and
Kinney did not share each other’s views on this point. Sidley
claims that the principal sponsors were not of the same mind
because Delegate Kinney at one point stated that “Mr. Green’s
interest in this matter is a little different than mine.”456 Again,
Sidley misses the mark. Both delegates shared the same goal of
protecting pension benefits in the same manner, but were
motivated by different public employee groups to do so.
Delegate Kinney, as discussed in Part I, made this statement
in reference to why she was motivated to sponsor the pension
proposal.457 As noted above, Delegate Green, a community college
official from Urbana,458 sponsored the constitutional provision
because of concerns raised by university employees, while
Delegate Kinney, a former DuPage County state’s attorney,459 was
prompted to do so by the concerns of police and firemen.460
As the discussion in Part I of this Article shows, there is no
evidence of original intent supporting Sidley’s interpretation
whatsoever. Illinois courts have long stated that an interpretation
of this sort lies beyond a constitutional provision’s scope,461
454 Supra notes 187–99 and accompanying text.
455. Supra notes 200–16 and accompanying text.
456. Sidley Memo, supra note 414, at 14.
457. Supra notes 126, 145–46, 160 and accompanying text.
458. 1 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 117, at 899 (convention biography of Del.
Green).
459. Id. at 892 (convention biography of Del. Kinney).
460. See 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 53, at 2925–26 (containing the
opening statements of Dels. Green and Kinney regarding the pension
proposal).
461. Wolfson, 126 N.E.2d at 710 (stating,
[i]n seeking such intention courts are to consider the language used,
the object to be attained, or the evil to be remedied. This may involve
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especially where that interpretation narrowly construes a
constitutional guarantee.462 Accordingly, Sidley’s reading of the
Clause’s Convention debates lacks merit because it cannot be
squared with the Clause’s purpose and accepted understanding at
the time of the Convention.

D. Illinois Court Decisions Categorically Reject Sidley’s
Interpretation of the Pension Clause
Sidley argues that even if the Pension Clause’s plain
language and Convention history do not support its view, the
Illinois Supreme Court’s 1974 decision in Peters v. City of
Springfield provides sufficient grounds for its interpretation.463 In
fact, Sidley claims that Peters already decided the very issue now
being debated in its favor.464 To support this conclusion, Sidley
paraphrases a passage from Peters:
[T]he delegates’ debate on the Pension Clause establishes
only ‘a general intent to protect the pension benefits of public
employees’ and that the ‘purpose and intent of the constitutional
provisions’ is limited to ‘insur[ing] that pension rights of public
employees which had been earned should not be diminished or
impaired.”465
Indeed, Sidley repeats the phrase “had been earned”
throughout its position statement as a means to prove up its
interpretation.466 Sidley also relies upon a 1979 Illinois Attorney
General opinion construing Peters.467 Sidley further states that
Peters has not been overruled by the Illinois Supreme Court and
later court decisions contrary to Sidley’s view
are
distinguishable.468
As detailed below, Sidley’s argument fails because the Peters
decision does not stand for the proposition Sidley suggests, and
more than the literal meaning of words. That which is within the
intention is within the statute, though not within the letter, and,
though, within the letter, it is nevertheless not within the statute if not
likewise within the intention. The same general principles to be applied
in construing statutes apply in the construction of constitutions.
(quoting Peabody v. Russel, 134 N.E. 148, 149 (Ill. 1922)).
462. Id. “A constitutional guaranty should be interpreted in a broad and
liberal spirit. Courts should not apply to strict a construction as to exclude its
real object and intent.” Id.
463. Sidley Memo, supra note 414, at 14–22.
464. Id. at 14. “[T]he same argument that Judge DiVito now makes was
rejected by the Illinois Supreme Court in Peters v. City of Springfield.” Id.
(citing Peters, 311 N.E.2d at 107).
465. Id. at 16.
466. Id. at 14, 15, 16, 17, 20.
467. Id. at 17.
468. Id. at 16.
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because both the Illinois Supreme Court and Appellate Court have
clarified the scope of the Peters decision. The more cogent inquiry
is how Illinois courts have construed that decision, not as Sidley
claims whether the Illinois Supreme Court has rejected Sidley’s
reading of Peters in terms Sidley finds acceptable.
In particular, the Illinois Appellate Court rejected the same
argument Sidley now makes in Kraus. Kraus both clarified the
holding in Peters and concluded that the Pension Clause “prohibits
legislative action which directly diminishes the benefits to be
received by those who became members of the pension system
prior to the enactment of the legislation, though they are not yet
eligible to retire.”469 Kraus, as an Illinois Appellate Court decision,
is the law of this State until the Illinois Supreme Court says
otherwise. In Felt, Buddell, and later decisions, the Illinois
Supreme Court has endorsed Kraus and its reasoning.
Accordingly, Sidley’s position is unpersuasive. Our discussion
below begins with the Peters decision.
1. Peters Does Not Advance Sidley’s Position
As discussed in Part II of this Article, the Illinois Supreme
Court in Peters considered whether the Pension Clause protected
from unilateral modification a mandatory retirement age provision
affecting firemen contained in the Illinois Municipal Code, not the
Pension Code. The court held that the provision was beyond the
Clause’s scope and the upheld the modification.
Sidley contends, however, that Peters “rejected the claim that
the Pension Clause gave a fireman the right to work up to the
‘minimum retirement age provided by law at the time he enters
the [retirement] system.’”470 Sidley further contends that Peters
held that the “Clause protects only previously earned benefits.”471
From these contentions, Sidley posits that Peters allows
“prospective changes in the law that reduce the benefits that could
be earned in the future” without violating the Pension Clause.472
a. Peters Offers Little Guidance on Whether the Legislature
May Cut the Pension Benefit Rights of Current
Employees
Sidley’s reading of Peters falters because the Supreme Court
was simply not confronted with a Pension Code change that
directly reduced the pension benefits ultimately received by
current employees. Rather, Peters involved a change in an
469. Kraus, 390 N.E.2d at 1292–93.
470. Sidley Memo, supra note 414, at 16.
471. Id.
472. Id. at 16–17.
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employment condition for firemen found in the Municipal Code,
not a change to the Pension Code applicable to the firemen.
Indeed, the trial court itself explained, the “narrow question
posed by this case is whether the law stating the retirement age in
effect at the time an employee comes within a pension system is
part of the pension contract so it may not be changed as to him
during his service even if not found in the pension act itself.”473
The appellant similarly framed the issue to the Supreme
Court as “whether the trial court correctly construed Section 5,
Article XIII” of the Illinois Constitution.474 Also, no party in Peters
advocated in its Supreme Court briefs that the Clause secures only
pension rights earned on a per day basis.
Peters, as with any judicial decision, must be read within the
context of the case before the court.475 Since the court was not
confronted with a Pension Code change, Peters offers no guidance
on whether the Clause would allow the legislature to cut the
pension benefit rights of current employees contained in the Code.
To conclude otherwise would be illogical, especially since the
Illinois Supreme Court only a year before Peters declared that a
public employee’s “right to a pension depends entirely upon the
provisions of the [Pension] Code which provide for the pension.”476
Moreover, if Sidley’s reading of Peters were correct, then the
decision would cause the Pension Clause to provide less protection
to pension benefits than the level of protection afforded to optional
pension plans under the 1870 constitution.477 Such a result would
be perverse and contrary to the Clause’s original intent as
previously discussed in Part I of this Article.478

473. Abstract of Record, Letter Announcing Circuit Court’s Decision at 24,
Peters, 311 N.E.2d 107 (No. 45766) (emphasis added).
474. Brief for Defendants-Appellants City of Springfield and Amicus
Curiae, Illinois Municipal League at 2, Peters v. City of Springfield, 311
N.E.2d 107 (Ill. 1974) (No. 45766).
475. Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801, 855 (Ill.
2005) (explaining that “[a] judicial opinion is a response to the issues before
the court, and these opinions, like others, must be read in the light of the
issues that were before the court for determination”); see United States v.
Mitchell, 271 U.S. 9, 14 (1926) (stating that “[i]t is not to be thought that a
question not raised by counsel or discussed in the opinion of the court has been
decided merely because it existed in the record and might have been raised
and considered”); Somers v. Quinn, 867 N.E.2d 539, 545–46 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)
(holding that “[a] judicial precedent attaches a specific legal consequence to a
detailed set of facts in an adjudged case or judicial decision, which then
considered as furnishing the rule for the determination of a subsequent case
involving identical or similar material facts and arising in the same court or a
lower court in the judicial hierarchy”).
476. Peterson v. Bd. of Trs., 296 N.E.2d 721, 724 (Ill. 1973).
477. Comment, supra note 34, at 442.
478. See supra notes 86–216 and accompanying text (discussing the Illinois
Constitutional Convention’s findings on the issue).
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b. Peters Is Best Understood as Reaching a Narrow Result
and Reserving the Question of When Pension Benefit
Rights Vest for Another Day
Finally, the most plausible reading of Peters is that it merely
declared a narrow result: a change in mandatory retirement age
not specified in the Pension Code lies beyond the Pension Clause’s
protection.479 Also, Peters is best understood as leaving open the
question of when pension benefits “vest” or are “earned.”480 This
conclusion stems from a careful comparison of the court’s opinion
with the position outlined by the City of Chicago in its amicus
curiae brief.
The City of Chicago argued that the court should reverse the
trial court decision because New York cases held that changes in
salary and employment conditions lacked constitutional protection
as “pension benefits,”481 and because the Pension Clause does not
cover “change[s] in employment conditions or salary” that are
“independently justifiable” and have “secondary effects on
pensions.”482 The court embraced both propositions in its
opinion.483
The Peters opinion also mirrors the City of Chicago’s
479. Comment, supra note 34, at 452–53, 457.
480. DiVito May Memo, supra note 423, at 2.
481. Brief of the City of Chicago, Amicus Curiae, at 11, Peters v. City of
Springfield, 311 N.E.2d 107 (Ill. 1974) [hereinafter Brief of the City of Chicago,
Amicus Curiae] (stating that “[t]he language [of the New York Constitution] is
almost identical to Article XIII, Section of the Illinois Constitution”). The New
York provision has been in effect and subject to judicial interpretation since
1940. Id. The New York Court of Appeals has held that a reduction in salary,
even though it ultimately had an adverse effect on the plaintiff’s pension
benefits, did not violate the New York Constitution. Hoar v. City of Yonkers,
67 N.E.2d 157, 159 (N.Y. 1946). Other New York courts have followed Hoar,
holding that a municipal employee’s salary is not a pension “benefit,” and that
such a salary may be constitutionally diminished even if this has some effect
on pensions. Doyle v. Wright, 108 N.Y.S.2d 473 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951). Changing
other conditions of employment is also not considered to be impairment of
pension benefits in violation of the New York Constitution (citations to other
New York cases omitted).
482. Brief of the City of Chicago, Amicus Curiae, supra note 481, at 12.
483. Peters, 311 N.E.2d at 112. The court explained that:
[m]unicipal employment is not static and a number of factors might
require that a public position be abolished, its functions changed, or the
terms of employment modified. Although this court has not previously
considered the nature of the ‘enforceable contractual relationship’
contemplated by section 5 of article XIII, a similar provision is
contained in the Constitution of New York and has been construed by
the courts of that State . . . [The Pension Clause] was not intended, and
did not serve, to prevent the defendant City from reducing the
maximum retirement age, even though the reduction might affect the
pensions which plaintiffs would ultimately have received).
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description of the Convention debates as “unclear,” and as only
providing “some general notion that [the provision] would help
pensioners, but they formulated no standard for the legislature or
home rule units to use when making pension policy.”484 The City of
Chicago further claimed that there was uncertainty as to when
and under what legal theory courts should use to determine the
vesting of pension benefits under the Clause.485
The City of Chicago then suggested that the court examine
the issue at length “and in light of other states with similar
pension problems.”486 To that end, Chicago further suggested that
“it is undesirable [for the court] to decide these questions
[regarding vesting] perfunctorily,” and that the court “should
await the appropriate case in which it is properly raised.”487
Given Peters’s murky language that the Clause protects
pension rights “which had been earned,” the court undoubtedly
heeded Chicago’s suggestion. The Illinois Supreme Court appeared
to confirm this point a year later in its Lindberg decision when it
stated that “the character of public-employee pension programs [as
under the “contract view” or otherwise] has not been definitely

484. Compare Brief of the City of Chicago, Amicus Curiae, supra note 481,
at 13, with Peters, 311 N.E.2d at 112 (stating that “[t]he debate on the
provision indicates a general intent to protect the pension benefits of public
employees, but, other than concern that vested rights not be defeated by
reason of the failure to provide necessary funding, reflects uncertainty as to
the scope of the restriction which the section imposed on legislative bodies”).
485. The Amicus Brief of the City of Chicago states:
[i]f retirement age were labeled [sic] a pension benefit or right, it would
be difficult to determine when such a right vested. There are two
conflicting lines of pension cases in Illinois, which are discussed at
length in Rubin G. Cohn, Public Employee Retirement Plans—The
Nature of the Employees’ Rights, U. OF ILL. L.F. 32, [written by]
professor of law at the University of Illinois and a member of the
Illinois Public Employees Pension Laws Commission. These pension
cases present very difficult problems concerning a public employee’s
rights in his “pension benefits.” The operation of these rights, such as
when the right to a pension benefit vests, have not been discussed at
length here. The theory to be applied in Illinois under Article XIII
Section 5 should be examined at length, and in light of the experience
of other states with similar pension problems. (Many informative cases
in this area are collected in Annotation Vested Right of Pensioner, 52
A.L.R.2d 437 (1957)). The public policy considerations, as discussed in
Professor Cohn’s article, are of growing importance in a time of
unsettled economic conditions. However, it is undesirable to decide
these questions perfunctorily. This, the Court’s interpretation of the
effect at Art. XIII, Sec. 5 should await the appropriate case in which it
is properly raised.
Brief of the City of Chicago, Amicus Curiae, supra note 481, at 13–14.
486. Id. at 13.
487. Id. at 14.
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established.”488
2. Sidley’s Reliance on the Attorney General’s 1979 Opinion
Is Misplaced
Sidley attempts to bolster its view of Peters by relying upon a
1979 Illinois Attorney General opinion.489 Sidley goes so far to
claim that “Peters led” the General Assembly to “enact” a Pension
Code change in “1978” that “prospectively reduce[d] pension
benefits by excluding some of the compensation received during an
employee’s final year of service from the calculation of his or her
pension benefits.”490 Sidley, in turn, states that the Attorney
General opined that the legislation, per Peters’s instruction, was
“constitutional notwithstanding the facts that it ‘may result in
lower pension for some employees than they would have received
otherwise’ and that the statute applies to employees who were
members of the pension system before the statute was passed.”491
Sidley further states “the Attorney General reasoned that, under
Peters, the Pension Clause protects only those pension rights
‘which had been [previously] earned’ and this statutory provision
did not affect pension benefits earned prior to the enactment of the
statute.”492
Sidley’s reliance on the Attorney General opinion is unsound
for several reasons. To begin with, there is no evidence that the
legislature was prompted by Peters, as Sidley claims, to enact the
purported Pension Code change addressed in the Attorney
General’s opinion. As the Senate sponsor of the bill explained, the
bill was a “housekeeping, clean-up type” measure that made
multiple Pension Code changes.493 The sponsor at no point
mentioned the Peters decision.
Also, an Attorney General opinion does not have the force and
effect of law, and only a well-reasoned opinion serves as
persuasive authority.494 The opinion is hardly well reasoned. Not
only does it lack a detailed analysis of the Pension Clause, but the
opinion also admits that the Peters court did not “settle” the issue
of when pension benefits are constitutionally secured, which is the
linchpin of Sidley’s entire analysis.495 Rather, as the Attorney
488. Lindberg, 326 N.E.2d at 752 (citing favorably Cohn, supra note 30).
489. Memorandum from Sidley Austin, LLP, supra note 414, at 17.
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Id.
493. 80th Ill. Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., at 208 (June 24, 1977) (statement of
Robert J. Egan, Senator, on H.B. 1872, Public Act 80-841).
494. Sparks & Wiewel Constr. Co. v. Martin, 620 N.E.2d 533, 541 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1993).
495. Pensions: Effect of Pension Code Revisions on Vested Rights, No.
S-1407, Op. Atty. Gen. Ill., at 7 (Jan. 10, 1979).
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General puts it, Peters “seems . . . to interpret the constitutional
provision less stringently than [Delegate] Kinney in the
Convention.”496
While Sidley is correct that the opinion ultimately favors
Sidley’s view, the Attorney General’s reasoning is based solely on
an assumption of what Peters “seems” to say, and not on what
Peters was asked to decide,497 let alone the Clause’s plain
language, Convention debates and history. In short, the opinion
violates “Lesson Number One,” as the Illinois Supreme Court
instructed, that “general language in a [judicial] opinion must not
be ripped from its context to make a rule far broader than the
factual circumstances which called forth the language.”498
In addition, the Attorney General’s opinion neither discusses,
nor can be squared with the Illinois Supreme Court’s 1978 decision
in Kerner v. State Employees’ Retirement System, where the court
held that the “contractual relationship” protected by the Pension
Clause is the terms of the Pension Code in effect when the person
becomes a member of the retirement system.499
We need not dwell further on the import of the Attorney
General’s opinion because four months after its issuance it became
legally irrelevant. In May 1979, the Illinois Appellate Court issued
its decision in Kraus.500 Kraus both clarified the holding in Peters
and concluded that the Pension Clause “prohibits legislative action
which directly diminishes the benefits to be received by those who
became members of the pension system prior to the enactment of
the legislation, though they are not yet eligible to retire.”501
Contrary to Sidley’s protests, Kraus, as an Appellate Court
decision, is the law of this State until the Illinois Supreme Court
says otherwise.502
As detailed below, the Illinois Supreme Court has not said
otherwise, but rather endorsed Kraus on multiple occasions, all of
which render Sidley’s view incorrect. While Sidley may find solace
in believing that the Illinois Supreme Court has not rejected its
view of Peters in terms Sidley would accept, that viewpoint fails to
resolve the issue at hand given Kraus’ broad acceptance.

496. Id. at 7–8.
497. See Blount v. Stroud, 904 N.E.2d 1, 15 (Ill. 2009) (explaining that
even if a decision contains broad language, “the precedential scope of our
decision is limited to the facts that were before us”).
498. See Rosewood Care Ctr. v. Caterpillar, 877 N.E.2d 1091, 1098 (Ill.
2007) (“Lesson Number One in the study of law is that general language in an
opinion must not be ripped from its context to make a rule far broader than
the factual circumstances which called forth the language.”).
499. Kerner, 382 N.E.2d at 247.
500. Kraus, 390 N.E.2d 1281.
501. Id. at 1292–93.
502. People v. Carpenter, 888 N.E.2d 105, 111–12 (Ill. 2008).

2014]

Is Welching on Public Pension Promises an Option for Illinois?

261

3. The Appellate Court’s Kraus Decision Displaces Sidley’s
Position
Sidley admits in its analysis that Kraus rejects its position,
but attempts to marginalize the decision because it is “not a
Supreme Court case” and because Illinois courts have only
purportedly “approved aspects of Kraus,” not “all of [its]
reasoning.”503 Again, as noted above, Sidley’s reasoning is
backwards and without merit because Appellate Court decisions
are the law of this State until the Illinois Supreme Court says
otherwise.504 Also, as Justice DiVito observed in his analysis,
Sidley can point to no instance where the Supreme Court has
disagreed with Kraus.505
If anything, Illinois court decisions since Kraus have either
adopted or acted consistent with Kraus’s Pension Clause
analysis.506 For example, one month after Kraus was decided, the
Appellate Court in Ziebell v. Board of Trustees Police Pension
Fund of the Village of Forest Park, concluded, per Kraus and
Delegate Green’s Convention statements, that the Pension Clause
eliminated the distinction between mandatory and optional
retirement plans under Illinois law.507 Ziebell further found that
the Clause established that pensions derived from contributions to
either type of plan were a “contractual arrangement . . . binding
the government to fulfill its agreement.”508 From these
propositions, Ziebell held that the Clause protects statutory
increases in pension benefits only where an employee makes
contributions to a pension system after the statutory change takes
effect.509 Ziebell explained that allowing an employee to receive a
benefit increase without paying the required contribution to the
pension system was tantamount to “an unconstitutional
expenditure of public funds for a private purpose.”510
503. Sidley Memo, supra note 414, at 21.
504. Kraus, 390 N.E.2d at 1292–93.
505. DiVito April Memo, supra note 422, at 5.
506. See DiVito April Memo, supra note 422, at 5 (noting that a “series of
cases postdating the Attorney General’s Opinion . . . have consistently
invalidated amendments to the Pension Code where the result is to diminish
benefits”); DiVito May Memo, supra note 423, at 2–3 (stating that Sidley
Austin “identifies no Illinois Supreme Court decision that disagrees with
Kraus in any relevant respect”).
507. Ziebell, 392 N.E.2d at 105–06.
508. Id. at 106.
509. Id. at 105–06.
510. Id. at 106. Ziebell’s conclusion that a pension participant must pay for
benefit increases via contributions to the pension system mirrors how both
Illinois courts and the Illinois Attorney General approached this issue under
the 1870 Illinois Constitution. See, e.g., Gorham v. Bd. of Trs., 190 N.E.2d 329
(Ill. 1963) (upholding statute permitting retired teachers to purchase a
pension benefit increase by electing to contributing an additional sum to the
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In 1981, the Illinois Supreme Court favorably cited Kraus for
the proposition that even before the Pension Clause, “The
legislature had no power to diminish or repeal [the pension
benefits under an optional plan], and a participant was entitled to
a pension based on the status of the plan at the time he began his
contributions.”511
In 1982, the Appellate Court in Kuhlmann v. Board of
Trustees of the Police Fund of Maywood,512 again relied on Kraus
as well as Ziebell to fashion the following rule regarding the
Clause’s scope:
[A]ny alteration of the pension system amounts to a
modification of the existing contract between the State
(or one of its agencies) and all members of the pension
system, whether employees or retirees. A member is
contractually protected against a reduction in benefits.
By the same token, a member cannot take advantage of a
beneficial
pension
change
without
providing
consideration for the contractual modification. This
consideration most often takes the form of new or
continued contributions to the pension system.513
Based on this framework, Kuhlmann made two holdings.
First, a police officer placed on disability was constitutionally
entitled to a pension at the salary level in place when he retired,
not the lower salary level later enacted by the legislature because
the higher salary level was part of the Pension Code when he
joined the pension system.514 Second, the police officer was not
pension system, and reviewing cases); People ex rel. Schmidt v. Yerger, 172
N.E.2d 753 (Ill. 1961) (holding that the legislature could not increase pension
benefits to firemen who retired prior to the effective date of a benefit increase
under the public funds clause of the 1870 Illinois Constitution); No. 81, 1960
Op. Ill. Atty. Gen. Ill. 146, 151 (reviewing case law and opining that a retired
employee may receive an increase in pension benefits if he or she returns to
service and makes the required contributions or remains retired but makes an
additional contribution to the pension fund). It should be noted that the
Illinois Supreme Court also upheld statutes providing pension payment
increases to retirees and widows of public officials and employees without
additional contributions so long as a moral obligation existed and the
increased payments were made from general tax revenues, not pension system
funds. Voight v. Bd. of Educ., 108 N.E.2d 426, 429 (Ill. 1952).
511. Arnold, 417 N.E.2d at 1027 (emphasis added).
512. Kuhlmann v. Bd. of Trs., 435 N.E.2d 1307, 1310–12 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
Accord Greves v. Firemen’s Pension Fund, 498 N.E.2d 618, 620 (Ill. App. Ct.
1986) (finding that under the Pension Clause, “a participant is entitled to a
pension based on the status of the system when his rights in the system vested,
either at the time he [i.e., the employee] entered the system or in 1971, when the
Illinois Constitution became effective, whichever is later.”) (emphasis added).
513. Kuhlmann, 435 N.E.2d at 1311.
514. Id. at 1311–12.
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constitutionally entitled to a later statutory increase in his salary
formula because the officer never made the required pension
contribution to the system after the increase became law.515 The
officer was on disability when the enhancement became law and
made no system contributions while on disability.
The rule Kuhlmann has been, in turn, adopted by the
Appellate Court on at least nine occasions as the governing legal
framework for determining whether or not an employee was
constitutionally entitled to statutory pension benefit increases or
protected from benefit decreases under the Clause.516 The Illinois
Supreme Court, moreover, has favorably cited at least one of the
post-Kulhmann decisions as well as Kraus as settled law.517
Also, the Supreme Court has adopted the same legal

515. Id.
516. See Redding v. Bd. of Trs., 450 N.E.2d 763, 764–65 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)
(holding based on Kraus and Kuhlmann that police officer was constitutionally
entitled to retire under the Pension Code provisions in effect as of 1971, the
year the Constitution took effect, and not a Code provision passed by the
legislature after the officer entered the system, but before he became eligible
to retire); Taylor v. Bd. of Trs., 466 N.E.2d 1075, 1077–78 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)
(citing Kraus, holding that a local pension fund acted improperly and in
violation of the Pension Clause when it attempted to add more conditions to a
police chief’s pension benefits after he had entered the system); Taft v. Bd. of
Trs., 479 N.E.2d 31, 35–36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (citing Kuhlmann and Kraus,
holding that the repeal of a Worker’s Compensation Act provision that
required employee pension benefits to be reduced by workers compensation
payments constituted a constitutionally protected increase in benefits for
individuals who made contributions to the system after the repeal took effect;
also holding that when the legislature later re-enacted the same Worker’s
Compensation Act provision employees who had made system contributions
prior to the re-enactment could not have the pension benefits reduced if they
later received workers compensation benefits); Gualano v. City of Des Plaines,
487 N.E.2d 1050, 1051–53 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (citing Kulhmann, Kraus, and
Ziebell and coming to the same holdings as in Taft); Carr v. Bd. of Trs., 511
N.E.2d 142, 144 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (citing Kraus, Kuhlmann, Taft, and
Gualano and reaching the same holdings Taft and Gualano); Fenton v. Bd. of
Trs., 561 N.E.2d 105, 109–11 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (citing Kraus, Gualano, Taft,
and Carr and holding that the trial court did not error when it awarded an
employee disability pension benefits without a reduction in payments received
under Workers Compensation Act); Schroeder, 579 N.E.2d at 999–1001 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991) (citing Kraus, Kuhlmann, Taft, Gualano, and Carr and holding
the same as Taft); Hannigan v. Hoffmeister, 608 N.E.2d 396, 402–03 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1992) (citing Taft, Gualano, and Carr and holding that university
employee’s pension benefits could be offset by amounts he received under the
Workers Compensation Act because the setoff provisions were always a part of
the Pension Code while the employee was a member of the system, the setoff
provisions were never repealed unlike in Taft, Kuhlmann, Gualano, Carr and
Fenton); Disabato v. Bd. of Trs., 674 N.E.2d 852, 859 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (citing
Felt and Kraus).
517. See McNamee, 672 N.E.2d at 1165 (citing Kraus and Schroeder for the
proposition that “the appellate court has also invalidated amendments to the
Pension Code only where the result was to diminish benefits”).
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framework,518 as have the Illinois Appellate Court and a federal
district court during the last ten years.519 In sum, Sidley’s
“disagreement” with Kraus’ interpretation of the Clause is not an
isolated affair, but rather fundamentally at odds with the wellaccepted framework Illinois courts use to analyze Pension Clause
violations. Sidley’s view simply cannot be squared with the fact
that under the Pension Clause a participant in a pension system is
entitled to a pension based on the status of the system at the time
he or she entered the system as well as enhancements added
during his or her term of service.520
4. The Illinois Supreme Court’s Felt and Buddell Decisions
Offer Sidley No Refuge
As a final attempt to salvage its reading of the Pension
Clause, Sidley turns to the Illinois Supreme Court’s Felt and
Buddell decisions.521 Neither case, however, advances Sidley’s
cause. Both cases confirm what has already been said throughout
this Article about the scope of the Pension Clause—the legislature
lacks the power to unilaterally cut the pension benefit rights of
current employees—even through self-described “comprehensive
prospective pension reform legislation.”522

518. DiFalco, 521 N.E.2d at 925. The framework provides:
After the effective date of the [1970] Constitution, ‘the contractual
relationship’ [under the Pension Clause] is governed by the actual
terms of the Pension Code at the time the employee becomes a member
of the pension system. Therefore, in determining plaintiff’s rights under
the Pension Code, we must look to the language of the relevant statutes
in effect . . . when plaintiff began paying into the system.
Id. Sklodowski I, 695 N.E.2d at 377. “This court has held that the contractual
relationship [under the Pension Clause] is governed by the actual terms of the
Pension Code at the time the employee became a member of the pension
system.” Id.
519 See generally Miller, 771 N.E.2d 431 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (citing
Sklodowski, Felt, Hannigan, Taft, and Kraus, and outlining the legal
framework); see also In re Marriage of Menken, 778 N.E.2d 281, 284 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2002) (citing Sklodowski, the court stated that the Pension Clause’s
“contractual relationship is governed by the terms of the [Pension] Code at the
time the employee becomes a member of the pension system”); Bosco v. Chi.
Transit Auth., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1055–56 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (citing Kraus
and Sklodowski and stating that “a participant [in a pension system] is
entitled [under the Pension Clause] to a pension based on the status of the
system when his rights in the system vested, either at the time he entered the
system or in 1971 when the 1970 Constitution became effective, whichever is
later”).
520. Greves, 498 N.E.2d at 620.
521. Sidley Memo, supra note 414, at 18–20.
522. Id. at 18–19, 22.
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a. Felt Supplies No Basis for Sidley’s View
As discussed, Felt involved a unilateral Pension Code change
to the salary basis used to calculate the pension benefits of sitting
judges from a judge’s salary on the last day of service to a one year
average of the judge’s final salary. The Supreme Court invalidated
the statutory change because it violated not only the Pension
Clause based on its plain language, Convention debates, and
analogous New York cases,523 but also the Illinois Constitution’s
Contracts Clause per the court’s 1961 decision in Bardens.524
Finally, the Felt court explained that only by ignoring the Clause’s
plain language, rejecting guiding New York cases, and overruling
Bardens could the court accept the Attorney General’s argument
that the legislature had the power to reduce pension benefits.525
Sidley claims, however, that
Felt did not hold that prospective changes in pension
benefit formulas are per se invalid. Rather, it applied a
balancing test in which it compared the ‘severity of the
impairment’ with the purpose served by legislation to
determine
whether
the
legislation
was
an
unconstitutional impairment of a contract rather than a
‘reasonable exercise of the police power.’526
Sidley further claims that the statute in Felt was invalidated
because there “was no substantial evidence that early retirement
of judges” caused the underfunding problem or that the legislation
would reduce the State’s present and future liabilities.527 Sidley
also points to the court’s recognition that the “legislature has an
undeniable interest and responsibility in ensuring the adequate
funding of State pension systems.”528 Sidley finally argues that
Felt could have declared the statute unconstitutional under Article
VI, Section 14 of the Illinois Constitution, which (ironically)
provides that judicial salaries “shall not be diminished” during a
judge’s “term of office.”529
523. Felt, 481 N.E.2d at 700–01.
524. Id. at 702.
525. Id.
526. Sidley Memo, supra note 414, at 18.
527. Id. at 18–19.
528. Id. at 18 (quoting Felt, 481 N.E.2d at 702.
529. Id. at 19, 28. The same analysis used by the Supreme Court in its
Jorgenson v. Blagojevich to discern “diminishments” in judicial salaries would
equally apply to “diminishments” under the Pension Clause. Jorgenson, 811
N.E.2d at 662. Both constitutional provisions use the word “diminish” and the
Pension Clause’s original intent and drafting history supports an identical
understanding of the court gave the term in Jorgenson that fiscal expediency
is not an acceptable reason to violate the Article VI, Section 14. Compare id.
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Sidley’s position is not remotely correct. No party raised in its
briefs the judicial salary clause in Felt. Also, the “balancing test”
Sidley refers to was addressed by the court simply as the Attorney
General’s “presumption” that the Pension Clause, like the
Contracts Clause, was subject to the legislature’s reserved power
to
make
insubstantial
or
reasonable
and
necessary
modifications.530 Indeed, this was the overarching argument that
the Attorney General made to the court in its briefs to uphold the
statute.531
In addition, the Attorney General expressly urged the court to
reject Kraus because the Attorney General viewed Kraus as
absolutely
protecting
pension
benefits
from
unilateral
reductions.532 As a substitute, the Attorney General asked the
with infra notes 541–49, 569–80, and accompanying text.
530. See Felt, 481 N.E.2d at 701–02 (explaining that “presumably the
defendants would offer a similar contention [i.e., that the insubstantial or
reasonable and necessary impairments are allowed] regarding section 5 article
XIII on the question of diminution and impairment of benefits”).
531. See Brief and Argument for Defendants-Appellants at 31–32, Felt, 481
N.E.2d 698 (No. 60373) (explaining that the Attorney General admitted that
while “the delegates sought to ensure that the government could not reduce
the level of benefits below what it was when a member joined the system,” the
Attorney General argued that the delegates nonetheless did not intent to
follow the interpretation given to New York’s identical provision, which
absolutely vested pension benefits and barred any unilateral benefit
reductions); Id. at 36 (stating that the Attorney General claims all the drafters
accomplished with the Pension Code was to bring pension benefits under the
Contracts Clause, and thereby allowing those benefits to be subject to
unsubstantial impairments or impairments justified as reasonable and
necessary under the legislature’s police power); Id. at 24–27 (stating that the
Attorney General urges the court to adopt California’s “limited vesting”
approach to pension benefits whereby an employee entering the pension
system acquires limited contractual rights which are fully vested at
retirement, but are subject to “reasonable modification” before retirement). See
also Reply Brief and Argument for Defendants-Appellants at 3–13, Felt, 481
N.E.2d 698 (No. 60373) (arguing the following: urging the court to deviate
from New York cases interpreting that state’s verbatim provision and
“absolute vesting” approach; stating that the Illinois is not obligated to follow
New York cases; reiterating the argument that the drafters did not intend to
follow New York cases; asserting policy reasons why New York’s
interpretation of its provision should not be followed by Illinois courts).
532. Brief and Argument for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 531, at
31–32. The Attorney General recounted,
the Court [in Kraus] examined the history of this constitutional
provision and concluded that it adopted ‘absolute vesting’. Citing the
remark by Del. Kinney, the court decided that the convention intended
to adopt the same constitutional provision as had been enacted in New
York. [Kraus, 390 N.E.2d at 1290–91]. Turning to New York law, the
Appellate Court examined the decision in Birnbaum v. N.Y. State
Teachers Ret. Sys., 152 N.E.2d 241 and determined that under this law
no changes could be made in the retirement benefits of government
employees under art. XIII, § 5. [Kraus, 390 N.E.2d at 1290–91]. The
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court to adopt California’s “limited vesting” approach to pension
benefits, which allows the legislature to make unilateral
reductions in benefits533
The Supreme Court, as discussed, neither adopted the
Attorney General’s view, nor his request to overturn Kraus.
Rather, the court merely accepted the Attorney General’s
Contracts Clause analysis for argument purposes.534 The court, in
turn, found that the salary formula change at issue nonetheless
failed the Attorney General’s self-prescribed test.535 As a
consequence, Felt’s “balancing test” discussion is little more than a
holding on a hypothetical before the court. Sidley may not, of
course, ignore the court’s principal holding that the Pension
Clause (and the Contracts Clause in the public pension context) is
an absolute bar to legislative impairments or reductions in pension
benefits.
Moreover, while Felt did state that the “legislature has an
undeniable interest and responsibility in ensuring the adequate
funding of State pension systems,” that proposition does not
supply the legislature with a compelling basis to unilaterally cut
the pension benefits of current employees. Rather, as the
McNamee decision later explained, the legislature has an
undeniable interest because the Clause was “intended to force the
funding of pensions indirectly, by putting the state and municipal
governments on notice that they are responsible for those benefits”
and by paying them when they are due.536
Finally, the Illinois Supreme Court explained, per Kraus, that

Court also examined the constitutional provisions of three other states
(Alaska, Hawaii, and Michigan) and found that each of those provisions
utilized the word ‘accrued’ when discussing the pension benefits which
could not be changed; the Court found the absence of this word in the
1970 Illinois Constitution ‘conspicuous.’ [Id. at 1291]. On the above
bases, the Appellate Court concluded that ‘section 5 of article XIII
prohibits legislative action which directly diminishes the benefits to be
received by those who became members of the pension system prior to
the enactment of the legislation, though they are not yet eligible to
retire.’ [Id. at 1292–93]. Defendant urges this Court not to follow this
interpretation for several reasons.
Id.

533. See id. at 24–27 (urging the court to adopt California’s “limited
vesting” approach to pension benefits whereby an employee entering the
pension system acquires limited contractual rights which are fully vested at
retirement, but are subject to “reasonable modification” before retirement).
534. See Felt, 481 N.E.2d at 701–02 (noting that the Attorney General
would “[p]resumably” apply the contract clause’s analysis of impairments “on
the question of diminishments or impairments of benefits” under the Pension
Clause).
535. Id. at 703 (comparing the Attorney General test against the salary
formula at issue).
536. McNamee, 672 N.E.2d at 1164–65.
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even under the 1870 Constitution’s Contracts Clause, the
“legislature had no power to diminish or repeal the vested
contractual rights [contain in an optional plan], and a participant
was entitled to a pension based on the status of the plan at the
time he began his contributions.”537 Since the Pension Clause
eliminated the legal distinction between optional and mandatory
pension plans,538 it cannot be seriously argued that pension rights
under the Clause somehow lack at least the same absolute legal
protection afforded to optional plans under the prior constitution.
The same result was reached under New York law in Kleinfeldt v.
New York City Employees’ Retirement System, which was favorably
cited and quoted by Felt.539
b. Buddell Confirms That Sidley’s View of Peters Is
Erroneous
As discussed in Part II, Buddell involved an adverse Pension
Code change affecting the pension rights of a current university
employee. At the time the employee entered the pension system,
the Pension Code allowed employees to purchase service credit for
their time in the military. The Code was later amended to repeal
the purchase credit right for new employees, and required current
employees to exercise the right by a specific date. The original
Code provision, however, contained no deadline on when an
employee had to exercise the right. When the plaintiff attempted
to exercise the purchase option after the specified date, the
retirement board denied the request based on the amended Code
provision.
537. Arnold, 417 N.E.2d at 1027; see Pensions: State Emps.’ Ret. Sys., No.
21, 1961 Op. Ill. Atty. Gen. Ill. at 78–80 (opining that optional pension plans
afforded vested contractual rights under the Illinois Constitution’s Contract
Clause “could not be impaired by subsequent legislation” even if the unilateral
alteration or modification were “slight” or “minor” in nature).
538. Kraus, 390 N.E.2d at 1291–92; Ziebell, 392 N.E.2d at 105–06;
Buddell, 514 N.E.2d at 186 (stating that, “in effect, this constitutional
provision guarantees that all pension benefits will be determined under a
contractual theory rather than being treated as ‘bounties’ or ‘gratuities,’ as
some pensions were previously.”).
539. Kleinfeldt v. N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. (Kleinfeldt I), 324 N.E.2d 865,
869 (N.Y. 1975) (mentioning how “[t]he court is not insensitive to the grave
problem of spiraling costs of retirement benefits. Although fiscal relief is a
current imperative, an unconstitutional method may not be blinked. As stated
in Birnbaum v. N.Y. State Teachers Ret. Sys., 152 N.E.2d at 246, ‘[t]he
constitutional amendment . . . prohibits official action during a public
employment membership in a retirement system which adversely affects the
amount of the retirement benefits payable to the members on retirement
under laws and conditions existing at the time of his entrance into retirement
system membership. (The Retirement system) argues that if this court (so)
holds . . . the system will be plunged into bankruptcy. The answer to that
argument must be that we are not at liberty to hold otherwise.’”).
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Under these facts, Buddell made two holdings that completely
undercut Sidley’s interpretation of the Clause and reliance on
Peters. First, Buddell answered the question of when a public
employee’s pension benefit rights “vest” under the Clause, which
Justice DiVito correctly observed was not resolved in Peters.
Buddell confirms Kraus’s holding that a person is constitutionally
entitled to the pension benefits set forth in the Pension Code when
he or she entered the system.540 There is no mention, as Sidley
incessantly argues, that a person is only entitled to those rights he
or she earns on a day-to-day basis while employed by a public
entity.
Sidley’s attempt to characterize Buddell as supporting its
view because the plaintiff had already “earned” his right is
unavailing. To use Sidley’s lingo, Buddell makes clear that a
person constitutionally “earns” the pension benefit rights that
exist in the Pension Code when he or she joins a pension system by
paying his or her initial contribution to that system.541 Later
Illinois Supreme Court decisions confirm this point.542 Sidley
unsurprisingly offers only a brief analysis of Buddell because it
later tacitly acknowledges that its reading of Buddell (and Felt) is
wrong.543
Second, Buddell clarified that Peters was inapposite to the
matter before the court because Peters did not involve a challenge
to a Pension Code amendment that reduced pension benefits.544

540. See Buddell, 514 N.E.2d at 187 (stating, “there can be no doubt . . .
that upon the effective date of the [Pension Clause] the rights conferred upon
the plaintiff by the Pension Code became contractual in nature and cannot be
altered, modified, or released except in accordance with usual contract
principles”).
541. See United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 878 (1977) (holding that
a serviceman had “already earned” the contractual right—and was entitled—
to receive a military bonus upon agreeing to a contractual commitment to reenlist in the Navy even though the bonus program was repealed by Congress
before the serviceman even began to serve his re-enlistment).
542. Accord DiFalco, 521 N.E.2d at 925 (discussing that, “[a]fter the
effective date of the [1970] Constitution, ‘the contractual relationship’ [under
the Pension Clause] is governed by the actual terms of the Pension Code at the
time the employee becomes a member of the pension system. Therefore, in
determining plaintiff’s rights under the Pension Code, we must look to the
language of the relevant statutes in effect . . . when plaintiff began paying into
the pension fund”); see Sklodowski I, 695 N.E.2d at 377 (concluding that, “the
contractual relationship [under the Pension Clause] is governed by the actual
terms of the Pension Code at the time the employee became a member of the
pension system.”); DiVito May Memo, supra note 423, at 6.
543. See Sidley Memo, supra note 414, at 22 (stating, “we acknowledge
that there is language in Buddell and Felt that might be interpreted to read
Peters narrowly or to give credence to the view that employees have some sort
contractually protected interest in continuation of the benefits formula in
effect when they commenced employment”).
544. Buddell, 514 N.E.2d at 721.
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This holding entirely upends Sidley’s reading of Peters because the
Attorney General defended the statute at issue under Sidley’s
theory of “earned” benefits. The Attorney General argued, per
Peters, that the plaintiff would have only “earned” the military
service credit “after he made timely payment” to purchase the
credit.545 The Attorney General pressed further that if under the
Clause “no legislative changes resulting in a reduction of benefits
were constitutionally permissible after the date an employee
became a member of the [pension] system, [then] Peters would
have to have been decided the other way.”546 The Attorney General
took the same position in a 1976 opinion involving the same
Pension Code provision.547 Since Buddell rejected the Attorney
General’s view of Peters,548 the same would be true of Sidley’s
reading of the case.

E. Sidley’s “Contract” Proposal to Reduce the Pension
Benefits of Current Employees Fails Under Contract
Principles
1. Sidley’s Contract Approach
Sidley also claims that even if its reading of the Pension
Clause is wrong (and it is), then “contract principles” nonetheless
allow the General Assembly to reduce the pension benefits of
545. Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 4–5, Buddell, 514 N.E.2d 184
(1987). See Reply Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 4, Buddell, 514 N.E.2d
184 (1987) (explaining that “[t]he Constitution proscribes reduction or
diminution of established contractual benefits. Plaintiff had an opportunity to
participate in voluntary program for which, by virtue of the nature of his prior
employment, he was qualified. He chose not to participate. The legislature
terminated the program. The termination of the program did not diminish
plaintiff’s earned retirement benefits by a single penny, and plaintiff does not
so contend. If he had paid the money, then he could have obtained a higher
amount of benefits. He failed to do so. Plaintiff’s voluntary inaction should not
be constitutionalized.”).
546. Reply Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 545, at 3.
547. See PENSIONS: State Univs. Ret. Sys. Serv. Credit, No. S-1153, 1976
Op. Ill. Atty Gen. 289, 291 (stating that “[n]either of the System participants
in your two questions had elected to purchase credit for prior governmental
service when the amendments altering the availability of prior service were
enacted. Therefore, these employees did not have an earned right to this
service credit when the amendments were enacted; the amendments thus did
not diminish their earned pension rights. Because section 5 of article XIII of
the Illinois Constitution protects only earned pension rights, Public Act 781184 and Public Act 79-775 did not violate the constitutional rights of these
two employees”).
548. Buddell, 514 N.E.2d at 187–88 (explaining that because the Pension
Code provided that the plaintiff could purchase military service credit in the
retirement system when he joined the system, [t]his right to purchase
additional credit became a contractual right under the [Pension Clause].”).
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current public employees as proposed by the Commercial Club.549
Sidley contends that “contract rights can be modified or
surrendered as long as ‘consideration’ is provided that supports
the change in the contract.”550 Sidley defines “consideration” as a
“new benefit to the employee, a new detriment to the employer, or
. . . mutual agreement.”551
Sidley submits that legislatively imposed reductions in future
pension benefits would be supported by “consideration” if the State
merely promised not to cut employee salaries or terminate
employees.552 Sidley reasons that an “employer’s failure to take
those actions prospectively is a ‘new detriment to the employer’
and is thus consideration,” while an “employer’s decision to not
take the other prospective actions is ‘a new benefit to the
employee.’”553 In Sidley’s view, “governments have the
constitutional authority to undertake either of these actions,
except “for judges and other officers who compensation is
constitutionally protected.”554 Accordingly, Sidley states that so
long as “appropriate notice” is provided to public employees “there
can be no objection to prospective modification of pension benefits
earned in the future.”555
Sidley further states its position is supported by two Illinois
employment law cases cited by Justice DiVito as well as Kraus.556
Sidley claims that, even under Kraus, “the Pension Clause itself
does not in any way limit the State’s ability to change, or even
terminate, the employment relationship and . . . the State is free to
prospectively modify the terms of employment regardless of the
incidental impact of such a modification upon pension benefits.”557
Sidley contends that Kraus “endors[es] reductions in salaries and
hours as examples of permissible actions” as well as “outright
termination of employment.” In its view, “Kraus goes on to explain
that ‘there is nothing to prohibit an employee from agreeing, for
consideration, to accept a reduction in benefits.”558

549. Sidley Memo, supra note 414, at 22–27.
550. See id. at 23 (quoting Robinson v. Ada S. McKinley Comm. Servs.,
Inc., 19 F.3d 359 (7th Cir. 1994)).
551. Id.
552. Id.
553. Id.
554 Id.
555. Id.
556. Id.; Doyle v. Holy Cross Hosp., 708 N.E.2d 1140, 1144 (Ill. 1999); Ross
v. May Co., 880 N.E.2d 210, 216–17 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
557. Sidley Memo, supra note 414, at 25–26.
558. Id. at 26.
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2. Sidley’s Contract Approach Fails Due to a Lack of
Consideration or Acceptance
As explained below, Sidley’s proposal fails for lack of
consideration and proper acceptance based on contract principles
and sound public policy. Sidley’s argument relies on an “at-will”
employment approach to modifying the pension benefit rights
public employees have under the Pension Clause. Specifically,
Sidley assumes that an employee’s pension rights are just like any
other term or condition of employment that an employer may
unilaterally modify.
Under this approach, an employer may modify the terms of
employment at any time, and if an employee continues to work
after the modification occurs, then the employee is deemed to have
accepted the change. Sidley tries to enhance the plausibility of its
approach by tying pension benefit cuts to the State’s promise to
forbear from either firing or reducing the salaries of State
employees. And, by placing employees on notice of this “offer,”
Sidley contends that employees who continue to work after the
change takes place have “accepted” the “offer.” Justice DiVito’s
description of Sidley’s approach as a “charade” is correct.559
Pension benefits are constitutionally protected, “vested
rights” and may not be traded away as easily as Sidley claims. As
an initial matter, Sidley assumes that all current State employees
have “at-will” employment status and could be subject to its
proposal. This is simply not true. At most, approximately 32% of
State employees participating in the State Employees Retirement
System (“SERS”) have “at-will” status, while the remaining 68%
are covered by the Personnel Code and may only be terminated
“for cause.” Moreover, over 91% of state employees are further
covered by a collective bargaining agreement with wage and job
protections.560
In short, the proposal Sidley outlines is inapplicable to most
SERS participants because they already have job and salary
protection under the Personnel Code and collective bargaining
agreements. This is also true of employees participating in the
Teachers Retirement System and State University Retirement
System as well because many of those employees are covered by
collective bargaining agreements and civil service statutes. After
all, the offer Sidley describes is premised on a promise by the State
not to fire or reduce the salaries of employees who already legally
enjoy that protection. An offer of this sort provides these
559. DiVito May Memo, supra note 423, at 7.
560. Doug Finke, State of Unions: Domination of Illinois’ Workforce a
Campaign Issue, JOURNAL STANDARD (Aug. 30, 2014) available at
http://www.journalstandard.com/article/20140830/NEWS/140839970/10287/N
EWS?template=printart.
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employees nothing of value in exchange for a reduction in
employee pension benefits.
Sidley’s proposal fares no better for purely “at-will” State
employees. Illinois courts have long held that the General
Assembly lacks the power to enact legislation that adversely
affects vested rights.561 Further, as already discussed above, the
Pension Clause affords constitutional protection to pension
benefits as enforceable contractual rights that “vest” when public
employees begin participating in the pension system.562 The
Clause, in turn, prohibits unilateral action by the legislature
“which directly diminishes the benefits to be received by those who
became members of the pension system prior to the enactment of
the legislation, though they are not yet eligible to retire.”563
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that pension benefits
“cannot be altered, modified or released except in accordance with
usual contract principles.”564 Any modifications, of course, would
need to be supported by new consideration and the mutual assent
of the affected public employee.565
It is hornbook law that an “at-will” employer lacks the
unilateral right to retroactively reduce or revoke contractually
agreed upon benefits that have already vested.566 In the context of
561. Boonstra v. City of Chi., 574 N.E.2d 689, 695 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
562. See, e.g., Schroeder, 579 N.E.2d at 999 (stating, “[a]n employee’s
rights in the [pension] system vest, either at the time he enters the system,
e.g., making contributions, or in 1971 when the 1970 Constitution became
effective, whichever is later”).
563. Kraus, 390 N.E.2d at 1292–93.
[T]he convention chose to follow New York and provide that the
employees’ [pension] rights vest at the time they became members of
the system . . . in instant case, we are dealing with an attempt to
directly diminish benefits toward which plaintiff has contributed 17
years of service. To imply a requirement that those benefits have fully
accrued in this context would, in our opinion, be an unwarranted
judicial engraftment on the constitutional provision and would
frustrate the express intent of the drafters.
Id. at 1291–92.
564. Buddell, 514 N.E.2d at 187.
565. Kraus, 390 N.E.2d at 1293; see also Lomax v. Matthews, 114 N.Y.S.2d
682 (N.Y. Cnty Ct. 1951) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to have increased
cost of living allowance included with the salary basis used to calculate his
pension amount under the New York Pension Clause because the plaintiff was
not required to sign an endorsement that the increase was to be excluded);
White v. Hussey, 87 N.Y.S.2d 252 (N.Y. 1949) (holding that public employee
waived right to include cost of living adjustment in salary basis for purpose of
New York Pension Clause where the employee was required sign and did sign
salary checks bearing an endorsement that the increase was conditioned on it
being excluded from the salary formula).
566. Nattah v. Bush, 605 F.3d 1052, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing 19
RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 54:36 (4th ed. 2010)); Jensen
v. IBM, 454 F.3d 382, 387 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating, “[b]ut consistent with the
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Sidley’s proposal, this means that the State cannot, as an “at-will”
employer, adversely change employee pension benefit rights as a
condition for continued employment because those rights are
already vested whether or not the employee is eligible to retire.567

nature of at-will employment, an employer can modify its offer until the offer’s
conditions are satisfied. At that point, the employee’s right under the
unilateral contract is deemed to have accrued or become vested, and the
employer no longer can modify the offer”); see Kulins v. Malco Inc., 459 N.E.2d
1038, 1044 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (explaining that severance benefits policy
allowing at-will employees to earn one week’s pay for every year of service
constituted “vested rights” for only each year the employees worked, and
employees did not forfeit these rights by continuing to work after the employer
terminated the benefits policy; stating “[t]o hold otherwise would relegate the
promise of severance pay to the illusory status of an offer revocable at the
pleasure of the corporation and result in a harsh forfeiture to loyal, long-term
employees.”).
567. Kraus, 390 N.E.2d at 1293. Accord Greves, 498 N.E.2d at 620 (finding
that under the Pension Clause, “a participant is entitled to a pension based on
the status of the system when his rights in the system vested, either at the
time he [i.e., the employee] entered the system or in 1971, when the Illinois
Constitution became effective, whichever is later”) (emphasis added);
Thompson v. Ret. Bd. of Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chi., 884
N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (parroting the same holding); see Kulins,
459 N.E.2d at 1044 (explaining, “[o]nce the service condition is satisfied, the
benefit derived from the term of service is vested and can be divested only by
failure to satisfy the eligibility provisions”); see also Yeazell, 402 P.2d at 545–
46 (holding that since public pension rights are vested rights upon acceptance
of employment, “the legislature could not thereafter constitutionally alter the
provisions of his already existing contract of [pension] membership” because
his “rights in the fund could only be changed by mutual consent”; further
holding that an employee’s continued working after a legislative change
occurred would not manifest consent or acceptance, because the employee
should not be compelled to choose based on “legislative coercion”); Bennet ex
rel. Arizona State Personnel Comm’n v. Beard, 556 P.2d 1137, 1139–40 (Ariz.
Ct. App., 1976) (applying Yeazell and holding that where a term of public
employment is not vested and employee serves “at-will,” the employer may
condition continued employment or employee compensation upon a change in
that term of employment that is less favorable to the employee; however,
where the term of public employment is a vested right based on state law, an
employer could not condition continued employment or compensation on
reduced benefits); Lauderdale v. Eugene Water & Elec. Bd., 177 P.3d 13, 19–
21 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining how under the contractual approach
pension benefit rights vest in toto at the time the employee begins working for
the employer and are therefore deemed “already earned” or vested,” and
stating that an “employer’s ability to change an at-will employee’s current
compensation cannot meaningfully be compared to an employer’s ability to
change vested post-employment benefits.”). Cf. Taylor, 466 N.E.2d at 1077–78
(holding that when a police chief was accepted into the pension system he
obtained contractual rights in that system and the police pension board acted
improperly when it attempted to impose new conditions on the police chief’s
ability to exercise those rights); Haake v. Bd. of Educ., 925 N.E.2d 297, 314
(Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (stating that “[t]he general rule regarding the modification
of vested benefits is that upon vesting, benefits become forever unalterable.
The defendant employer has not identified any precedent in which simply
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Similarly, the State could not force an employee to accept a
forfeiture of his or her vested rights merely by continuing to
work.568 As with any modification to an existing contract, there
must be an offer, new consideration, and voluntary acceptance.569
As detailed below, Sidley’s proposal fails under contract principles
because it is bereft of new consideration and acceptance.
a. Sidley’s Proposal Lacks Valid Consideration
While Sidley is correct that forbearance from firing or
reducing the salary of an “at-will” employee may qualify as
“consideration” for contract purposes, the forbearance it offers is
not legal consideration for several reasons. First, the forbearance
being offered is unsolicited and lacks any fixed period of time.
Illinois courts have explained that forbearance will suffice as
consideration where it “was expressly or impliedly requested by
[the other party] as the agreed equivalent for his promise.”570
Second, Sidley fails to specify the duration of the forbearance.
Since the Club appears to believe that public employees are
overpaid,571 it is unreasonable to assume that the forbearance
being offered is permanent. Rather, it is reasonable to assume that
the offered forbearance is entirely within the State’s discretion.
Under these circumstances, the consideration would be illusory.572
Indeed, the Club’s proposal is akin to what took place in
Mimica v. Area Interstate Trucking, Inc.573 In that case, an “atcontinuing to wok under similar circumstances was held to constitute assent
to a reduction of vested benefits.” (quoting Bland v. Fiatallis N. Am., Inc., 401
F.3d 779, 784 (7th Cir. 2005))).
568. McCaskey v. Cal. State Auto. Ass’n, 189 Cal. App. 4th 947, 970–73
(Cal. Ct. App. 2010); Yeazell, 402 P.2d at 545–46; Beard, 556 P.2d at 1139–40.
569. Holy Cross Hosp., 708 N.E.2d at 1145 (stating, “[a] modification of an
existing contract, like a newly formed contract, requires consideration to be
valid and enforceable”); Robinson, 19 F.3d at 364 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying
Illinois law, “[a] valid modification requires an offer, acceptance, and
consideration”); York v. Cent. Ill. Mut. Relief Ass’n, 173 N.E. 80, 83 (Ill. 1930)
(stating, “[t]here is no doubt that the parties to a contract may by mutual
agreement accept substitution of a new contract for the old one with the intent
to extinguish the obligation of the old contract, but one party cannot by his
own acts release or alter its obligations. The intention must be mutual”).
570. First Nat. Bank v. Chapman, 366 N.E.2d 937, 941 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977);
see 3 LORD, supra note 566 § 7:44 (explaining, “[m]ere forbearance to exercise
a legal right, without any request to forbear or circumstances from which an
agreement to forbear may be implied, is not consideration such as which will
support a promise.”).
571. PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 64–68.
572. 3 LORD, supra note 566, § 7:48 (“If upon proper interpretation, the
agreement is to forbear only for such time as the promisor chooses, it is
insufficient, for it is an illusory promise.”).
573. Mimica v. Area Interstate Trucking, Inc., 620 N.E.2d 1328 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1993).
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will” employee who invented a new kind of truck trailer while
working for a trucking company was threatened with termination
if he did not assign his patent rights over to his employer. The
employee assigned his rights and was fired two weeks later. The
court invalidated the assignment because the employee “was never
paid anything for [the] assignment other than an illusory
promise.”574 The court found that the consideration was grossly
inadequate and accompanied by unfairness because the employer
used its superior bargaining position to take undue advantage of
the employee and substantially impaired the employee’s exercise
of free will.575 A court would most likely reject Sidley’s proposal for
the reasons outlined in Mimica.
Third, Judge DiVito’s assessment is correct that the
forbearance contemplated by Sidley is inadequate because under
Kraus, the State cannot use the potential threat of a loss of
employment or cut in pay as a means to “bargain for” a reduction
in pension benefits.576 Kraus explains that while the legislature
may reduce work hours, salaries, and jobs, it may only do so when
“directed toward another aim” even if those actions would have an
indirect effect on the pension benefits ultimately received.577
Sidley’s proposal is conspicuously directed toward cutting benefits
and for no other purpose.
Fourth, the State cannot terminate employees who refuse to
accept an offer that directly cuts their pension benefits. Such a
termination would most likely constitute a retaliatory discharge.
Illinois courts have long held that public employees do not waive
their constitutional rights as a function of employment, nor may
they be arbitrarily barred or removed from employment.578 The
Illinois Supreme Court observed that a private sector employee
could not bring a retaliatory discharge action against a private
employer for a constitutional violation because constitutional
provisions are limitations on government actions and “mandate
nothing concerning the relationship of . . . private individuals in
the employer-employee relationship.”579 As discussed, this is not
true of public employees because pension benefits are a
fundamental component of the public employer-employee
relationship. In addition, the Illinois Supreme Court has
574. Id. at 1334–35.
575. Id.
576. DiVito May Memo, supra note 423, at 7–8; Kraus, 390 N.E.2d at 1293.
Cf. Bd. of Cnty Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 696 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (stating that “[a] public employee is always an individual, and a
public employee below the highest political level (which is exempt from Elrod)
is virtually always an individual who is not rich; the termination or denial of a
public job is the termination or denial of a livelihood.”).
577. Kraus, 390 N.E.2d at 1293.
578. Scutt v. LaSalle Cnty. Bd., 423 N.E.2d 213, 218 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
579. Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1357 (Ill. 1985).
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recognized that retaliatory discharge is an exception to the “atwill” employment doctrine and covers public employees.580
Put differently, if the State cannot legally terminate public
employees who refuse to agree to a cut in pension benefits, then
the State is not in a position to offer a promise that it would not
discharge them.581 Similarly, a strong argument can be made that
threatening to reduce the salaries of public employees who refuse
to accept a cut in pension benefits would be tantamount to
economic duress and void.582 As a result, the State cannot offer a
promise of no salary cuts as new consideration. The offer of
forbearance Sidley describes is nothing more than a thinly veiled
threat to public employees that if you do not accept benefit
reductions you will be fired or your salary will be cut. Such an
“offer” is simply inconsistent with public policy.
Finally, a public employer most likely lacks the power to
discharge or discipline an “at-will” public employee seeking to
exercise or preserve his or her pension rights. As the Illinois
Supreme Court stated in one Pension Clause case, “[a]ttempting to
save pension funds would not constitute cause for discharge nor
would a discharge for that purpose be, in certain circumstances, a
good-faith exercise of the asserted authority to summarily
discharge probationary [at-will] [public employees].”583
A recent California court decision is also instructive.584 The
case involved “at-will” employees selling insurance policies who
obtained vested rights to sell fewer policies than other
employees.585 The employer wanted the employees to sell more
policies and attempted to unilaterally modify the employees’
580. See id. at 1356 (stating that “[t]he common law doctrine that an
employer may discharge an employee-at-will for any reason or for no reason is
still the law in Illinois, except for when the discharge violates a clearly
mandated public policy.”); Smith v. Waukegan Park Dist., 896 N.E.2d 232
(2008) (allowing a retaliatory discharge claim against a public sector
employer).
581. See also Fragakis v. Ill. State Toll Highway Auth., No 05 C 2741, 2006
WL 533359, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (holding that a public employee could
bring a retaliatory discharge action against a public employee for a
constitutional violation); Hegeler v. Ill. State Toll Highway Auth., No 05 C
2739, 2005 WL 2861051, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (holding the same).
582. Cf. Gerber v. First Nat’l Bank, 332 N.E.2d 615, 618 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975)
(holding that a bank’s threat to terminate its legal business with an attorney
unless the attorney signed a promissory note to cover a portion of a business
loss experienced by a bank official in a venture recommended by the attorney
sufficiently alleged economic duress where the bank provided the attorney
with one-third to one-half of his income); see generally Hasentab v. Bd. of Fire
& Police Comm’rs, 389 N.E.2d 588 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (holding that public
employer could not suspend and reprimand firemen who exercised their
constitutional rights).
583. DiFalco, 521 N.E.2d at 927.
584. McCaskey, 189 Cal. App. 4th 947.
585. Id. at 963–70.
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vested rights by forbearing from firing the employees.586 The
employees refused to consent to the unilateral change.587 The court
found that the employees’ vested rights created an exception to the
“at-will” doctrine by only allowing the employer to discharge the
plaintiffs “for no reason, or even for a bad reason,” but not “for the
reason that [the plaintiffs] had invoked, or insisted on the right to
invoke, [their vested rights].”588 The court further concluded that
the employees did not consent to the modification merely by
continuing to work after the modification took place.589
b. Sidley’s Proposal Also Fails for Lack of Assent
Even assuming Sidley’s proposal provides adequate
consideration, it nonetheless fails for lack of employee assent.
Public employees who are members of a pension system are
already obligated to contribute and work in order to receive
pension payments.590 At least one Illinois court has held, in the
pension context, that employee acceptance will not be inferred
where the person who continues to work already has a preexisting
duty to do so.591
The Arizona Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in
Yeazell v. Capins.592 In that case, the court held that because the
pension benefit rights of public employees became “vested” upon
accepting employment, the legislature could not later change those
rights retroactively without the mutual assent of the employee.593
The court also held that an employee’s choice to continue to work
after the statutory change took effect could not be construed as an
employee’s acquiescence or a waiver of rights.594 In the court’s
view, the employee could not be compelled to choose while being
employed between his original pension rights and the statutorily
modified pension rights via “legislative coercion.”595
Acceptance can only be demonstrated if the employee took
some affirmative action apart from merely working as usual to
586. Id. at 958.
587. Id. at 972.
588. Id. at 970.
589. Id. at 971–73.
590. See e.g., 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-107 (2008) (requiring persons
enrolled in SERS to have 35 years of creditable service in order to retire at any
age to receive a pension).
591. Haake, 925 N.E.2d at 313–14; see also Excelsior Stove & Mfg. Co. v.
Venturelli, 8 N.E.2d 702, 704 (Ill. App. Ct. 1937) (noting that “[t]he mere fact
that a person to whom an offer to buy or sell goods is made fails to reply
thereto and reject the offer, ordinarily, cannot be taken as an acceptance to the
offer, even though the offer states that silence will be taken as consent”).
592. Yeazell, 402 P.2d 541.
593. Id. at 546 (citing and quoting York, 173 N.E. at 83).
594. Id. at 546–47.
595. Id.
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manifest a desire to be bound by the offer.596 For example, a public
employee would need to voluntarily and knowingly sign a waiver
acknowledging that the employee was unequivocally agreeing to
accept the benefit reductions in exchange for new legal
consideration. 597 New York courts use the same approach when
evaluating whether a public employee has waived his or her
pension rights under that State’s identical constitutional
provision, which the Pension Clause is modeled after.598 That
approach requires any waiver to be assessed on an individualized
basis.599
The fact that Sidley’s proposal contains language informing
employees that continuing to work manifests employee acceptance
does not alter this result. To paraphrase the Illinois Supreme
Court’s holding in Doyle v. Holy Cross Hospital, continued
employment does not constitute acceptance because the “illusion
and irony is apparent:” to preserve their right under the existing
contract the employees “would be forced to quit.”600 Court decisions
from other jurisdictions take the same view.601 As the Illinois
596. Haake, 925 N.E.2d at 313–14; Yeazell, 402 P.2d at 546–47.
597. See, e.g., Suburban Downs, Inc. v. Ill. Racing Bd., 735 N.E.2d 697, 704
(Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (explaining that while property rights, once acquired,
cannot be dissolved by the legislature, the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily
waived his due process rights by submitting a written waiver of any and all
rights to a hearing in accordance with the contested case provisions of the
Illinois Horse Racing Act and elected instead to present evidence to the Racing
Board at an informal hearing).
598. Lomax, 114 N.Y.S.2d at 684–85; Wright, 108 N.Y.S.2d at 474–75;
Carroll v. Grumet, 117 N.Y.S.2d 553, 555–57 (N.Y. App. Div. 1952); Rosen v
N.Y.C. Teachers’ Ret. Bd., 122 N.Y.S.2d 485, 487–88 (N.Y. App. Div. 1953).
Accord Kleinfeldt v. N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. (Kleinfeldt II), 341 N.Y.S.2d 784,
789–90 (N.Y. 1973) (rejecting the claim that the mere acceptance of a pay
check after the operative date of legislation changing how pension benefits are
calculated for current employees constitutes a waiver of vested pension
rights).
599. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 114 N.Y.S.2d 730, 737 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1952).
600. Holy Cross Hosp., 708 N.E.2d at 1146.
601. See Robinson, 19 F.3d at 364 (applying Illinois law, “by continuing to
work, [the employee] was merely performing her duties under the original
contract. According to [the employer’s] logic, the only way [the employee] could
preserve her rights under their original employment contract would be to quit
working after [the employer] unilaterally issued the disclaimer. That is
ridiculous”); DeMasse v. ITT, 984 P.2d 1138, 1145–46 (Ariz. 1999) (collecting
cases, “it is too much to require an employee to preserve his or her rights
under the original employment contract by quitting working. Thus, an
employee does not manifest consent to an offer modifying an existing contract
without taking affirmative steps, beyond continued performance, to accept.”);
Thompson v. Kings Entm’t, 674 F. Supp. 1194, 1199 (E.D. Va. 1987)
(explaining “under [the employer’s] view, acceptance is inferred from an
employee’s continuing to work with knowledge of the handbook’s terms”). The
Thompson case goes on to explain
[a]ccordingly, an employee seeking to reject the offer could not remain
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Appellate Court explained in a similar context, “the [government]
cannot whipsaw citizens into ‘voluntarily’ choosing one of two
means by which they will be divested of an existing property
interest.”602
Moreover, even if a proposed Pension Code revision reducing
the pension rights of current employees were supported by legal
consideration, each employee must still retain the right to
withhold his or her consent and continue performing under the
unrevised Code provisions.603 For these reasons, Sidley’s contract
approach fails and is without merit.

F. Contrary to Sidley’s Claim, the State Must Make
Pension Benefit Payments from Its General Fund if a
State Pension System Defaults or Is on the Verge of
Default
In a separate memorandum, Sidley contends that if the
pension system goes broke, then public employees entitled to
pension payments will have no recourse against the State to
receive continued payments.604 As explained below, welching by
silent and continue to work. Instead, such an employee would have to
give specific notice of rejection to the employer to avoid having his
actions construed as acceptance. Requiring an offeree to take
affirmative steps to reject an offer, however, is inconsistent with
general contract law. In the absence of special relations between the
parties or other circumstances, the offeree need make no reply to the
offer and his silence and inaction cannot be construed as assent.
Id. See also 2 LORD, supra note 566 § 6:53 (explaining, “it is clear that,
whatever the offeree may be thinking, no contract can be made unless the
offer stated that the offeror would assume assent in the case the offeree did
not reply, or the offeror in some other manner has led the offeree to believe
that it may accept by remaining silent. Even under those circumstances, the
offeree’s silence is ambiguous and may be shown not to have been intended as
an assent to accept the offeror’s proposal. The offeror cannot, merely by
indicating that it will take silence to mean assent, cast the burden to speak on
the offeree, and the offeree may keep silent if it chooses without becoming
liable on the express contract.”).
602. See Boonstra, 574 N.E.2d 689, 695 (invalidating a City of Chicago
amendment to its taxi cab ordinance that conditioned license renewals on
owners of previously issued licenses forfeiting their original right to assign the
license to another person; holding that the owner who renewed the license
maintained, rather than lost his assignment rights and had standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the amendment).
603. See York, 173 N.E. at 83 (explaining that a party to mutual agreement
that had “[k]nowledge of the terms of the new [agreement] when he made the
payments was not sufficient to show an acceptance of those terms, for he had
the right to disregard those terms and make the payments in accordance with
the provisions of the old [agreement]”). It was therefore necessary to prove an
intention to accept the terms of the new agreement. Id.
604. Sidley Guarantor Memo, supra note 421, at 1; Sidley Supplemental
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the State is not an option, contrary to Sidley’s suggestion.
The Clause stands as a constitutional guarantee that pension
recipients will receive their pension payments when due even if a
pension fund defaults or is on the verge of default. Any state
pension participant placed in such a position would have a cause of
action in circuit court to enforce this guarantee and obtain
payment directly from the State’s General Fund. A participant
need not pursue payment before the Illinois Court of Claims and
depend upon the largesse of the General Assembly.
1. A Summary of Sidley’s Position That the State Is Not a
Guarantor of Pension Payments if a Fund Defaults
Sidley claims that the obligation to pay annuities rests solely
with the “State’s employee pension funds” and that the “State
itself is not a guarantor of that obligation.”605 Sidley asserts that
this result stems from Section 22-403 of the Illinois Pension Code,
which provides that “[a]ny pension payable under any law
hereinafter referred to shall not be construed to be a legal
obligation of the State . . . but shall be held to be solely an
obligation of such pension fund, unless otherwise specifically
provided in the law creating the fund.”606
Sidley advances this claim even though the Pension Code
Article of each of the State’s five retirement systems contains a
nearly verbatim provision stating: “The payment of the required
department contributions, all allowances, annuities, benefits
granted under this Article, and all expenses of administration of
the system are obligations of the State of Illinois to the extent
specified in this Article.”607
Sidley focuses on the phrase, “to the extent specified in this
Article.” From this phrase, Sidley argues that the State cannot be
a guarantor because no other provision within each Article
expressly states, “if the fund does not have sufficient assets, the
State is the guarantor that pension benefits will be paid.”608
Accordingly, Sidley loops back to Section 22-403 and concludes
that there is no “specific provision” in the Pension Code requiring
the State to act as a guarantor.609
Sidley further argues in a follow-up memorandum that
because the “Obligations of the State” language in the Pension
Code predated the adoption of the Pension Clause in 1970, and
because the State pension systems were “mandatory” plans, the
Guarantor Memo supra note 421.
605. Sidley Guarantor Memo, supra note 421, at 1.
606. See id. at 1 (quoting 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/22-403).
607. 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-132 (emphasis added).
608. Sidley Guarantor Memo, supra note 421, at 2.
609. Id.
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“Obligation of the State” language “could not have been intended
to establish a State guarantor obligation for pension benefits.”610
To support this proposition, Sidley points to the reasoning in the
Illinois Supreme Court’s Lindberg decision.611 In Lindberg, the
court held that the pension funding provisions of the Pension Code
predating the 1970 Constitution did not create a binding funding
obligation on the State because most pensions were deemed
gratuities, not contractual rights.
Sidley also claims that the Convention debates “do not
support that the delegates intended for the State to be a guarantor
for the payment of State pensions as opposed to the State pension
funds themselves.”612 Rather, Sidley rehashes its argument that
delegates only agreed that the Clause did not impose specific
funding obligations or provide for automatic cost of living
adjustments.613 Further, Sidley attempts to marginalize the
statements of Delegate Kinney who stated that the term
“impairment” as used in the Clause provided pension participants
with a cause of action if a pension fund defaults or is on the verge
of default.614 Finally, Sidley contends that even if the State were a
guarantor, the Sovereign Immunity Clause of the Illinois
Constitution would require pension participants to obtain relief in
the Illinois Court of Claims, not circuit court, and await a General
Assembly appropriation to be paid.615
2. The Clause Makes the State a Guarantor Based on Its
Plain Meaning, Convention History, Illinois Court
Decisions, and Common Law Understanding of Pension
Payments as Creating a Debtor Relationship
a. Sidley’s “Guarantor” Argument Ignores the Clause’s
Plain Language and Common Meaning
Sidley’s position is untenable for several reasons. First, as
previously discussed in this Article, the Clause contains
prohibitory language that pension benefit rights cannot be
“diminished” or “impaired.”616 Illinois courts have interpreted the
word “diminish” under both the 1870 and 1970 Illinois
Constitutions as a mandate to pay an obligation when due.617 As a
610. Sidley Supplemental Guarantor Memo, supra note 604, at 4, 15–21.
611. Id. at 19–21.
612. Id. at 8–13.
613. Id. at 9.
614. Id. at 9–10.
615. Id. at 28–37.
616. Supra notes 23–29, 434–43 and accompanying text in Parts I and III,
respectively.
617. See Lyle, 195 N.E. at 452–53 (construing Article IX, § 11 of the 1870
Illinois Constitution during the depths of the Great Depression as a command
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consequence, Illinois courts will presume that the word
“diminishment” as used in the Pension Clause imposes an
identical mandate that pension payments be paid when due,
especially since the term has a settled legal meaning.618
This conclusion is bolstered by Delegate Kinney’s statements
at the Convention. Delegate Kinney explained that the term
“impair” “meant to imply and to intend that if a pension fund
would be on the verge of default or imminent bankruptcy, a group
action could be taken to show that these rights should be
preserved.”619 She further explained that while the Clause “was
not intended to require 100 percent funding or 50 percent or 30
percent funding,” it would trigger funding if a court “determine[d]
that imminent bankruptcy would really be [an] impairment” in
that pension payments could not be made.620 She also stated that
“if the word ‘impairment’ bothers people, I suggest, if it is the wish
of the Convention, that word could be deleted, and the rest of the
[Clause] could stand” via the word “diminish.”621
In addition, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded in
Lindberg, McNamee, and Sklodowski that the Clause guarantees
that pension recipients will receive pension payments when they
become due.622 Relying on the statements of Delegates Green and
Kinney, the court explained in McNamee that the Clause was
“intended to force the funding of pensions indirectly, by putting
the state and municipal governments on notice that they are
responsible for those benefits.”623 As a result, Sidley’s search for
the “magic”624 word “guarantor” in the Clause is unnecessary given
require that judicial salaries be paid where the provision provided that the
“fees, salary or compensation of no municipal officer who is elected or
appointed for a definite term of office, shall be increased or diminished during
such term”); see Northrup, 31 N.E.2d at 337 (same conclusion with respect to
the salaries of aldermen); Jorgensen, 811 N.E.2d at 659–66 (relying on its Lyle
decision and holding pursuant to Article VI, § 14 of the 1970 Illinois
Constitution as a mandate that judges receive previously awarded cost of
living increases where the provision provided that “Judges shall receive
salaries provided by law which shall not be diminished to take effect during
their terms of office”).
618. See People v. Smith, 923 N.E.2d 259, 262 (Ill. 2010) (finding that “if a
term has a settled legal meaning, the courts will normally infer that the
legislature intended to incorporate the established meaning”); Robbins v. Bd.
of Trs., 687 N.E.2d 39, 43 (Ill. 1997) (“It is fundamental that where a word or
phrase is used in different sections of the same legislative act, a court
presumes that the word or phrase is used with the same meaning throughout
the act, unless a contrary legislative intent is clearly expressed.”).
619. 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 53, at 2926.
620. Id. at 2929.
621. Id.
622. See discussion supra Part II. B (discussing how Illinois jurisprudence
has interpreted the Pension Clause).
623. McNamee, 672 N.E.2d at 1164.
624. Sidley Supplemental Guarantor Memo, supra note 604, at 4.

284

The John Marshall Law Review

[48:167

the meaning of the terms “diminish” and “impair.”
b. The Pension Code Sufficiently Manifests an Intent to
Make Pension Payments the Obligations of the State
When Due
Second, the Illinois Pension Code Article of each of the five
state-funded pension systems contains a provision with sufficient
language binding the State to pay pensions even if a system
defaults. Each provision states in pertinent part that “[t]he
payment of the required department contributions, all allowances,
annuities, benefits granted under this Article, and all expenses of
administration of the system are obligations of the State of Illinois
to the extent specified in this Article.”625 The statute’s use of the
word “specify” denotes a common meaning “to mention, describe,
or define in detail.”626
The obvious import of the provision when read as a whole is
that each of the required payments specified by the provisions
within each Article (i.e., contributions, allowances, annuities,
benefits, and expenses) is an obligation of the State. Even if this
construction were not so plain, the Illinois Supreme Court has long
held that ambiguous Pension Code provisions are to be construed
in favor of pension recipients.627 Similarly, the Illinois Appellate
Court has interpreted this language to mean that general state
funds “could be reached” if a judgment were entered against a
retirement system.628
Alternatively, Illinois courts have characterized public
pension benefits as a “chose-in-action.”629 A “chose-in-action” is an
intangible, personal property right to bring an action to receive or
recover a debt, moneys or damages.630 As a form of compensation,
the pension benefits owed by an employer to an employee create a

625. 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-132.
626. WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, supra note 22, at 1367.
627. Taddeo v. Bd. Trs., 837 N.E.2d 876, 879 (Ill. 2005).
628. Shields v. State Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 844 N.E.2d 438, 442 (Ill. App. Ct.
2006); Jones v. Jones-Blythe Constr. Co., 501 N.E.2d 374, 375 (Ill. App. Ct.
1986).
629. In re Marriage of Hunt, 397 N.E.2d 511, 517–18 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
Accord, In re Marriage of Smith, 405 N.E.2d 884, 886 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
(stating a contractual pension right is a chose in action); In re Marriage of
Papeck, 420 N.E.2d 528, 532 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (stating pension rights are
deferred compensation); see Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554
U.S. 269, 275 (2008) (defining “chose in action—an interest in property not
immediately reducible to possession (which overtime came to include a
financial interest such as a debt, a legal claim for money, or a contractual
right)”).
630. Gonzalez v. Profile Sanding Equip., Inc., 776 N.E.2d 667, 679–80 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2002); Levine v. Pascal, 236 N.E.2d 425, 429 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
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debtor and creditor relationship.631 As such, there is an absolute
obligation on the part of the employer to pay and an absolute right
on the part of the employee to receive payment.632 Accordingly,
Sidley is incorrect that the Pension Code could only be interpreted
as making the State a guarantor if the Code “specifically provides”
that the State will pay pensions if the pension system cannot.633
c.

Section 9 of the Transition Schedule of the Illinois
Constitution Renders Sidley’s Interpretation of the
Pension Code Invalid Even if Correct

Third, even if Sidley’s interpretation of the Pension Code were
correct that the State is not a guarantor or that pension recipients
only have a right to moneys in their respective funds, this
conclusion cannot overcome what the Pension Clause requires.
Section 9 of the Transition Schedule of the 1970 Illinois
Constitution provides in pertinent part:
The rights and duties of all public bodies shall remain as
if this Constitution had not been adopted with the
exception of such changes as are contained in this
Constitution. All laws, ordinances, regulations and rules
of court not contrary to, or inconsistent with, the
provisions of this Constitution shall remain in force,
until they shall expire by their own limitation or shall be
altered or repealed pursuant to this Constitution.634
The Illinois Supreme Court has construed this provision as
invalidating those statutory provisions predating the 1970
Constitution that are inconsistent with the provisions of the new
Constitution.635
As explained in this Article, the Clause guarantees that
pension participants will receive their pension payments when
those payments become due. Delegate Green made clear at the

631. See State Street Furn. Co. v. Armour & Co., 177 N.E. 702, 703 (Ill.
1931) (stating in part that “[t]he relationship between an employer with
respect to unpaid wages is that of a debtor and creditor, and the right of the
employee to those wages is a chose in action”).
632. Id. at 704.
633. Sidley Supplemental Guarantor Memo, supra note 604, at 3–4, 15.
634. ILL. CONST. of 1970, Trans. Sched., § 9.
635. See, e.g., Kanellos v. Cnty. of Cook, 290 N.E.2d 240, 243–44 (Ill. 1972)
(holding that a referendum provision contained in a statute predating was
invalid pursuant to Section 9 of the Transition Schedule of the 1970
Constitution where the statute conflicted Cook County’s home rule powers
under the new Constitution); see also Washington Home of Chi. v. City of Chi.,
41 N.E. 893, 896–97 (Ill. 1895) (reaching a similar conclusion under the 1870
Illinois Constitution).
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Convention that the main reason the Clause “mandate[d]
contractual status” for pension benefits was to ensure what
happened in New Jersey would not occur in Illinois.636 As
discussed, the New Jersey Supreme Court held in its Spina
decision that its public pension participants only had a property
interest in the pension fund itself, not any specified benefits.637
The court relied on this premise for its holding that the legislature
had the power to reduce the pension benefits of current employees
where the pension fund at issue lacked sufficient amounts to pay
current and future recipients due to chronic underfunding.638 As a
result, even if Sidley’s narrow interpretation of the Pension Code
were correct, that interpretation would conflict with the demands
of the Pension Clause and be invalid pursuant to Section 9 of the
Transition Schedule of the 1970 Constitution. After all, the
General Assembly cannot thwart a constitutional guarantee by
legislation.639
In addition, the Supreme Court would most certainly reject
Sidley’s public policy argument that the State somehow retains a
reserved police power to abscond on its obligations to pension
recipients should a pension system default.640 As discussed above,
Illinois courts have concluded that the Clause affords the
legislature no such reserved power.641 Relying on Kraus, the
Illinois Supreme Court explained in Felt that to accept the
Attorney General’s argument “we would have to ignore the plain
language of the Constitution of Illinois, reject the New York
decisions on the constitutional provision which was the model for
section 5 of article XIII, and overrule this court’s decision in
Bardens.”642 As a New York court noted, “[a]lthough fiscal relief is

636. 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 53, at 2931.
637. See supra notes 53–59 and accompanying text (explaining the New
Jersey Supreme Court’s holding and how this decision influenced the
discussion of the proposed amendment to the Pension Clause at the 1970
Illinois Constitutional Convention).
638. Id.
639. See Washington Home, 41 N.E. at 896–97 (holding, “[i]n cases where
[a constitution’s] provisions are negative or prohibitory in their character, they
execute themselves. Where that instrument limits the power of either of the
departments of the government, or where it prohibits the performance of any
act by an officer or person, none would contend that the power might be
exercised or the act performed until prohibited by the general assembly. . . .
When the constitution says, ‘You must not pay,’ it must be obeyed in
preference to a statute which says, ‘You must pay.’ And this is true, not only
where the statute on its face is in conflict with the constitutional provision,
but also in a case where an attempt to apply the statute to a given state of
facts gives rise to a violation of such provision”).
640. Sidley Supplemental Guarantor Memo, supra note 604, at 33–35.
641. See supra notes 260–61, 280–82, and 504–49 and accompanying text
(discussing Illinois precedent).
642. Felt, 481 N.E.2d at 702.
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a current imperative, an unconstitutional method may not be
blinked.”643
d. A Pension Recipient Would Most Likely Obtain Relief in
Circuit Court Through a Mandamus Action Against the
State Comptroller
Finally, Sidley is incorrect that a pension participant would
need to seek relief before the Illinois Court of Claims should a
State pension system default or be on the verge of default. Again,
while the Illinois Supreme Court has held that the Pension Clause
does not provide pension participants with a constitutional right to
a specific funding percentage,644 it undoubtedly guarantees them
the right to receive the money due them at the time of
retirement.645
In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized, per the
statements of Delegate Kinney, that if a pension fund were “on the
verge of default or imminent bankruptcy” such that “benefits
[were] in immediate danger of being diminished,” then pension
participants would have a cause of action in circuit court to enforce
their right to receive payments.646 Since the Clause acts as a
restriction on legislative power, it is enforceable by the courts.647
This conclusion comports with the drafters’ original intent,648
643. Kleinfeldt I, 36 N.Y.2d at 100, 324 N.E.2d at 869 (cited and quoted
favorably by Felt, 481 N.E.2d at 700).
644. Lindberg, 326 N.E.2d at 752.
645. See Sklodowski I, 695 N.E.2d at 379 (stating, “[t]he framers of the
Illinois Constitution were careful to craft in the pension protection clause an
amendment that would create a contractual right to benefits”); McNamee, 672
N.E.2d at 1166 (explaining, “[the Clause] creates an enforceable contractual
relationship that protects only the right to receive benefits.”); Lindberg, 326
N.E.2d at 751–52 (stating that the Clause provides the right to “receive money
due them at the time of their retirement”).
646. Sklodowski I, 695 N.E.2d at 379 (quoting McNamee, 672 N.E.2d at
1166).
647. Hynes, 390 N.E.2d at 850 (1979) (stating, “limitations written into the
Constitution are restrictions on legislative power and are enforceable by
courts.”); see also People ex rel. Hilger v. Myers, 252 N.E.2d 924 (Ill. App. Ct.
1969) (holding that sovereign immunity did not bar a mandamus action
against a state official to pay a State employee back pay where a state statute
required that the employee be paid).
648. See 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 53, at 2926 (Del. Kinney) (defining
the word “enforceable” as “meant to provide that the rights . . . established
shall be subject to judicial proceedings and can be enforced through court
action”; and defining the word “impaired” as “meant to imply and to intend
that if a pension fund would be on the verge of default or imminent
bankruptcy, a group action could be taken to show that these rights should be
preserved”); id. (Del. Kemp) (stating he understood the Clause as making
“certain that irrespective of the financial condition of a municipality or even
the state government, that those persons who have worked for often
substandard wages over a long period of time could at least expect to live in
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and the voters’ understanding that pension recipients would
receive their full benefits.649 In addition, the Attorney General
conceded and counsel for TRS in Sklodowski argued in its briefs
that the Clause guarantees that pension participants could enforce
their pension benefits in court and continue to receive pension
payments from the State.650 Sidley’s contention that no such
arguments were made is simply untrue.651
some kind of dignity during their golden years”) (emphasis added).
649. See supra notes 200–16 and accompanying text (discussing the
Convention’s official explanation and newspaper articles).
650. See Brief and Argument of Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of The State of Illinois
at *25–26, People ex rel. Sklodowski v. State, 695 N.E.2d 374 (Ill. 1998) (No.
82459), 1997 WL 33616214 (arguing, “[i]ndeed, by the logic of the State
Defendants’ interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine, the court
could do nothing to enforce the TRS’s members’ right to receive retirement
payments even if the TRS’s assets were totally depleted, and the Pension
Protection Clause’s express guarantee that the right to receive such benefits is
‘enforceable’ would therefore be meaningless. Since a position rendering an
explicit constitutional guarantee meaningless is untenable, the State
Defendants attempt to avoid the logical consequence of their argument by
contending that the courts can enforce the Pension Protection Clause only
when the State Retirement Systems go totally bankrupt. That position
concedes the issue. If the courts have the power to act when the Systems go
bankrupt, then they do have the power to act. There is no logical explanation
for the distinction that the State Defendants advance in this regard. Either
the courts have the ability to enforce constitutionally binding contractual
commitments by this State, or they do not. Undoubtedly, the courts have such
power”); Brief of Defendants-Appellants and Counterdefendants-Appellants at
*41–44, People ex rel. Sklodowski v. State, 695 N.E.2d 374 (Ill. 1998) (No.
82459), 1997 WL 33559053 (conceding that plaintiffs would have stated a
cause of action under McNamee and Lindberg if they had alleged that their
benefits had been unpaid, reduced or were even in danger of being unpaid or
reduced in the near future; further, “even if . . . the pension funds were on the
verge of bankruptcy such that the participants’ benefits were diminished,
there clearly was no danger that benefits might not be paid at the time the
Appellate Court decided this case in late 1996. . . . [Public Act 88-593] not only
repealed the language of Public Act 86-273 upon which plaintiffs,
counterplaintiffs, and intervenors rely . . . but it provides for continuing
automatic appropriations of the state contributions to each pension system if
adequate contributions are not otherwise appropriated.”); Reply Brief of
Defendants-Appellants and Counterdefendants-Appellants at *23–24,
Sklodowski I, 695 N.E.2d 374 (No. 82459), 1997 WL 33559057 (arguing that
“[t]he plaintiffs did not allege that anyone had their benefits reduced or were
in imminent danger of having their benefits reduced. Thus, the only
contractual right which article XIII, section 5 gives to the plaintiffs—the right
to receive a given amount of benefits under a given set of circumstances—is
not at issue in this case . . . [i]f, as this Court has held, [the Pension Clause]
guarantees only the right to receive pension benefits and no participant has
failed to receive benefits, the impairment of contract provisions of the United
States and Illinois Constitutions are not implicated”).
651. See Sidley Guarantor Memo, supra note 421, at 4 (stating that
plaintiffs have never argued that Illinois must pay pension benefits when due
as a guarantor if the funds were on the verge of default or imminent
bankruptcy); Sidley Supplemental Guarantor Memo, supra note 604, at 25
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In sum, if the Illinois Supreme Court were confronted with a
circumstance where a pension fund were on the verge of default
and pension payments were diminished, then the court would
most likely permit a mandamus action to proceed and resolve that
action in the same manner as Jorgenson v. Blagojevich.652 In that
case, the court held that where a constitutional or statutory
provision “categorically commands the performance of an act, so
much money as is necessary to obey the command may be
disbursed without any explicit appropriation.”653 The court applied
this principal to compel the State Comptroller to pay judges from
the State Treasury, without an appropriation, the cost of living
increase that was part of their constitutionally protected salaries
under Article VI, Section 14 of the Illinois Constitution.654
As noted, that provision bars the diminishment of judicial
salaries just as the Clause prohibits the diminishment of pension
benefit rights. Accordingly, the Supreme Court would most likely
grant pension participants the same relief provided in Jorgenson
by compelling the Comptroller to pay the needed funds from the
State General Revenue Fund, especially since the State Pension
Funds Continuing Appropriation Act requires automatic
appropriations be made from the Fund to the five State pension
systems.655

G. The State Cannot Require Current Employees to Pay
Higher Contribution Rates for the Same Level of
Pension Benefits
In December 2010, the Commercial Club unveiled a second
proposal to unilaterally wean current employees off of their
existing pension benefit plans.656 Under this proposal, current
(stating that plaintiffs have never argued that Illinois must “pay pension
benefits when due if the pension funds are unable to do so”).
652. Jorgensen, 811 N.E.2d 652. See Sklodowski II, 674 N.E.2d at 87
(holding that the separation of powers doctrine did not prohibit the trial court
from considering whether to issue a writ of mandamus to compel State
officials to comply with a law) abrogated on other grounds, 695 N.E.2d at 379.
Accord Noyola v. Bd. of Educ., 688 N.E.2d 81, 86 (Ill. 1997) (“[courts] most
certainly have the authority to assure that the action of public officials does
not deprive citizens of rights conferred by statute or the Constitution. Where,
as alleged here, public officials have failed or refused to comply with
requirements imposed by statute, the courts may compel them to do so by
means of a writ of mandamus, provided that the requirements of that writ
have been satisfied”) (citation omitted).
653. Jorgensen, 811 N.E.2d at 668 (quoting Antle v. Tuchbreiter, 111
N.E.2d 836, 841 (Ill. 1953)).
654. Id. at 668–69.
655. 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 15/1-1.2 (2008).
656. Tom Cross, Op-Ed, More Pension Reforms, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 17, 2010),
available
at
http://press.gop-
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employees would be required to pay substantially higher
contributions to retain the same pension plans.657 For example, the
normal cost of benefits for a sitting judge as a JRS member is
38.79% of his or her salary.658 The employee contribution rate for a
judge is 11% of that 38.79% of normal cost, while the State is
responsible for the remaining 27.79%.659 The Club’s proposal
would increase the employee contribution from 11% to at least
36.45%—a threefold-plus increase in what sitting judges would
need to pay to obtain the same pension benefit.660
The phrase “at least” is used because the proposal would also
require current JRS members to pay for any system liabilities due
to any future wage increases.661 This amount remains
uncalculated for JRS and the other State systems, and would
further increase the employee contribution rate paid by current
members.662 In other words, the proposal seeks to make it cost
prohibitive for current employees and officials to stay with their
existing plans.
The proposal would also allow employees to opt into the
pension reform plan the legislature enacted in 2010 for new
employees beginning on January 1, 2011.663 Under this option,
employees and the State would split the plan’s cost.664 In addition,
the proposal would permit employees to select a 401(k) style
defined contribution plan in which the State would match
employees’ contributions.665 In January 2011, identical legislation

network.org/news/full_article/116122?request= http%3A%2F%2Fpress.gopnetwork.org%2F (stating, “[t]he Civic Committee of the Commercial Club of
Chicago, a nonpartisan group of business and civic leaders, has studied this
issue in depth and proposed a fair and balanced approach to help get our state
on better financial footing”).
657. See id. (stating, “[e]mployees could stay in their current defined
benefit pension plan, but the state would cover only 5 percent of the cost of the
plan. The employees would cover the rest of the cost”).
658. Letter from Sandor Goldstein, Goldstein & Associates, to Dan
Haniewicz, Commission on Gov’t Forecasting and Accountability, at 3 (Feb. 16,
2011) (on file with author) (regarding House Bill 149).
659. Id.
660. Id. at 3, 5. For a current SERS employee, the contribution rate would
increase at least from 5.63% to 13.5%. Id. For a current TRS employee, the
contribution rate would increase at least from 9% to 13.77%. Id. For a current
SURS employee, the contribution rate would increase at least from 8% to
15.31%. Id. For a current GARS member, the contribution rate would increase
at least from 11.5% to 24.98%. Id.
661. Id. at 2, 5.
662. Id. at 5.
663. Chris Wetterich, State Worker Pension Reductions Unconstitutional,
Cullerton Says, STATE JOURNAL REGISTER (Feb. 9, 2011), available at
http://www.sj-r.com/top-stories/x1179516893/Pension-reductions-for-currentemployees-unconstitutional-Cullerton-says.
664. Id.
665. Id.
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encompassing the proposal was filed in the House and Senate, but
failed to pass the legislature.666
Simply put, the Club’s 2010 proposal sought to shift current
employees off of existing plans through a combination of costprohibitive employee contribution increases and a reallocation of
State pension contributions to other plans. As detailed below, the
proposal would violate the Pension Clause because it unilaterally
and adversely changes the actual terms of the pension benefit
rights of current employees by requiring them to pay more to
retain the same level of benefits. This conclusion is based on five
reasons that cogently summarize the findings of this Article.
First, the proposal is contrary to the Clause’s plain language
and common meaning. The Clause makes an employee’s
membership in a public pension system an “enforceable
contractual relationship,” and prohibits the “benefits of” such
membership from being diminished or impaired.667 The term
“benefit” refers not only to the specific annuity payments a public
employee is eligible to receive, but also other terms of membership
that advantage the public employee.668
When a public employee joins a pension system, the employee
agrees, per the Pension Code, to contribute to the system a specific
percentage of salary and work a certain number of years to
ultimately receive a pension upon retirement. The employee’s
contribution rate, in other words, is a term of that enforceable
contractual relationship and a benefit because the employee need
only pay that rate to receive a pension. In contract terms, the
employee’s contribution rate is the “consideration” that supports
the unilateral contract between the employee and State. In short,
requiring current employees to pay more for the same ultimate
pension payment is tantamount to a bank changing the fixed
mortgage payment required under a loan without a contractual
right to do so. Considering a bank could not take such unilateral
action, neither may the State.
Second, the proposal is inconsistent with the drafters’ original
intent based on the Clause’s Convention history. Both sponsors of
the Clause articulated that the provision safeguarded those
pension rights existing at the time a public employee joined a
pension system. Delegate Green aptly explained: “[w]hat we are
trying to merely say is that if you mandate the public employees in
the state of Illinois to put in their 5 percent or 8 percent or
666. S.B. 105, 97th Gen. Assem. (Ill. 2011), available at
http://www.ilga. gov/legislation/97/SB/PDF/09700SB0105lv.pdf; H.B. 149,
97th
Gen.
Assem.
(Ill.
2011),
available
at
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/97/HB/PDF/09700HB01 49lv.pdf.
667. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIII, § 5.
668. WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
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whatever it may be monthly, and you say when you employ these
people, ‘Now if you do this, when you reach sixty-five, you will
receive $287 a month,’ that is in fact, is what you will get.”669
Delegate Kinney similarly stated that the Clause was intended “to
guarantee that people will have the rights that were in force at the
time they entered into the agreement to become an employee.”670
In addition, the drafters specifically rejected during the
Convention two requests from the Pension Laws Commission to
insert language or read a floor statement allowing the General
Assembly to unilaterally change employee contribution rates.671
Also, the provision was described to voters as protecting pension
benefit rights and granting public employees a constitutional right
to their “full pension benefits.”672 As a consequence, the Club’s
proposal deviates from the framers’ intent and must be rejected.
Third, Illinois court decisions offer the proposal no legitimate
assistance. As discussed, Illinois courts hold that the Clause
entitles public employees to have their pension benefit rights
determined in accordance with the terms of the Pension Code in
effect when they entered the pension system.673 In other words,
the Pension Code existing at the time “is deemed to be part of the
contract as though it was expressly referred to or incorporated into
it.”674 These pension rights, in turn, “vest” when the employee
begins making contributions to the system.675 Thus, the Clause
entitles an employee to receive a pension based on those relevant
sections of the Pension Code.676
As a result, the legislature could not unilaterally increase the
contributions rates of current employees because it adversely
changes the terms of the original contract by requiring employees
to essentially pay additional consideration for the same pension
amount.677 Put differently, the State is merely offering current
669. 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 53, at 2930.
670. Id. at 2930–31. See id. at 2929 (stating that the Clause gives public
employees “a basic protection against abolishing their rights completely or
changing the terms of their rights after they have embarked upon the
employment—to lessen them”).
671. Supra notes 187–99 and accompanying text.
672. Supra notes 200–16 and accompanying text.
673. Supra Part II.A.
674. Schroeder, 579 N.E.2d at 999–1000.
675. Id. at 999; Kraus, 390 N.E.2d at 1289.
676. Kraus, 390 N.E.2d at 1289; Redding, 450 N.E.2d at 765; DiFalco, 521
N.E.2d at 925 (the “contractual relationship” under the Pension Clause “is
governed by the actual terms of the Pension Code at the time the employee
becomes a member of the pension system. Therefore, in determining plaintiff’s
rights under the Pension Code, we must look to the language of the relevant
statute in effect . . . when plaintiff began paying into the pension fund”).
677. See Boyd v. Madison Mut. Ins. Co., 507 N.E.2d 855, 857 (Ill. 1987)
(declaring that it would be unconstitutional to retroactively apply a statute to
an existing insurance contract where the statute imposed additional
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employees what it is already required to do—paying them a
pension based on the terms in place when they joined the system.
Illinois courts have long held that one party cannot modify a
contract merely by offering to do something that the party is
already legally obligated to perform.678
As the Oregon Supreme Court stated in a similar context,
“[o]nce offered and accepted, a pension promise made by the state
is not a mirage (something seen in the distance that disappears
before the employee reaches retirement).”679 The court continued
that to allow the legislature to unilaterally increase a current
employee’s cost of participation in a pension plan, “would serve
notice to any person who might consider embarking on a career in
public service that the state’s promises could well prove worthless,
even after the employees had given consideration for those
promises.”680
To be sure, the Club would most likely argue that providing
current employees with the option to join a plan to receive lower
pension benefits or a 401(k)-style plan constitutes a legal
consideration. Even if that were true,681 current employees, as
discussed, must still have the power to freely accept or reject the
offer and remain in their current plan under its original terms.682
obligations on one party which had not been originally agreed to by the
parties; statute required insurance company to advance a sum of money equal
to any settlement offer in order for the insurance company to preserve its
existing contractual subrogation rights).
678. See Smith v. Gray, 147 N.E. 459 (Ill. 1925) (holding, “[i]t is the law
that a promise to do that which the promisor is already bound to do is not
sufficient consideration for such an agreement”). Accord Watkins v. GMAC
Fin. Servs., 785 N.E.2d 40, 44 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (stating, “[a] contract
modification must satisfy the same criteria required for a valid contract: offer,
acceptance, and consideration. Preexisting obligations are not sufficient
consideration.”); Carlile v. Snap-On Tools, 648 N.E.2d 317, (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
(noting that at least two law professors have described an individual who
refuses to perform his contract duties unless he receives a concession “as an
extortionist”).
679. Oregon State Police Officers’ Ass’n v. State, 918 P.2d 765, 775–76 (Or.
1996)
680. Id.
681. In Miller v. Retirement Board, the Appellate Court considered a
factually analogous circumstance where amendments to the Pension Code had
the effect of increasing employee pension contributions and reducing pension
payment amounts. Miller, 771 N.E.2d at 435. The court concluded that
applying the amendments to the plaintiffs “amounted to a change in the terms
of their contract with the pension system and directly diminished their
benefits under the contract” in violation of the Clause. Id. at 440. The Club’s
proposal is little different than what took place in Miller because current
employees are required to either pay more for what they are already entitled,
opt into a plan providing lower pension payments for potentially the same or
higher employee contributions or opt into a 401(k) style plan that does not
provide a guaranteed defined benefit.
682. Supra Part III.E.
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Otherwise, the proposal is tantamount to legislative coercion.
In addition, the proposal cannot be squared with the Illinois
Supreme Court’s Felt decision where the court rejected the
Attorney General’s request that the Pension Clause be construed
according to California’s “limited vesting” approach.683 That
approach permits the legislature to unilaterally reduce the
benefits of current employees so long as they receive some kind of
off-setting advantage.684 The Felt court explained, per Kraus, that
in “order to accept the defendants’ argument we would have to
ignore the plain language of the Constitution of Illinois, reject the
New York decisions on the constitutional provision which was the
model for section 5 of article XIII, and overrule this court’s
decision in Bardens.”685
Fourth, the Club’s proposal finds no support in the Appellate
Court’s Kraus decision. In Kraus, the court stated in dicta that “[i]t
is also possible, although we do not decide the question, that an
increase in the contribution rates of some employees to equalize
their contributions with those of others would not be
prohibited.”686 Kraus cited a Michigan Supreme Court advisory
opinion for this proposition.687
That opinion involved a legislative proposal to unilaterally
increase the contribution rates of certain teachers from 3% to 5%
(an $84 annual increase) to bring those rates in line with other
teachers.688 The Michigan court concluded that the change was
permissible because that State’s constitution only protected
“accrued financial benefits,” and because the convention debates
contemplated that the legislature could “attach new conditions for
earning financial benefits which have not yet been accrued.”689
As discussed above, both the Clause’s plain language and
Convention history manifest an intent that is at odds with what
the Michigan Constitution would allow. Indeed, the Clause
protects the “benefits of” pension system members, not just
“accrued financial benefits” as under the Michigan Constitution.
The Kraus court itself found this distinction important in arriving
at its conclusion that the legislature may not unilaterally change
the pension benefit rights of current employees.690 The Illinois
Supreme Court agreed in Felt, and used this analysis to reject the
Attorney General’s claim that the legislature retained a reserved

02.

683. Supra notes at 280–82, and 642–43 and accompanying text.
684. Supra notes 642–43 and accompanying text.
685. Felt, 481 N.E.2d at 702.
686. Kraus, 390 N.E.2d at 1293.
687. Id.
688. Advisory Op. re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 258, 209 N.W.2d at 201–
689. Id. at 202–03.
690. Kraus, 390 N.E.2d at 1291.
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power under the Clause to adversely alter the pension rights of
current employees.691
Also, the Club’s proposal neither seeks a nominal increase in
employee contribution rates, nor attempts to equalize contribution
rates with those of other employees. Rather, the proposal makes it
cost-prohibitive for current employees to retain their existing plan.
Even under these circumstances, the Michigan Attorney General
would find its Supreme Court’s decision inapposite. In 1985, the
Michigan Attorney General opined that legislation substantially
increasing current employee contributions rates—a $1,200 annual
increase—without any commensurate advantage to employees
would run afoul of the Michigan Constitution.692 For these reasons,
Kraus is unpersuasive and does not advance the Club’s proposal.
Finally, two law firms (DLA Piper and Jenner & Block) have
similarly concluded in opinions provided to the Illinois Education
Association and the Teachers Retirement System that a unilateral
increase in employee contributions without a simultaneous
enhancement in benefits would violate the Pension Clause.693 DLA
Piper reached this conclusion in April 2010, while Jenner & Block
did so in February 2005 well before it signed onto Sidley’s opinion
and changed its view.694

691. Felt, 481 N.E.2d at 702.
692. 1985–86 Mich. Att’y Gen. Op. 67, 1985 WL 200597 at *3–5.
693. See Memorandum from William Campbell et al., DLA Piper, to the Ill.
Educ. Ass’n, on Constitutionality of Pension “Reform” Proposals (Apr. 19,
2010) (opining that the Club’s initial proposal to unilaterally reduce existing
employee pension benefits or increase employee contribution rates without a
corresponding increase in pension benefits would violate the Pension Clause;
also rejected Sidley’s “earned right” concept); Memorandum from William
Heinz, Jenner & Block, to Teachers Ret. Sys., on Constitutionality of Potential
Increases to TRS Members’ Contributions at 2, 8 (Feb. 3, 2005) (stating, “we
believe that it is more likely than not that legislation increasing the teachers’
contributions to the TRS without providing any corresponding benefit to the
teachers would be found to be unconstitutional because it directly impairs the
teachers’ existing contract rights in their pensions”). The memorandum
further opines,
[u]nlike situations that have been held to be an indirect impairment
such as reduction in work hours or salary or reduction in the
mandatory retirement age that have only incidentally related to the
pension benefits, increasing the required contribution by plan members
directly impairs the benefits that the plan members ultimately receive.
In effect, the plan members are contributing more money to receive the
same amount of benefit under the pension plan.
Id.

694. See supra note 415; Editorial, Crisis and Judges, CHI. TRIB., (Apr. 14,
2013),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-04-14/opinion/ct-edit-courts201 30414_1_pension-system-pension-reform-pension-funds.
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H. Sidley’s Police Powers Argument Is Without Merit
In April 2011, Sidley issued a new position statement on
behalf of the Commercial Club of Chicago in response to a
forerunner of this Article made public in March 2011.695 In that
statement, Sidley unveiled a new argument that purportedly
allowing the General Assembly to unilaterally reduce the pension
benefits of current employees, but not retirees.696 Under its new
argument, Sidley claimed the legislature may exercise its so-called
police or reserved powers “to modify the level of pension benefits
that will be earned in the future when, as here, the legislation
enables the funding of benefits that have been earned to date and
is necessary to allow the State to continue to provide essential
governmental services.”697 Sidley reasoned that because paying
100% of all pension benefits will “crowd out expenditures on
health, education, and public safety” under current revenue
assumptions, the State can trump is obligations under the Pension
Clause and divert funds from those obligations in order to fund
government services the General Assembly deems essential.698
Sidley rested this conclusion on the general notion that “no
constitutional rights are absolute,” its reading of the Illinois
Supreme Court’s decision in Felt, and its view that the Pension
Clause provides no better protection than the Contract Clause of
the U.S. Constitution.699 While a thorough reply to Sidley’s new
argument is beyond the scope of this Article, Sidley’s police powers
argument is without merit for reasons already articulated in this
Article.700
First, Sidley’s argument cannot be squared with the Clause’s
plain language, which admits of no exceptions. That claim is also
contrary to the Clause’s drafting history, Convention debates, and
voters’ understanding of the Clause. Indeed, the drafters did not
accept the proposal made by Delegate Wayne Whalen, an opponent
of the Pension Clause, to expressly amend the Illinois

695. Memorandum from Sidley Austin LLP on The Gen. Assembly’s Auth.
to Enact Comprehensive Pension Reform Legislation: A Response to Eric
Madiar
(April
11,
2011),
available
at
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/96732951/ April-THE-GENERAL-ASSEMBLYAUTHORITY-TO-ENACT [hereinafter Sidley Police Power Memo]; Eric M.
Madiar, Is Welching on Public Pension Promises an Option for Illinois? An
Analysis of Article XIII, Section 5 of the Illinois Constitution (Mar. 1, 2011),
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1774163.
696. Sidley Police Power Memo, supra note 695, at 2–3, 12–14, 30–59.
697. Id. at 2–3, 14, 30–59.
698. Id. at 2–3, 31–32, 37–41.
699. Id. at 2–3, 12–14, 30–59.
700. Madiar Prologue Article, supra note 8, nn.257–296 and accompanying
text (for additional reasons why Sidley’s police power’s argument is without
merit).

2014]

Is Welching on Public Pension Promises an Option for Illinois?

297

Constitution’s Contracts Clause to protect public pensions.701
Instead, the delegates adopted an independent provision modeled
after the one found in the New York Constitution to ensure “the
vested rights of pension plan participants not be defeated or
diminished.”702 The Illinois Supreme Court has explained that the
framers added the Clause to give public employees “a basic
protection against abolishing their rights completely or changing
the terms of their rights after they have embarked upon the
employment—to lessen them.”703
In addition, the voters ratified the Clause based on the
premise that the provision protected public pension benefit rights
from reductions and that public employees were granted a
constitutional right to their “full pension benefits.”704 As the
Convention’s official explanation to voters stated, the Clause was a
new section “and self-explanatory.”705 Accordingly, the state’s
police power yields to the Clause as it must to other specific
constitutional prohibitions and positive mandates.706
701. 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 53, at 2931.
702. Buddell, 514 N.E.2d at 186.
703. Felt, 481 N.E.2d at 698 (quoting 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 53, at
2929) (statement of Del. Kinney).
704. Supra notes 203–16 and accompanying text.
705. Supra note 205 and accompanying text.
706. People v. Adams, 597 N.E.2d 574, 579 (Ill. 1992) (“the police power
may not be used to violate a positive constitutional mandate”); O’Brien v.
White, 846 N.E.2d 116, 124 (Ill. 2006) (explaining, “the General Assembly
cannot enact legislation that conflicts with specific provisions of the
constitution, unless the constitution specifically grants the legislature that
authority”); Maddux v. Blagojevich, 911 N.E.2d 979, 988 (Ill. 2009) (“The
constitution operates as a limitation upon the General Assembly’s sweeping
authority, not as any grant of power [citation]; thus the General Assembly is
free to enact any legislation that the constitution does not expressly
prohibit[.]”); Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Darien, 357 N.E.2d 211, 217
(Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (“the State is free as a matter of its own law to impose
greater restrictions on the police power than those held to be necessary upon
federal constitutional standards”); Greenfield v. Russel, 127 N.E. 102, 105 (Ill.
1920) (“Our Legislature possesses every power not delegated to some other
department of the state or to the federal government or not denied to it by the
Constitution of the state or of the United States.”); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.
113, 124 (1876) (“When the people of the United Colonies separated from
Great Britain, they changed the form, but not the substance, of their
government. They retained for the purposes of government all the powers of
the British Parliament, and through their State constitutions, or other forms
of social compact, undertook to give practical effect to such as they deemed
necessary for the common good and security of life and property. All the
powers which they retained committed to their respective States, unless in
express terms or by implication reserved to themselves. Subsequently, when it
was found necessary to establish a national government for national purposes,
a part of the powers of the States and of the people of the States was granted
to the United States and the people of the United States. This grant operated
as a further limitation upon the States, so that now the governments of the
States possess all the powers of Parliament of England, except such as have

298

The John Marshall Law Review

[48:167

Second, the Illinois Appellate Court rejected the argument
that the Clause is subject to a police or reserved powers exception
back in 1979 in its Kraus decision.707 The court in Kraus explained
how during the constitutional convention the Illinois Public
Employees Pension Laws Commission, per its May 1971 report to
the General Assembly, “attempted to have language allowing a
reasonable power of legislative modification added to the section
[i.e., the Clause] or read into the [convention] debates to establish
intent, but no such action was taken during the Convention.”708
The court continued that “[w]hile it might have been wise to
provide for such power, there is no suggestion in the wording of
the provision or in the debates to support the existence of one.”709
The Commission’s failed attempts to modify the Clause are
detailed in this Article and its appendices.710
Third, contrary to Sidley’s claim, the Illinois Supreme Court
found Kraus persuasive and reached the same conclusion in its
Felt decision.711 The court explained:
The defendants have argued that while there are
decisions similar to those of New York and similar to
Bardens and our holding here, there are jurisdictions
that would permit reduction in retirement benefits. They
note at least three States, Alaska, Hawaii, and Michigan,
there are constitutional provisions relating to pensions.
As was observed in Kraus v. Board of Trustees (1979)
[citation omitted], however, in those constitutional
provisions, unlike ours and that of New York, there is
restrictive language that has permitted modifications in
benefits. In order to accept the defendants’ arguments we
would have to ignore the plain language of the
Constitution of Illinois, reject the New York decisions on
the constitutional provision which was the model for
section 5 of article XIII, and overrule this court’s decision

been delegated to the United States or reserved to the people. The reservations
by the people are shown in the prohibitions of the constitutions.”) (emphasis
added); Town of Lake View v. The Rose Hill Cemetery Co., 70 Ill. 191, 197
(1873) (“It has been said, the source of [the police power] may be readily
recognized as flowing from the people in their organized capacity, inalienable
in its character, but it is difficult to define its boundaries or limit its
operations. We are unwilling, however, to concede the existence of an
indefinable power, superior to the constitution, that may be invoked whenever
the legislature may deem the public exigency may require it[.]”).
707. Kraus, 390 N.E.2d at 1294–95.
708. Id.
709. Id.
710. See supra notes 200–16 and accompanying text (discussing the
Commission’s failed attempts to modify the Pension Clause).
711. Felt, 481 N.E.2d at 702.
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in Bardens.”712
As revealed by this Article, the Supreme Court reached this
conclusion after extension briefing and despite then-Illinois
Attorney General Hartigan’s insistence that the court reject Kraus
and that the Pension Clause was subject to a police power
exception just like the U.S. Constitution’s Contracts Clause.713 The
Felt decision makes clear that the Attorney General did not
prevail in either having the court reject Kraus or reading a police
power exception in the Pension Clause.
Finally, even assuming pension benefits were only entitled to
the same level of protection as optional pension plans under the
1870 Illinois Constitution’s Contracts Clause, the legislature
would still be devoid of any power to unilaterally reduce those
benefits per the Illinois Supreme Court’s Arnold decision.714 In
that case, the court favorably cited Kraus for the proposition that
even before the Pension Clause, the “legislature had no power to
diminish or repeal these vested contractual rights [i.e., the pension
benefits under an optional plan], and a participant was entitled to
a pension based on the status of the plan at the time he began his
contributions.”715 As stated earlier in this Article, prior to the 1970
Constitutional Convention, it was well understood that by the
Illinois Attorney General and at least one scholar that the Bardens
decision absolutely barred the General Assembly from unilaterally
reducing the benefits of participants in an optional plan.716
In sum, to read a police power exception into the Pension
Clause would be perverse, and contrary to the Clause’s plain
language, the drafters’ original intent, the voters’ understanding of
the provision, and court decisions construing the Clause. To read
such an exception into the Clause would also ignore the State’s
sordid history of failing to properly fund the pension system.717
The Clause, as the Illinois Supreme Court recently observed, was
intended “to guarantee that retirement rights enjoyed by public
employees would be afforded contractual status and insulated

712. Id.
713. See supra notes 531–40 and accompanying text (discussing the
Attorney General’s police powers argument and request that the Illinois
Supreme Court reject the Kraus decision).
714. Arnold, 417 N.E.2d at 1027.
715. Id.
716. Pensions: State Emps.' Ret. Sys., No. 21, 1961 Op. Atty. Gen. Ill. at
78–80 (1961) (opining that optional pension plans afforded vested contractual
rights under the Illinois Constitution’s Contract Clause “could not be impaired
by subsequent legislation” even if the unilateral alteration or modification
were “slight” or “minor” in nature); Cohn, supra note 30, at 62; Comment,
supra note at 34, at 458–59 & n.87.
717. See Madiar Prologue Article, supra note 8, nn.15–140 and
accompanying text (detailing the State’s long history of failing to properly fund
the State’s public pension systems).
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from diminishment and impairment by the General Assembly.”718
The court further observed that the Clause “was aimed at
protecting the right to receive the promised retirement benefits,
not the adequacy of the funding to pay for them.”719 The court
concluded that it “may not rewrite the pension protection clause to
include restrictions and limitations that the drafters did not
express and the citizens of the Illinois did not approve.”720
With the General Assembly’s passage of Senate Bill 1 in
December 2013, however, the issue will again be before the Illinois
Supreme Court since the Illinois Attorney General is primarily
relying on a police powers argument to defend the legislation.721
Indeed, as this Article went to press, a circuit court judge in
Sangamon County found Senate Bill 1 unconstitutional under the
Pension Clause and rejected the claim that the Clause is subject to
a police powers exception.722 The likelihood of this defense
succeeding on appeal should be extremely unlikely and at best a
remote outcome.723
It is worth noting that the Arizona Supreme Court recently
rejected the same defense that the Arizona Constitution’s pension
clause, which is nearly identical to Illinois Constitution’s Pension

718. Kanerva, 2104 IL 115811, ¶ 48.
719. Id.
720. Id. ¶ 41.
721. Answers and Defenses, Ill. Att’y Gen., In re: Pension Reform
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 57–62 (May 15, 2014) (claiming that Public Act
98-599 is constitutional as “a permissible exercise of the State of Illinois’
reserved sovereign powers (sometimes referred to as the State’s police
powers)”). See Madiar Prologue Article, supra note 8, nn.141–256 and
accompanying text (for a discussion of Senate Bill 1). See generally Eric M.
Madiar, Public Pension Benefits Under Siege: Does State Law Facilitate or
Block Efforts to Cut the Pension Benefits of Public Servants?, 27 A.B.A. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 179, 185–87 (2012); Jack A. Beerman, The Public Pension Crisis, 70
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 47–63 (2013) (for a discussion of the police power
exception to the U.S. Constitution’s Contract Clause).
722. In re Pension Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, slip-op. (Sangamon Cty. Cir.
Ct., Nov. 21, 2014). Pensions: Effect of Pension Code Revisions on Vested
Rights, No. S-1407, Op. Atty Gen. Ill., at 7 (Jan. 10, 1979).
723. See Scown v. Czarnecki, 106 N.E. 276, 285 (Ill. 1914) (“‘It is the duty
of this branch of the government to pass finally upon the construction of a law
and determine whether the Legislature in its action has transcended its
constitutional limits, and the community has the right to expect with
confidence we will adhere to decisions made after full argument and upon due
consideration. The members of the court may change totally every six years,
and, if each change in the organization produces a change in the decisions and
a different construction of laws under which important rights and interests
have become vested, it is easy to see that the consequences will be most
pernicious.’ * * * If ever there should be an adherence to former decisions, it
should be in cases of construction of the Constitution involving rights of
citizens as declared by that instrument.” (quoting Fisher v. Horicon Iron &
Mfg. Co., 10 Wis. 351, 355 (1860))) (emphasis added).
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Clause, provided no better protection than the Contracts Clause.724
The court reached this conclusion based on the clause’s text and
held that interpreting the clause just like the Contracts Clause
“would render superfluous the latter portion of § 1(C), the Pension
Clause, which prohibits diminishing or impairing public
retirement benefits.”725 The court explained that since the Arizona
Constitution’s pension clause only applies to public retirement
benefits, it “confers additional, independent protection for public
retirement benefits separate and distinct from the protection
afforded by the Contracts Clause.”726

IV. CONCLUSION
While writing this Article, the Chicago Tribune published an
editorial stating that the Pension Clause as a constitutional
provision “is not a suicide pact.”727 The Tribune invoked this
phrase to support its view that when push comes to shove Illinois’s
present political and economic circumstances should control how
Illinois courts interpret the Pension Clause, rather than its text,
Convention history or relevant court decisions.
That view is incorrect. As one court explained:
[I]t must be remembered that the people act through the
courts, as well through the executive and legislature.
One department is just as representative as the other,
and the judiciary is the department which is charged
with the special duty of determining the limitations
which the law places upon all official action. The
recognition of this principle, unknown except in Great
Britain and America, is necessary, to ‘the end that
government may be one of laws and not of men’—words
which Webster said were the greatest contained in any
written constitutional document.’728
After all, courts “sit to determine questions on stormy as well

724. Fields v. Elected Officials’ Ret. Plan, 320 P.3d 1160, 1164–65 (Ariz.
2014). Article 29, Section 1(C) of the Arizona Constitution provides:
“Membership in a public retirement system is a contractual relationship that
is subject to Article II, § 25, and public retirement system benefits shall not be
diminished or impaired.” ARIZ. CONST. art. 29, § 1(c).
725. Fields, 320 P.3d at 1164–65.
726. Id.
727. Editorial, The Suicide Pacts, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 27, 2010,
http://articles. chicagotribune.com/2010-11-27/news/ct-edit-pension20101127_1_suicide-pacts -retirement-deals-unions.
728. State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship, 207 S.E.2d 421, 433–34 (W.
Va. 1973).
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as calm days,”729 and the Constitution was upheld during the
Great Depression.730
Indeed, perhaps this debate over the Pension Clause is, as
Eden Martin of the Commercial Club candidly stated, “not about
the law at all, it’s about the politics and arm-wrestling over
money.”731 That very well may be true for some stakeholders. This
is Illinois after all.
There is, however, more at stake here—the rule of law in
Illinois and keeping promises. This Article opened with a quote
from Franklin MacVeach, a former president of the Commercial
Club, and his statement that a “contract breaker is an utter misfit
as a citizen or a business man.”732 He made this statement in a
speech to the Cincinnati Commercial Club in 1905 about labor
unions. As he put it, “until contracts become sacred with all
unions—until the public mind believes union contracts to be good
as gold—unionism will not be finally accepted by either the
employers or the people.”733 MacVeagh then went on to extol the
virtue of one union official who not only refused to break his
union’s contract, “but used every influence of his personal
authority and that of every friend he could rally about him to avert
what he considered the dishonoring of his people.”734
It was this same sentiment that drove public employee groups
to advocate for the inclusion of the Pension Clause in the 1970
Constitution. As the Executive Director of SURS stated in a letter
to Delegate Henry Green in July 1970, while the “General
Assembly has done an excellent job in funding its own retirement
system obligations,” it “has failed to meet its commitments to
other public employees” and “created such a staggering liability for
future taxpayers that the extra load during an adverse economic
period may require the public to renege on its obligations to its
public servants.”735 Unfortunately, over 40 years later, not much
has changed, and Illinois now finds itself on a precipice of what
was foreshadowed—choosing to either honor the promise embodied
in the Pension Clause or bow to the expediency of the moment.736

729. WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, 1939 TO 1975: THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 55–56 (1st ed. 1981).
730. Supra text accompanying note 24, 541.
731. Editorial, Pension Bomb Still Ticking, QUAD-CITIES ONLINE, Jan. 18,
2011, http://www.qconline.com/archives/qco/print display.php?id=52701.
732. See Address of Franklin MacVeagh, supra note 2 (citing a speech
made whereby the author of the speech chastises individuals who breach
contracts generally).
733. Id. at 30.
734. Id. at 31.
735. Supra text accompanying notes 100–01.
736. See Madiar Prologue Article, supra note 8, nn.15–140 (detailing the
State’s long history of failing to properly fund the State’s public pension
systems).
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These are the ill effects of decades of skipping pension
contributions to avoid tax increases and service cuts—a
circumstance Illinois Governor John Peter Altgeld described long
ago as the “cost of [getting] something for nothing.”737
As this Article shows, the rule of law is clear. The Pension
Clause not only makes a public employee’s participation in a
pension system an enforceable contractual relationship at the time
an employee joins a pension system, but also insulates from
diminishment or impairment by the General Assembly all
“benefits” found in the Pension Code or in other state statutes that
are conditioned on a person’s membership in one of the State’s
various public pension systems, including subsidized health care.
The Clause’s protection also extends to employee contribution
rates and any benefit increases added during an employee’s term
of service. Further, the Clause bars the General Assembly from
adversely changing the benefit rights of current employees and
retirees via unilateral action. And, the Clause ensures that
pensions will be paid even if a pension system defaults or is on the
verge of default. The Clause’s plain language, the framers’ original
intent, and voters’ understanding of the provision, as well as court
decisions interpreting the Clause, show these conclusions to be
correct and Sidley’s analysis erroneous.
While welching on its pension obligations is not an option for
Illinois, legitimate contract principles provide a solution to
mitigate this crisis. The Pension Clause will become a “suicide
pact” only if individual citizens are purely self-interested and
admit no obligation to the common good and pay public employees
what they are constitutionally entitled to receive.738 By adopting
737. JOHN PETER ALTGELD, THE COST OF SOMETHING FOR NOTHING 131–
32
(1904),
available
at
http://books.google.com/books?id=glImAAAAMAAJ& printsec=frontcover&dq=
the+cost+of+something+for+nothing+altgeld&source=bl&ots=A_jG7CDlwE&si
g=vcE2D2Lho1XrVYBcZda_g76pZG4&hl=en&ei=xQ1kTffeEsys8Aas_tzlCw&s
a=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBMQ6AEwAA#v=onepage
&q&f=false (stating “[e]very thoughtful person who reads this book must
realize that nothing can be had without cost, and that the accounts of the
universe are adjusted and balanced so that in some way everyone must, sooner
or later, pay for what he gets”).
738. William Atwood, Commentary, Law Says State Can’t Renege on
Pensions,
CHI.
SUN-TIMES
(Feb.
18,
2011),
http://www.suntimes.com/news/oth erviews/3876426-417/law-says-state-cantrenege-on-pensions.html?print=true (stating, “[t]his arrangement—lower
salaries for state employees in exchange for a constitutionally guaranteed
pension—allowed the state to balance its budget, allocate resources to other
state needs and provide critical public services”). Atwood further explains,
[t]oday, with the state facing severe budgetary constraints, some are
arguing that these pension obligations be discounted or ignored. That
approach, however, is simply not legally or morally tenable. For the
state to consider balancing its books by denying promises made to
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the Clause, the drafters and voters weighed, measured, and found
wanting the current claim that it is unfair or impossible for the
State to pay its pension obligations.739 Public employees have paid
their required fair share of pension costs; it is incumbent on the
State to meet its end of the bargain.

generations of public services—a pledge memorialized in the state
constitution—would be an injustice.
Id.

739. See 5 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 143, at 4516 (Del. Borek) (opposing
the Clause, Del. Borek stated, “I regret that I must vote no [on the Pension
Clause]. I objected very much to section 5 [i.e., the Clause], since I represent
six out of seven people who are not mentioned as a guarantee in the
constitution with their pension system.”); 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 53, at
2928 (Del. Borek) (stating “let’s look at it [i.e., the Clause] this way: We’re told
on this floor that one out of every seven people are [sic] public employees. By
this amendment we are doing special legislation protecting one out of seven.
What happens to the six out of seven that do not get this constitutional
guarantee? They’ve got to be resentful and vote against this.”). Despite Del.
Borek’s statements in opposition, Convention delegates adopted the Clause by
a vote of 57–36–6 on July 21, 1970, and again by a vote of 99–3–2 on August
31, 1970. 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 53, at 2933; 5 PROCEEDINGS, supra note
143, at 4516.
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Appendix A — Letter and Legal Memorandum from Edward
Gibala, Executive Director of the State Universities Retirements
System, to Delegate Henry Green (dated July 2, 1970). Papers of
Henry Green, Box 1, Folder 13 (University of Illinois, UrbanaChampaign, Illinois History and Lincoln Collection.)
Appendix B — Letter from Chairman E.B. Groen, Illinois
Public Employees Pension Law Commission, to Delegate Henry
Green (dated August 7, 1970). Papers of Henry Green, Box 1,
Folder 13 (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Illinois
History and Lincoln Collection).
Appendix C — Letter and Enclosed Statement of Rubin G.
Cohn, Member of the Illinois Public Employees Pension Laws
Commission, to Delegate Henry Green (dated August 27, 1970).
Papers of Henry Green, Box 1, Folder 13 (University of Illinois
History and Lincoln Collection).
Appendix D — Chapter 9 of the Report of the Illinois Public
Employees Pension Laws Commission to the Illinois General
Assembly (dated May 31, 1971).
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1, Folder 13 (University of Illinois History and Lincoln Collection).
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Appendix D
Chapter 9 of the Report of the Illinois Public Employees Pension
Laws Commission to the Illinois General Assembly (dated May 31,
1971).

316

The John Marshall Law Review

[48:167

2014]

Is Welching on Public Pension Promises an Option for Illinois?

317

318

The John Marshall Law Review

[48:167

2014]

Is Welching on Public Pension Promises an Option for Illinois?

319

320

The John Marshall Law Review

[48:167

2014]

Is Welching on Public Pension Promises an Option for Illinois?

321

322

The John Marshall Law Review

[48:167

2014]

Is Welching on Public Pension Promises an Option for Illinois?

323

